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In the years after Mr P W Botha became Prime Minister of South 
Africa, it became generally noticed that the military as an 
ins ti tu ti on had become a more important actor within the central 
decision-making structures. While this excited a great deal of 
contemporary comment, few appreciated that this represented not 
necessarily a formal coup, but rather the culmination of a 
meticulously planned counter-revolutionary strategy - the response of 
the Botha government to a perceived "total onslaught". 
This study traces the rise of the "total onslaught" rhetoric and 
links it to changes which occurred in the security intelligence 
apparatus. It describes the structure of the National Security 
Management System (NSMS) in detail, and it advances various arguments 
in an attempt to assess the significance of the changes which have 
occurred in the decision-making structures, as well as the efficacy 
and durability of the NSMS. 
The study concludes that, because of the dedication of its proponents 
and because of its efficiency, the NSMS may afford the regime a 
breathing-space, but that ultimately the international environment, 
and internal demographic and economic pressures are such as to make 




The 1970's were profoundly disturbing years for the Afrikaner elite 
who had effectively ruled South Africa since 1948. In 1971, the 
International Court of Jus.tice ruled, in an advisory opinion, that 
South Africa was in illegal occupation of South West Africa. Later 
that year, thousands of Ovambo workers in the territory went on 
strike, shattering the illusion that the local population was content 
with South African rule. In 1972, the Pearce Commission, appointed to 
investigate Douglas-Home's settlement plan for Rhodesia, reported 
that the plari was unacceptable to black Rhodesians, and this heralded 
an escalation in the guerilla war to the north of South Africa's 
borders. In 1973, hundreds of thousands of black workers, particu-
larly in the Durban area, went on strike, ending a period of relative 
quiescence in labour relations. Early in 1974, a coup in Portugal 
caused the downfall of Caetano and presaged the withdrawal of the 
Portuguese administrations in Angola and Mozambique placing, as one 
Air Force officer put it, a potentially hostile regime within the 
distance of a· "30 minute flight in a Boeing passenger aircraft" from 
the Reef. (1) In 1975, the gold price plummeted, according to a 
semi-official source, because of US manipulation (2) and South Africa 
was obliged to devalue the rand. Early in 1976, South African troops 
were forced, somewhat ignominiously, to withdraw from Angola, after 
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attempting to forestall an MPLA victory in the civil war. In June of 
that year black students began rioting in Soweto and riots soon broke 
out all over the country. In 1977, the black consciousness leader, 
Steve Biko, died in mysterious circumstances in detention, causing a 
world-wide outcry, and prompting the United Nations to impose a 
mandatory arms embargo against South Africa. 
International developments served to sustain the gloomy outlook : the 
resignation of President Nixon; the withdrawal of US troops from 
Vietnam, and the Viet Cong victory there; the victory of the Labour 
Party in the 1974 British general election and the election of 
Pr~sident Carter in the US (and the consequent uncompromising stand 
taken by both governments on South Africa's policy of apartheid); the 
fall of the regime of the Shah in Iran and the consequent difficulty 
in obtaining oil supplies all served to make South Africa's position 
in the world community extremely vulnerable. 
All these factors were perceived to constitute a threat to the 
se<::uri ty not only of South Africa as a whole, but to the Afrikaner 
volk in particular. (3) Indeed, the Nationalist government of South 
Africa has been almost obsessed with the issue of security since 
their accession to power in 1948, and has perceived threats to 
Afrikanerdom as equivalent to threats to South Africa, and vice 
versa. (4) But because the "threats" to South Africa, and thus to 
Afrikanerdom, had increased "both in intensity and scope", ( 5) this 
induced South African policy-makers to conclude that the country was 
the subject of a "total onslaught" masterminded by the Soviet Union. 
(6) This perception, in turn, induced a great deal of thought amongst 
the top policy-makers of the National Party about how this 
"onslaught" ought to be "countered". 
Because of the structure of Mr Vorster's cabinet, his style of 
leadership and, in later years, his bad health, the response by the 
Government to this perceived "onslaught" was at first ad hoc and 
fumbling. Immediately after the Portuguese coup, Mr Vorster made an 
attempt to develop a modus vivendi with some of the more moderate 
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African leaders, in order to defuse the escalating conflict in 
Rhodesia and to present to the world - if not to Africa - the image 
that South Africa was an African power with which to be reckoned. (7) 
This attempt was wrecked both because of the unwillingness of the 
South African government to compromise on its internal policy and 
because of its involvement in the Angolan civil war. (8) South Africa 
also embarked on a strategy of direct military involvement in Angola, 
but this was abandoned, reportedly because assistance promised by the 
US government failed to materialise. (9) Finally, the South African 
government tried, through its Department of Information, to project a 
favourable image of itself abroad by a mixture of public relations, 
covert diplomacy and bribery. This bid ended when it was discovered 
that key officials in the Department were engaging in financial 
irregular'ities and internal party politics. (10) 
The disbanding of the Department of Information also caused the 
political ruin of Dr Connie Mulder, who had been tipped to succeed Mr 
Vorster, and secured the election of Mr P W Botha as Prime Minister. 
It also coincided with a time of re-assessment by Afrikaner 
intellectuals of the policy of apartheid. The word "change", for so 
long a taboo concept in Afrikaner circles, suddenly took on a 
respectable air. (11) 
Mr Botha was not unaffected by this soul-searching. Certainly, since 
the early 1970's, his military advisors, and particularly the Chief 
of the South African Defence Force, General Magnus Malan, had been 
telling him that changes would have to be made to the political 
system in South Africa if the "total onslaught" was effectively to be 
"countered". (12) 
It was some time after Mr Botha became Prime Minister before he 
committed himself openly to change, but this can be attributed to his 
first having to clear up the Information Department scandal, 
culminating in the resignation of Mr Vorster as State President in 
June 1979. However, in July, Mr Botha made his celebrated "adapt or 
die" speech in Upington, warning Afrikaners that an adaptation of 
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traditional apartheid was a prerequisite for their continued 
existence. ( 13) He followed this up at the Natal Congress of the 
National Party in August with the exposition of his twelve-point 
plan, which included, significantly, a commitment to "remove 
unnecessary and hurtful discrimination". (14) These were followed in 
turn by a commitment to "improve" the Mixed Marriages Act and 
Section 16 of the Immorality Act, a promise to "listen" to the 
business community and so on. ( 15) All these statements of intent 
created the impression that fundamental change was, if not imminent, 
then at least on the agenda of Mr Botha's new administration. 
Most of these statements promised changes in style and emphasis, and 
could, to some ex~ent, be said to reflect the differences between the 
temperament and personality of Mr Botha and that of his predecessor. 
(16) To the more gullible, the statements presaged greater things to 
come; to those more versed in the realities of Afrikaner politics, 
the subsequent retreat and vacillation of Mr Botha in the light of a 
suddenly powerful right wing came as a saddening, if not wholly 
unpredictable, development. 
However, it was precisely Mr Botha's understanding of these politics 
that caused changes to the very decision-making structures - changes 
which have been more substantive, more significant and more enduring. 
Although he is by nature haughty, disdainful and aggressive, Mr Botha 
understood perfectly the complex relationship between the grassroots 
of his party and its leadership; between the congresses, which in 
terms of the National Party constitution are vested with the 
~olicy-making function (17) and the Members of Parliament and 
Cabinet, who are supposed to implement that policy. (To be sure, Mr 
Vor~ter was also haughty, but consulted widely before making 
decisions, and frequently did nothing rather than antagonise a 
significant section of the Party). (18) 
Mr Botha realised, too, that for thirty years, the rank and file of 
the Party had been fed a diet of racial prejudice with the result 
that many were inculcated with the belief that the grand apartheid 
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system was both morally defensible and likely to endure indefinitely., 
Whatever soul-searching might be going on amongst the elite had not 
pe~meated, and was not likely to permeate, through to the rank and 
file. To make matters worse, some of the members of the Party opposed 
to change were to be found in his caucus and even the Cabinet. (19) 
Mr Botha realised therefore that if change was to take place, it 
would have to be effected almost by steal th, at the same time as 
giving the congresses of the Party the illusion that they still 
controlled the policy-making function. In order to realise this goal, 
Mr Botha substantially altered the top decision-making structure of 
government, and mirroring this, rationalised the structure and 
organisation of the bureaucracy. Thus Spicer notes that -
"a quiet revolution in the structures, procedure and 
personnel of party, government and bureaucracy was the 
means used by the Prime Minister to consolidate his 
position and prepare for change." (20) 
An understanding of organisational politics was, of course, something 
for which Mr Botha's political experience had pre-eminently prepared 
him. He had started his political career in the 1940's as a National 
Party organiser and had later become head of the most tightly-knit 
and efficient political machine in the country - the National Party 
of the Cape. He understood that pure organisation in politics can 
sometimes overcome problems as effectively as charm, charisma and 
debating prowess. Spicer concludes that -
"Beyond its technical impressiveness, revealing Mr 
Botha' s background as a long-time and skilled party 
organiser, this court revolution reflects his determi-
nation that change should be tightly managed and 
controlled through centralised policy-making and a 
streamlined administration." (21) 
Nowhere have these organisational changes been more significant than 
in the area of security decision-making. The far-reaching changes 
made by the new Prime Minister in this area were attributable to 
three interrelated factors. The first was Mr Botha's long association 
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with the Defence Force as Minister of Defence from 1966 until 1980. 
This meant that Mr Botha was constantly briefed on the security risk 
which South Africa faced - or at least the Directorate of Military 
Intelligence's perception of it - and tended to view policy problems 
from a security perspective, so much so that Seiler argues that Mr 
Botha has a "preoccupation with ·defence capabilities." ( 22) 
Secondly; as has been mentioned, Mr Botha was profoundly influenced 
by General Malan, who, according to one source, has "tutored" Mr 
Botha in military theory -
"Malan used to prepare reading lists for Botha, who 
would go to t.he library, pick up an armful of volumes 
on military history, read them and return for the next 
batch." ( 23) 
General Malan has, in turn, been a student of revolutionary warfare. 
He h~s publicly maintained that the revolutionary (and, by implica-
tion, the counter-revolutionary) war is "a war through the hearts and 
minds of the people". The counter-insurgency war, he argued, was only · 
20% military and 80% "on the social, political and economic level". 
( 24) Thus for General Malan, .and for Mr Botha, the issues of security 
and social, political and economic change were inextricably con-
nected. 
Thirdly, as Mr Botha realised that change - so necessary in order to 
meet the security challenge - was likely to be painful and unpopular 
amongst wh'i tes, and thus politically inexpedient for his administra-
tion (25) it would be expedient if this change took place, as far as 
possible, in secret. The cloud of secrecy which surrounded the 
security intelligence apparatus, in terms of the old Official Secrets 
Act (now the Protection of Information Act) and Section 118 of the 
Defence Act, made this apparatus ideal for bringing about change by 
stealth. During his period of office as Minister of Defence, Mr Botha 
had already transformed the Defence Force in this way - for the first 
time in South Africa's history, black troops were armed, blacks were 
tommissioned and some units integrated (the latter measure being at 
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least arguably a contravention of the Reservation of Separate 
Amenities Act and the Group Areas Act, two of apartheid's corner-
stones) . ( 26) 
Aside from Mr Botha' s own predilection to employ the security 
intelligence apparatus as an agent Of change I this Option held two 
other advantages. As Professor Carter has noted, Mr Botha was "used 
to working with the Army and to making, and having precise 
determinations carried out". (27) 
When he became Prime Minister, he sought to change the top 
decision-making structures to make this style of leadership over the 
entire administration possible. Secondly, both as a result. of his 
"tutoring" by General Malan, and of his perception of the very 
visible deterioration of events in Iran, there can be no doubt that 
Mr Botha was familiar with the concept of a revolution of rising 
expectations that so often accompanies periods of rapid social, 
political and economic change, and with the necessity of such change 
being, to use Spicer' s phrase, "tightly managed". His preoccupation 
with the theme of "orderly" change, prevalent in his speeches and 
those of his military advisors, bears testimony to this. The security 
forces were the only agents which could ensure that change would take 
place in an orderly manner. 
This argument, of course, presuppqses that the Prime Minister was 
firmly in control of Party and Government and that the changes were 
made on his initiative. Some sources, particularly the sensational 
press, dispute this, arguing that it was the Defence Force its elf 
that was in control. Thus one account reads -
"The generals now form the most powerful source of 
inspiration for Cabinet-level decisions ... The Defence 
Force plays a prominent role in most areas of policy." 
(28) 
Gutteridge, however, persuasively discounts this argument -
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"There has even been the suggestion that in the 
aftermath of the Muldergate affair, the commanders of 
the armed forces have to all intents and purposes 
seized power in the fields of foreign policy and 
defence and are profoundly influencing domestic devel-
opments on the basis of a new concept of security. To 
emphasise the role of military personnel in this way is 
to under-estimate the importance of Mr P W Botha's 
t.welve years as Minister of Defence before he became 
Prime Minister. His experience in the policy-making 
field, is therefore, exceptional for a politician and 
.far greater than any of the generals who are now 
supposed to be so influential." (29) 
Neither of these two views seems adequately to reflect what has 
actually happened. It is obviously true that Mr Botha is still "in 
charge", but it is equally true that "the generals" are more 
influential than they were when Mr Vorster was Prime Minister. What 
has qccurred is that Mr Botha, perhaps at the insistence of his 
military advisors, has accepted that a "total national strategy" has 
to be created in order to meet the "total onslaught". This "total 
national strategy" has an internal and a sub-regional dimension; one 
deals with re-organising the state to meet an internal revolutionary 
ch.allenge to the status quo, while a distinct but complementary 
strategy is directed towards neutralising the challenges posed by the 
front-line states and the challenge they, or their guests, the ANC, 
pose from without. The acceptance of the "total national strategy" 
has had two important effects - it has changed the organisational 
structures, and it has changed the way in which policy, particularly 
security policy, is made. 
The organisational changes which Mr Botha has made to the security 
pol icy-making apparatus _have given prominence to certain key SADF 
members, and the changes to the method of policy-making have given 
these members more influence in policy determination. This influence 
has been most dramatic in the style of sub-regional foreign policy, 
but because the "total onslaught" is perceived to have an internal 
dimension, so, too has the influence of the SADF grown in the 
internal management of the "total strategy" (30), thereby gtving "the 
generals" an internal policy-making competence which goes beyond what 
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is accepted in Western societies as legitimate. 
These developments have not gone unnoticed by political scientists 
and observers of the political process in South Africa. Al though 
small, this school of writers is highly perceptive and articulate. 
The most complete study of the' developments has been undertaken by Dr 
Philip Frankel, whose major contribution to the debate is his 
Pretoria's Praetorians, published in 1984. (31) 
Dr Frankel has very ambitiously tackled the whole subject of civil-
mili tary relations in South Africa, a topic which, as he says, is 
"essentially unexplored" (p.xi), despite its cardinality to under-
standing the nature of the modern South African state. He fills this 
gap admirably. He traces the development of the Union Defence Force 
and later th~ SADF, and analyses its place within the South African 
body-politic. He argues that the SADF has been subjected to two 
im~ortant traditions, firstly, the British tradition, emphasising the 
liberal view that a c'lear distinction needs to be kept between the 
"professional" soldiers who are nominally neutral, and the "amateur" 
political controllers of such soldiers, and secondly, the Boer 
tradition, emphasising the ethos of a citizen army whose role 
v~s-a-vis the state is essentially synonymous, as it is a microcosm 
of the state. Over time, but especially since 1960, South African 
society has become increasingly militarised, and this has served to 
tip the scales in favour of the Boer tradition. In turn, this has led 
to a more easy absorption of the military chiefs into the top 
decision-making structures. 
He has been correct too, in isolating the importance of the total 
strategy idea, and the undoubted influence which the idea has had on 
the SADF and on Mr Botha himself. He points to the many consequences 
of the infusion of the idea in ~he central decision-making 
structures, on the one hand, and in the SADF itself, on the other. 
Alone amongst the other commentators he has realised that many 
seemingly unconnected developments, for example, the formation and 
continued importance of Armscor, and the subsequent co-option of many 
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of the captains of South African industry with.in the "total defence 
effort", must be seen within the context of the total strategy, and 
as part, therefore, of a coherent whole. Unlike Professor Grundy, he 
has also based this proposition on a series of documented occur-
rences; he has shied away from speculative and exploratory hypotheses 
and contained himself within the arena of what is known. 
Similarly, he has correctly assumed that the recruitment of minority 
groups, particularly the coloureds and Indians into the SADF, is a 
crucial and necessary part of the total strategy, and that the very 
militarisation of South African society facilitates the adoption of 
the idea of a total strategy, even across what would otherwise be 
antagonistic ideological barriers. This serves to allow the apartheid 
system to become updated and made more efficient, even while becoming 
peripherally liberalised. 
Dr Frankel's most important insight is that, despite indications to 
the contrary in sensational accounts, the military are only as 
effective as the National Party politicians allow them to be, largely 
because of the improbability of the SADF throwing in its lot with an 
attempt to overthrow the apartheid state. In the absence of their 
ability to "threaten· unfaithfulness" the SADF, and the bureaucratic 
machinery which it has spawned in operationalising the concept of a 
total strategy, can do ii ttle more than facilitate and manage the 
"violent evolution" in which South Africa, with the seeming approval 
of the politicians, is in any event engaged. Thus, while from a 
strictly sociological point of view, the total strategy has 
undermined the traditional "liberal" model of civil-military rela-
tions - and many view this as a sinister development - the rise of 
the military should not be seen as presaging the possibility of a 
junta in South Africa. 
The book is, as I have said, admirable, and, with his other 
contributions to this topic (32), Dr Frankel has served to impress 
upon us the necessity of taking the military seriously in any serious 
analysis of the South African state. Yet his perspective in tackling 
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this topic is essentially sociological : the structural analysis of 
the organs of government is, with one or two exceptions, absent, and 
the relationship between key political ·actors is dealt with only 
scantily. He does not, for example, deal with the precise structure 
of the National Security Management System, nor does he explore the 
relations between the various elements of this system, except on 
central government level, and even then with no great exactitude. 
( 33) It may be that, at the time of his research, he was denied 
access to credible sources of information, or alternatively, he may 
have felt constrained to suppress certain information to ensure that 
this book did not fall foul of the legislation governing official 
information. Whatever the reason, this absence of detail detracts 
from his otherwise complete account. 
It is also surprising that, despite his comprehensive treatment of 
the structure of the SADF in historical perspective, he did not deal 
with the security intelligence apparatus, and the conflicts which the 
components of this area of state activity have experienced over time. 
Although he is aware that these various bodies exist, he has chosen 
to describe the present composite and co-ordinated central structure 
without attributing sufficient weight to the interaction of these 
bodies over time, nor indeed, to the fact that one of the most 
important reasons for the present centralisation is precisely the 
lack of co-ordination which persisted for so long within the security 
intelligence family. (34) 
What is also surprising is Frankel's lack of emphasis on any role 
which the conflict of key political actors has played in the creation 
of the security intelligence framework which now exists. Mr Vorster's 
relationship with General van den Bergh was a crucial determinant in 
security intelligence decision-making prior to Mr Botha's administra-
tion, just as Mr Botha' s relationship with General Malan is to the 
present situation. Dr Frankel remarks, almost in passing, that "the 
political in-fighting surrounding the collapse of the Vorster 
government in the wake of the so-called 'Information Scandal'" was 
undoubtedly important, but says that this "is still a matter for 
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speculation".· (35) I would argue that the nature of the present 
security intelligence arrangements was in very large measure the 
result of a deliberate strategy to avoid a repetition of such 
political in-fighting by a master of state organisation - P W Botha. 
The "in-fighting" was the result of differing interpretations both of 
the "total onslaught" and of the methods needed to "counter" such an 
onslaught. The victory of Mr Botha in this political battle meant 
that a particular type of security intelligence structure emerged; 
had Dr Mulder won, there are strong grounds for assuming that very 
different structures would have emerged, affecting the entire scope 
of civil-military relationships and certainly, the centrality of the 
SADF in the total political power equation. It is evident from the 
Erasmus Commission Reports, for example, that General van den Bergh 
would have occupied a central position in Dr Mulder's structures; as 
it was, he was summarily removed from his position as Security 
Advisor to the Prime Minister and even had his passport confiscated. 
Another odd feature of Dr Frankel's analysis - and this has also been 
noticed by Dr Seegers ( 36) - is that he sees a clear distinction 
between a pre-1960 and a post-1960 view on civil-military relation-
ships. As Dr Seegers has noted, and I will try to demonstrate, the 
situation is far too complex to attempt to place an exact date on the 
rise of the military. As with any other bureaucracy, there was a 
measure of ebb and flow in the influence of the constituent elements 
of the South African bureaucracy since Union itself. If a date has to 
be placed on the current resurgence in the influence of the SADF, it 
is surely the date on which Mr Botha became Minister of Defence. It 
is probably the case, though, that subsequent to becoming Prime 
Minister and having to reconcile the demands of a large bureaucracy, 
the influence of the military started to decline. Subsequent study 
will have to determine whether this postulation is correct. 
If it is true that Dr Frankel's study went much wider than the 
specific question of the security intelligence decision-making 
structures, the same cannot be said of Professor Grundy's two early 
studies, The Rise of the South African Security Establishment ( 37) 
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and "South Africa's Domestic Strategy" ( 38), which specifically 
concerned themselves with this topic. Grundy examines the various 
institutional organs of security intelligence in some detail, both in 
historical and contemporary context, and correctly argues that 
personalities had a great deal to do with the relative importance of 
these organs over time. 
Grundy also highlights the militarisation of white society and quotes 
specific examples of how this has facilitated the growth of the SADF 
as a power in domestic politics, even to the extent of having become 
involved in partisan politics. Professor Grundy provides valuable 
insights concerning the role which the SADF has played in regional 
politics and in South Africa's relationships with the front-line 
states, and.specifically in the campaign of destabilisation of these 
states. Like Dr Frankel, Professor Grundy is also sceptical of the 
ability of the SADF top structure to convert itself into a political 
junta, and correctly exposes the realities of South African politics, 
that without a secure domestic political base, the generals are no 
more than influential advisors to the politicians. To be sure, their 
influence has become more extensive than formerly, but this can be 
attributed mainly to their close personal relationship with the head 
of state. Their influence can accordingly be expected to decline were 
the head of state to be replaced. 
Professor Grundy's paper suffers from two major weaknesses. First, 
like Dr Frankel, he has concerned himself principally with the 
organisational changes which have occurred on the central government 
level. He deals, therefore, at length, with the structure of the 
State Security Council, the Working Committee, the Secretariat of the 
State Security Council and with the Interdepartmental Committees. He 
does not, however, enlighten ts as to the exact interaction between 
these elements, nor can he tell us which of the elements is the most 
important in the application of the total strategy idea. A major 
omission is any mention of the Joint Management Centres, which are 
crucial from the perspective of day-to-day management of "countering" 
the total onslaugpt. Indeed, while he correctly identifies the 
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domestic element of the total strategy (for example, in the campaign 
'-
of selective disinformation), he fails to isolate the agency 
responsible for this. Similarly, while he correctly argues that the 
Cabinet is unlikely to reject recommendations of the State Security 
Council because of the political and administrative prestige which 
its members possess (39), it appears that this alone constitutes his 
case for the SSC's centrality. Given the workload of members of the 
SSC, it seems equally unlikely that they have any more time 
dispassionately to consider the recommendations emanating from the 
Working Committee, or from Interdepartmental Committees, than the 
Cabinet has similarly to consider SSC resolutions. No-one doubts the 
importance of the Security Management System in the decision-making 
process, but this System needs to be seen in its entirety, and the 
relative importance of each of its components needs correctly to be 
identified. 
Secondly, and again we a.re indebted to Dr Seegers for highlighting 
this general weakness in published material on the Security 
Management System, Professor Grundy's study does not really ever rise 
above the level of informed journalism. Dr Seegers tellingly remarks 
that "the result is that recent scholarship has developed a serious 
credibility problem we simply do not know how much of the 
scholarship is based on demonstrable facts and reasonable deductions 
and how much is mere contrivance" ( 40), and this critic ism is 
particularly apposite in Grundy's study. In fairness, Grundy's was 
the first comprehensive study of its kind, and ·he may have had to 
rely on rumours and tendencies, rather than hard facts. Further, he 
himself admits that his examples "do not represent a complete picture 
of defence involvement in matters not entirely defensive or strategic 
in nature", but rather serve to "illustrate some of the broad 
observations" (41). Nonetheless, when he adduces, as evidence of his 
proposition that the SADF "contributed to, if not imposed, the 
decision not to turn District Six in Cape Town back into a coloured 
group area", and then says that "it has not been possible to confirm 
the story", one is entitled to look askance at the original 
statement. (42) In other places, he says that there "appears to be an 
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uncanny confluence of strategic and economic thinking" (43), that it 
is "difficult" to establish the extent to which government and SADF 
thinking overlap (44), that "it would appear ·that the homelands 
polic~ has a strategic element" (45) and so on. There is a weal th of 
interesting and even illuminating statements made in Grundy's work, 
but these statements are based, to use Seeger' s phrase, "on 
questionable (though perhaps suggestive) evidence". (46) The study as 
a whole suffers as a result of this. 
Many (though not all) of these weaknesses were avoided in Grundy's 
second, and more comprehensive treatment of the subject, The 
Militarisation of South African Poli tics. (47) As its title implies, 
this book seeks to locate the rise of the South African security 
establishment within the wider context of the developments in South 
African politics. 
In his study, Professor Grundy examines the phenomenon of the total 
onslaught and traces the use to which it has been put, chiefly as a 
means of persuading whites generally and the political establishment 
in particular that a restructuring of the central government 
decision-making structures was vital to ensure continued white 
domination. It has, as other commentators have noted, also been used 
as a mechanism to effect a considerable militarisation of South 
African society, even while the actual numbers (and percentage of the 
population) of the SADF remain small. I 
Grundy als_o treats, at some length, the changes which have occurred 
in the central decision-making structures and isolates the reasons 
for the rise of the military within these structures. Both because 
the military suit Mr Botha' s style of leadership and because there 
has been a "cross-fertilisation process" between Mr Botha and the top 
leadership of the SADF, the military now play an "enlarged" role in 
decision-making. Perceptively, Professor Grundy has predicted a 
longer-term diminution of SADF influence in this role, as Mr Botha 
increasingly searches for talent outside his former bailiwick. At the 







advice on coercion and on the formulation and execution of policy. 
This leads Grundy to conclude that while the influence of the 
military is undoubtedly important, their influence is more particu-
larly a technical, rather than political, one. 
He also deals in detail with the State Security Council 
1 
and the 
effect that this has had on the style of government decision-making. 
While the institution of the SSC has catapulted top SADF officers 
into very crucial forums, it has also had the same effect on top 
officials in other departments. However, both because they are 
experts on security management in the context of an accepted "total 
onslaught" and because of their demonstrated personal loyalty to Mr 
Botha, these senior military officers have a more central role in the 
SSC. Given the decline of other ins ti tut ions formerly politic ally 
powerful in South Africa, such as the National Party caucus and 
Parliament, as well as the rationalisation of the Cabinet Committee 
Structure, the SSC; and by implication its key advisors, the 
military, are therefore very much more powerful than ever before. 
This has enabled the SADF to make policy imputs - even if they are 
technical in nature - on a wide variety of security-related issues. 
Furthermore, because of the status of the SSC, and because of the 
very fact that decisions of the Council are backed up by expert 
technical advice, decisions of the SSC are accepted by the Cabinet 
almost as a formality. 
As was the case in his previous study, Professor Grundy leaves 'other 
elements of ,the NSMS, such as the Joint Management Centres, 
essentially unexplored. While he acknowledges their existence, and 
indeed importance, he fails to describe or analyse their role in the 
formulation of total strategy and in its implementation. Instead, he 
attempts to show ·how the very militarisation of white society has 
facilitated the supremacy of the military in civilian politics. While 
this is undoubtedly true, an examination of the penetration of the 
local structures of the NSMS into local and regional government would 
have been far 'more convincing. Even in his discussion of militarisa-
tion, he omits to examine the system of conscription, surely one of 
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the most powerful socialising factors in the white group. 
Professor Grundy concludes, and extends his earlier work, by 
examining the role of the Defence Force in relation to the homelands 
and to South Africa's position in the sub-region. He suggests that 
the military is taking a far more active part in the formulation of 
foreign policy as well. While destabilisation, as an accepted policy, 
is evidence of a declining role for the Department of Foreign Affairs 
vis-a-vis the SADF, Grundy is unable to determine a coherent pattern 
to acts of destahilisation. This seems to derive from the fact that 
he fai1s, in his analysis, to delineate clear foreign pol icy 
objectives in the sub-region. To be sure, there are departmental 
conflicts, but the basic foreign pol icy objectives are discernible, 
and the activities of both the Department of Foreign Affairs and 
those of the SADF are directed to the same ends, precisely by the 
institution of the NSMS. 
His conclusions about the role of the SADF in civil government are 
that while it occupies a central position in the new decision-making 
structures brought about by Mr Botha' s "managerial revolution", its 
role in the future will continue to be circumscribed. The SADF is 
unable, he argues, to act independently, both because of a political 
tradition which militates against such a step and also, more 
practically, because the top management of the SADF shares the 
objectives of the National Party. Grundy is at pains to point out 
that the "defence family" does not always get its own way, nor is it 
internally homogeneous, and that its influence. may decline with a 
change in the political leadership of the National Party. Its 
apparent success so far can be attributed to the fact that, by and 
large, its top structures share the belief in reform while 
simultaneously retaining white domination. 
Professor Grundy's new study fleshes out the bare bones of his 
earlier monogfaph, and the result is a more polished product. Yet key 
questions remain unanswered. Chief amongst these is the extent to 
which the military will voluntarily abdicate from positions of power 
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and influence. It appears dubious enough whether having established 
themselves as advisors extraordinary to the Government, the top 
leadership of the SADF will ~oluntarily divest themselves of such 
influence, even under another Nationalist leader, let alone one 
committed to radical restructuring o.f the polity. Besides, as Grundy 
himself has demonstrated, the ethos of militarisation has too firmly 
been established, and the structures too securely embedded, for the 
military to collapse like "a' house of cards", his description of the 
demise of BOSS after the fall of Vorster. ( 48) This is obviously an 
area for further study. 
Many questions also remain unanswered in the short article by 
Geldenhuys and Kotze, "Aspects of Political Decision-Making in South 
Africa". ( 49) Al though the authors provide a disclaimer by way of 
their introduction, and say that their study "intends achieving 
nothing more than paving the way for further research" ( 50) , the 
article is extremely thin on hard evidence, nor has such evidence as 
is readily available, been properly exploited. 
Geldenhuys and Kotze argue that the best way to identify the locus of 
power in a decision-ma.king system is not by constitutional analysis, 
but by institutional or structural analysis. They proceed to embark 
on such an analysis of the cent~al decision-making structures with 
specific reference to the place of the State Security Council, and 
the other components of the Security Management System, within these 
structures. They argue that because of a number of factors, the State 
·.Security Council can be regarded as the "first amongst equals" of the 
five (and later four) Cabinet Committees set up when Mr Botha became 
Prime Minister. Among these reasons is the fact that the supporting 
bodies of the SSC are far more powerful than is the case with the 
other Cabinet Committees, and that the Secretariat of the SSC is a 
homogeneous and efficient integrated body. 
It is in describing the role of these supporting bodies that 
Geldenhuys and Kotze 's study is most valuable : they alone seem to 
have recognized that the SSC sits at the pinnacle of an awesome { 
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structure consisting of all the security intelligence agencies in 
South Africa, and both because of its access to co-ordinated 
intelligence, and to the Secretariat and the executive intelligence-
gathering bodies, it is extremely powerful. If the SSC is the primus 
inter pares of the Cabinet Committees, then the Secretariat is the \ 
primus ,inter pares of the officials with ready access to the members 
of the Cabinet. 
These authors have also correctly described the role and importance 
of the Joint Management Centres, which form the local eyes and ears!' 
of the Security Management System, and which act as the agents of the 
SSC in implementing the total strategy in domestic and in regional 
matters. But while they have seen the importance of these bodies, 
they have not gone into the structure of the Joint Management 
Centres, nor their modus operandi. We are also left in the dark as to 
the relationship between the JMC 's and the rest of the Security 
Management System. Who makes decisions and who implements those 
decisions? What role do the Interdepartmental Committees play in the 
implementation of total strategies by such JMC's? Because the authors 
are hesitant to provide ·examples of the work of the JMC' s, it is 
difficult to know whether their description would stand up to 
rigorous scrutiny. 
In part this is because their methodology is wrong. They have argued 
that structural analysis is. the correct way to approach a study of 
the Security Management System. They are undoubtedly right, but only 
up to a point. In order to understand the interaction between the 
various elements of the System and to appreciate the relationship 
between each of them, one needs to involve oneself in process 
analysis. They have correctly said that this involves the case study, 
but they have rejected this approach without giving reasons for doing 
so. Had they adopted this approach they themselves would have been 
able authoritatively to answer the various questions they have posed 
to give direction to future research. To focus on structures alone is 
a sterile approach; it gives one a detailed photograph, but is not 
able to do an action replay by which we may know where the actors 
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have come from and where they are likely to go from there. 
This criticism is all the more applicable to the contribution of Dr 
Hough. In his "Nasionale Veiligheid, Strategie en Strategiese 
Beplanning" ( 51) he outlines the various elements of the Security 
Management System drawing heavily and uncritically from official 
publications and, predictably, from the works of Beaufre and 
Liddel-Hart. 
He accepts, seemingly without question, that the formulation of 
~ 
national security policy consists of a logical extrapolation of the~ 
national interest, coupled with specific national objectives and ~ 
specific national policy di rec ti ves. This is what the 1977 Defence 
White paper would have us believe, and this makes the formulation of 
national security policy seem inoffensive and non-partisan. The 
problem is that this methodology was developed for societies in which 
basic consensus about national security exists. This presupposes that 
there is consensus about the, political system within which such 
national interests are formulated and expressed. In South Africa this 
basic consensus does not exist, and thus the execution of national 
security policy is inevitably controversial. If his interpretation is 
correct, the Security Management System would merely be a means of 
~mplementing National Party policy, but it is surely more subtle and 
far-reaching than that. 
Dr Hough's article \does, however, throw important light on the 
subject of national security policy. Perhaps because he has stuck 
closely to official sources, he has emphasised the difference between\ 
total strategy on the one hand, and departmental strategies on the 
other. This distinction is crucial to the understanding of the role 
of the Interdepartmental Committees, and the relationship which these 
committees have with the State Security Council itself. He has also I 
usefully provided examples (albeit only in terms of military 
strategy) of how joint strategies are arrived at, and by these 
examples we are able to infer the nature and scope of others. (52) He 
has also been careful to separate the policy formulation function 
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from the execution function, something that other commentators have 
glossed over. This prevents him from assuming that the State Security 
Council is all-powerful and sinister. The ability of the SSC to 
formulate total strategy is dependent on the ability of the executive 
departments to carry these out, and here one 
which plague other bureaucracies the world 
deals with problems 
over, such as the 
unwillingness of civil servants to deviate from standard operational 
procedures. 
If Dr Hough's article seemed somewhat uncritical, Professor Roherty's 
contribution (53) is characterised by a positively slavish adherence 
to what he has been told and what he has read in official 
publications. It apparently escapes him that "political generals" (a 
genre he says does not exist in South Africa) have a vested interest 
in telling people that they are not "political". So Professor Roherty 
treats one to a series of folksy anecdotes about the maps in General 
van der Westhuizen's office and General van Deventer's informal view 
of his masters, without critically examining the value (or indeed 
truth) of what he was told. It was not that he did not have other 
sources to consult which might have induced a more sober perspective; 
. on the contrary, he devotes considerable space to precisely the type 
of vituperous attacks he has accused (quite wrongly, as it happens) 
other scholars of making on the "apolitical generals", on the work of 
these scholars. At best, his contribution was based on naive 
gullibility; his article does not advance the debate one iota. 
Roherty 's problem is that he seems unable to steer a middle course 
between the official and semi-official accounts (which have a patent 
tendency to minimise the political role of the "generals") and 
another school of authors who impute to the SADF a role far b~yond 
its actual capabilities. Michael Evans (54) appears to belong to the 
latter school, and seems to portray the SADF as an all-powerful 
amalgam of official and private sector knowledge and political clout, 
bent on the wholescale oppression of the people of Namibia and on the 
rigorous application of the policy of apartheid. Not that Evans is 
necessarily wrong. It is simply that if one wishes to avoid appearing 
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conspiratorial, one owes it to readers who are not familiar with 
one's basic tenets to develop these theses more fully than Evans was 
able to do in six brief pages. Even if one accepts that this was a 
very early work (and therefore commendable in terms of the importance 
of what he was revealing), one cannot but accuse it of being a rather 
superficial treatment of what are very complex relationships. 
Much the same criticism can be levelled at Robert Jaster. Professor 
Jaster is a foremost scholar in the field of civil-military relations 
and the influence of the military on political decision-making. 
Despite this, his contribution to the debate on this topic - "South 
African Defence Strategy and the Growing Influence.of the Military" -
is somewhat superficial, perhaps because he covers so much ground in 
so short an article. (55) 
Professor Jaster traces the strategic imperatives which have governed 
South African policy-making (particularly in the area of foreign 
policy) since the 1948 election. He correctly concludes that the 
coup d'etat in Portugal in 1974 heralded a fundamental shift in this ( 
policy and allowed "the military" to become more integrally involved 
in public policy-making than had hitherto been possible. This was 
inter alia because South Africa's policy-makers prepared for a 
"worst-case contingency" (56), and the implicit or explicit accep-
tance of this scenario demanded the inclusion of the military in 
decision-making to counteract the contingency. 
Jaster also correctly postulates that the military advisors.that have 
become powerful 'require not only military action but also political 
reform, and alone amongst the commentators, recognises that the 
relationship between the military and Mr Botha is symbiotic - the 
military requiring Mr Botha to carry through his political "reform 
programme", while Mr Botha requires the military to ensure him the 
stability necessary for rapid political, social and economic reform. 
Indeed, Jaster goes further : he suggests that the military might 
seriously consider a coup -
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"with or without Botha, in which a military dictator-
ship would take the necessary steps to ram through a 
series of reform measures over the stubborn opposition 
of right-wing whites": (57) 
This speculation about the role of the military is, however, 
journalistic and flies in the face of hard realities. The SADF is 
only 12% permanent force - and the major instruments of coercion (the 
conventional forces) lie foursquare in citizen force commanders' 
hands. While it is true that socialisation and methods of selection 
of citizen force commanders are such that they do not rock the boat, 
it is also true that such commanders are half-soldiers, half-
civilians, and do not easily believe that the military are the 
custodians of all political virtue. Besides, the very business of 
mounting a coup would involve a fearful amount of quite explicit 
preparatory action (e.g. dispatching call-up instructions, drawing 
equipment, booking troop-trains, etc. ) which would inevitably draw 
attention to what was occurring. A coup, a military dictatorship, 
depends for its success on a large number of standing troops, and 
that is simply not available to the South African military 
commanders. In short, the "military" do not constitute an internally 
homogeneous group, and are not therefore a unit of sociological 
analysis. 
However, this does not contradict the statement that a de facto coup 
has not already taken place in South Africa, if "coup" is the right 
word for it. South Africa's politicians have voluntarily surrendered 
their responsibility over security intelligence management to an 
~lite ~ithin the security forces. Professor Jaster suggests - again 
correctly, if tautologically - that the influence of "the military" 
has increased markedly under Mr Botha's administration. Perceptively, 
I 
he argues that, at the moment, this influence is only as powerful as 
Mr Botha allows it to be, but that, faced with increasingly complex 
military and military/technical questions connected to Afrikaner 
\ 
survival, any subsequent administration would find it impossible to 
ignore the military imputs to policy-making. Thus, what has occurred 
is at once less dram·atic yet more enduring than he would have (in 
other parts o~ his work) us believe : a creeping .coup by consent; a 
/ 
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steadily improving institutional position commanding a vast range of 
technical information without which the amateur politicians cannot 
survive. 
His penchant for the dramatic has led Professor Jaster to ignore the 
vital r?le played by key professionals in the SADF in setting up the 
National Security Management System. Indeed, his grasp of the system 
as q whole seems limited - he identifies only two elements (the State 
Security System and the Interdepartmental Committees) of it ( 58) -
and this has perhaps led him to underestimate the importance of other 
key institutional actors in the formulation and execution of total 
strategy. 
We remarked that Profes.sor Grundy's study fell short of providing a 
clear pattern of sub-regional foreign policy in the Total National 
Strategy era. This gap has more than adequately been filled by 
Professor Price's "Pretoria's Southern African Strategy". ( 59) Price 
is careful to demonstrate that what lies behind South African foreign 
policy is the striving towards international acquiescence of white 
minority rule. Threats to this come, he argues, principally from 
three potential sources - the liberation movements, the threat of 
conventional war and the threat of international economic pressure. 
As part of its total national strategy, the South African policy-
making elite has delineated short, medium and long term security 
goals, and has devised a specific set of policies designed to realise 
these goals. Some of these policies may have a "spill-over" effect, 
making the achievement of other (lesser or incidental) goals more 
attainable. 
Price suggests that the collapse of the cordon sanitaire which the 
Portuguese colonies and Rhodesia had constituted for South Africa, 
' 
made it necessary to construct an "alternative means of protecting 
(South Africa) from the potential politico-military threat from the 
north" ( 60). Therefore, as a long term strategy, it has become 
necessary to create a "Constellation of Southern African States" ·in 
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which arrangement South Africa will be the lynch-pin. This long term 
strategy has at ieast four advantages. First, it would lock all South 
Africa's potential enemies into a state of economic subjugation which 
would severely limit those enemies' freedom of movement. Secondly, it 
would afford a degree of international recognition to South Africa's 
"independent" homelands; in that formally independent and interna-
tionally recognised sovereign states would have to negotiate with 
such independ~nt home~ands as equal partners. Thirdly, the fact that 
Southern African states were tied into South African patronage would 
split the OAU, and make the dream of an all-African army of 
liberation impossible to realise. Finally, the creation of the 
Constellation would allow for Western rapprochement with South 
Africa, both because ·of its status as a regional Leviathan and 
because the African bloc would be split on what the West should do. 
The inducements to becoming part of the Constellation are, according 
to Price, somewhat vague at this stage, but the disincentive for 
remaining without the Constellation is the possibility of being 
destabilised. The primary purpose of destabilisation is the collapse 
of ."radical" anti-South African regimes in the sub-continent. But the 
great advantage of the destabilisation campaign is that it does not 
even have to be wholly successful. If it causes impoverished 
developing countries to divert scarce foreign exchange to counteract 
such a campaign, this might cause sufficient popular dissatisfaction 
as to lead to the collapse of "radical" regimes, as it were, 
"naturally". 
However, as Professor Price is quick to point out, destabilisation is 
a costly and time-consuming tacti_c, whose outcome is by no means able 
to be guaranteed. It is therefore essential to have a fall-back, 
medium term strategy. This strategy seeks to neutralise the 
acti vi t.ies of hostile ' neighbours by a combination of "forward 
defence" and economic leverage. "Forward defence" (or, more commonly, 
"pre-emptive strikes") seeks both to inflict maximum damage on the 
facilities of anti-government guerilla forces and to lower the 
credibility of the country hosting these forces. Economic leverage is 
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derived from the fact that the Southern African economy is .)1ighly 
integrated, and dependent on the economic muscle of its southernmost 
member. Naturally, destabilisation plays an important role in this 
strategy, promoting transport dependency and undermining development 
ventures initiated by the Southern African Development Co-ordinating 
Conference (SADCC). 
Price argues convincingly that the seemingly ironical short term goal 
of South African regional policy is precisely to retain Russian/Cuban 
troop presences within the sub-region. He correctly suggests that 
South Africa's strategic value to the West in itself is marginal, but 
what increases South Africa's strategic importance.is the perception 
that the country is under direct military threat from the Soviet 
Union. 
Professor Price's piece has been invaluable in determining (as he 
puts it) "the inner logic" of South African regional pol icy. He 
carefully avoids commenting on its likely success, except to point 
out that the costs of a policy of destabilisation succeeding -
riamely, maintaining the client state in power - would be prohibitive. 
But he, too, avoids commenting on the way in which this pol icy has 
been arrived at. Clearly, if his interpretation is correct, it is a 
policy which will have been sponsored by the hawks within the South 
African decision-making apparatus, and presumably can be attributed 
to the increased role of the military within such apparatus, but this 
is . not considered in detail. Similarly, to refer, as he did 
throughout his piece, to "Pretoria's strategy" implies an internal 
consistency and an internal continuity in respect of regional policy. 
This may now be the case, but it certainly was not true under 
Vorster. What has changed to provide the consistency and continuity? 
On this, Price is silent. 
Price's article relied heavily for examples of destabilisation on 
Simon Jenkins' article "Destabilisation in Southern Africa" which 
appeared the previous year. ( 61 ) Jenkins was writing for a news 
magazine, and not surprisingly, has written a journalistic piece 
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which is speculative and, in many places, unsubstantiated. Yet he was 
the first commentator to have argued that there was a pattern to 
South African destabilisation, al though its purpose was, at that 
stage, unclear. 
Jenkins shares Price's view that the purpose of both destabilisation 
and "pro-active defence" (which he treats as essentially the same 
thing) is to recreate the buffer zone, and he attributes the new 
style of regional policy precisely to the ascendancy of the military. 
He goes further and dates this ascendancy to beginning in 1977 when 
the first major Angolan offensive after Operation Savannah was 
launched, precisely at the time that the Department of Foreign 
Affairs was engaged in delicate negotiation on Namibia. Thereafter, 
and more particularly after P W Botha became Prime Minister, the 
influence of the military has waxed and that of the Department of 
Foreign Affairs waned. 
Jenkins has gone further and has argued that the institutional means 
of securing the domination of the military in regional policy has 
been its control over the SSC and that body's associated bureaucracy. 
He builds a very impressive, if circumstantial, case for individual 
cases of destabilisation being part of a pattern to secure a 
military-sponsored grand design i.n Southern Africa. This amounts, he 
suggests, t~ a type of Brezhnev doctrine in Southern Africa; the 
exerting, in other words, of the same type of hegemony which Russia 
exerts over Eastern Europe, and achieved by the same mix of economic 
and military domination. Jenkins detects an almost crus~der-like 
attitude within the military, which sees itself as being the 
"catalyst of 'capitalist counter-revolution" against Russian expan-
sionism. (62) 
Like Price, Jenkins argues that the major potential weakness of the 
destabilisation strategy (apart, naturally, from its colossal human 
and developmental cost) is the possibility of its succeeding. Jenkins 
was, of course, writing prior to the Nkomati Accord, and before the 
secret non-aggression part with Swaziland had become public know-
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ledge, and he can perhaps be excused for not appreciating that 
destabilisation was never intended to succeed to the extent of 
toppling "radical" regimes. Its purpose, more correctly, was to 
induce such countries to adapt their policies and arguably their 
public pronouncements. The exact "mix" pf strategies that were 
brought to bear depended on the country concerned. 
Despite professing themselves dissatisfied with "much recent writing 
on the region", which focusses on "mere crude 'destabilisation'", 
Davies and O'Meara find themselves largely in agreement with 
Professor Price's conclusions. (63) Like him, they discern "a 
sophisticated matrix of economic and other 'incentives' applied 
together with military and· other 'disincentives'" which conjointly 
constitute Total National Strategy applied to the region. (64) Like 
Price, they suggest that the object of the regional total strategy is 
to "create a new network of regional economic and social relation-
. ships which would persuade Southern African states that it is in 
their interests to collaborate with Pretoria". (65) 
These authors trace the historical development of relations in the 
region which have made the application of this strategy possible. 
They share the view that the primary purpose of the strategy is to 
realise Mr P W Botha's cherished goal of a Constellation of Southern 
African states, but that there are "lesser goals" which can be 
simultaneously pursued by the same means. They admit that the 
bureaucratic reorganisation of the State under P W Botha has had an 
important effect on the formulation and execution of this policy, and 
that the SSC plays a primordial part in shaping such policy. Indeed, 
they argue, there is not one aspect of regional policy that is not 
sanctioned by this body. 
They suggest that regional policy has developed through four distinct 
phases. The first of these was associated with the aggressive 
promotion of the Constellation idea, ~nd this lasted until mid-1980, 
when the victory of Mr Mugabe and the formation of the SADCC made the 
creatio~ of a Constellation impossible. The second phase, lasting 
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until the end of 1981, saw destabilisation applied on a wide and 
fairly indiscriminate basis. This was followed by a phase of more 
selective and intensive destabilisation, culminating in the signing 
of the Nkomati Accord. Finally, South African policy in the 
post-Nkomati phase is directed to trying "to reproduce the subordina-
tion to South African capital" in the front-line states. (66) They 
admit that the policy has been successful to the extent that the ANC 
has been placed under pressure, but that the crisis facing South 
Africa is internal and no amount of terminological confusion nor 
internationalisation of the problem will resolve it. 
Part of the purpose of this article was apparently an attempt to 
place the debate on South African regional policy within a Marxist 
framework, hence the authors' disapproval of the existing literature 
whilst seemingly coming to the same conclusions. Much space is taken 
up in rather personal (and semantic) reference to Professor 
Geldenhuys, to which he, in another article (67) rightly took 
exception. But the adoption of this perspective places the authors in 
a number of difficult and often contradictory situations. They argue, 
for example, that the ,aggressive regional pol icy is not as much 
attributable to the military predominance in the "apartheid state" as 
to a "reorganisation of the ruling capitalist class", which share an 
"unquestioned vision of strategic objectives". (68) Yet, the authors 
themselves refer to "top military strategists" who were increasingly 
uneasy with the ad hoc nature of Vorster's leadership, and who on 
this account carved out a new prominence for themselves in the 
central decision-making structures (69), and argue that PW Botha's 
new bureaucratic organisation was precisely intended to resolve 
"institutional conflicts". ( 70) The authors are undoubtedly right : 
there were, and still are, such institutional conflicts, and this 
accounts for a great deal of policy variation over time. To suggest 
that the State operates. perfectly consistently (and that "monopoly 
capital" fits in with the State's plans as well) is, 1 ike Evans, to 
oversimplify what are in fact very complex internal relationships of 
power and influence. 
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Seemingly, few scholars have appreciated that the campaign to cow 
South Africa's neighbouring states and the internal security 
manageme_nt campaign are both products of "total strategy"; or at 
least those that do recognise the nexus choose to imply, rather than 
to exp9se and analyse, this relationship. An exception to this 
general tendency is Professor Geldenhuys. Although he has dealt with 
each aspect separately in previous articles, (71) he has drawn the 
two together in his book The Diplomacy of Isolation. (72) 
\ 
Much o.f this work goes beyond the scope of this study, in that it 
presents a global analysis of South African foreign policy-making 
since Union, and because he has chosen as uni ts of analysis the 
persons and institutions involved in foreign policy formulation. This 
method of analysis is at the same time an asset and a liability. It 
is a comprehensive and even exhaustive treatment, which has perforce 
considered a variety of actors whos.e influence on policy-making was 
and is probably at best marginal. At the same time, the same net has 
caught the really important actors, and in Geldenhuys' analysis of 
the interrelationship between these actors he has been able to 
recognise the plurality' and complexity of influences of the "state". 
While authors like Davies and 0' Meara might (and do) criticise the 
fact that Geldenhuys tends not to assess the relative importance of 
the persons and institutions he describes, at least he does not 
present a conception of the "state" as merely the extension of the 
machinations of "monopoly capital". 
Professor Geldenhuys treats the role of the Defence Force in foreign 
policy carefully, and highlights the fact that the perceptions of 
"total onslaught" and "total national strategy" have significantly 
affected the Defence "family's" modus operandi in its foreign 
dealings, particularly since Angola. ( 73) Likewise, he recognises 
that, in dealing with the "onslaught" defence planners see little or 
no distinction between external and internal operations. (74) He 
traces the rise to prominence of the doctrine of "total onslaught" 
' from the early 1970's, and refers, in admirably meticulous detail, to 




which made the "organisation man", P W Botha, determined to 
policy-making on a more rational footing. (75) While he 
recognises the centrality of the SSC in both domestic and foreign 
dealings, he does not present it in a melodramatic light, arguing 




having too free a hand, as it had during the Angolan 
(76) Perhaps most refreshingly of all, his arguments are 
illustrated by specific examples, largely culled from a 
wide variety of personal interviews he obtained with key politicians 
and officials involved in the events at the time. 
As Dr Seegers has noted, the literature on the subject of the "total 
onslaught" and the institution of the National Security Management 
System is fraught with oversimplifications and generalisations. 
Yet vie~ed conjointly it is remarkable how much information has been 
provided by a relatively small corpus of literature on a subject so 
swathed in official secrecy. Each of the authors has provided a 
little more information which gives us further insight into what 
actually happens within the Security Management System. If their 
conclusions are somewhat tentative, these do at least provide us with 
avenues to pursue in additional research. Each published study has, 
in turn, prompted the authorities to be slightly more forthcoming 
with essential information. (77) For, despite official protestations 
that there is nothing secret about the Security Management System, 
information is extraordinarily hard to come by. One's normal avenue 
when secondary sources are scarce is to resort to personal interviews 
as geldenhuys has done, but even here one comes up against either an 
understandable reluctance to divulge too much information lest this 
"' 
be construed as a breach of the laws governing official secrets, or 
else an equally understandable tendency to "reinterpret" history to 
justify particular actions. 
With these restrictions very much in mind, this study will attempt, 
in the first instance, to describe and analyse the National Security 
Management System. This will involve an examination of the changes 
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which have occurred in the central decision-making structures as a 
result of the adoption of the "total strategy". To do this, it will 
be necessary to compare and contrast the structures in existence 
before Mr Botha became Prime Minister with those set up under his 
direction subsequently. This study will also show that the "techno-
cratic revolution" in the central decision-making structures is 
directly related to the adoption of the concept of a total strategy 
and in turn to the perception that South Africa is the subject of a 
total onslaught. Too often, commentators are inclined to play down 
the significance of the sometimes florid and melodramatic statements 
of politicians as being unfounded and therefore irrelevant. This is a 
pity, since as often as not, such politicians sincerely believe such 
statements and act accordingly. 
This. has certainly been the case with Mr Botha, and had the 
commentators taken his statements prior to 1978 seriously, they could 
with a reasonable degree of accuracy have predicted the organisa-
tional changes he brought about. 
Finally, this study will examine some of the strategies which have 
emanated from the National Security Management System. The reason for 
this is two-fold. Firstly, the study will illustrate in the working 
of the System the complex interrelationship between the politicians 
and the security technocrats. The System has presented opportunities 
and constraints to both groups, and it is in an examination of this 
symbiotic relationship that some finality can be reached on the 
controversy about which group is "in charge". Secondly, this 
dissertation will trace the motives which lie behind the strategies, 
in order to assess the real reasons which have caused Mr Botha and 
his advisors to adopt the quasi-ideology of total onslaught and the 
correspondent organisational metamorphosis involved in the total 
' strategy. This might enable us to assess to what extent this System 
will be able to guarantee the survival of white power and privilege 
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THE TOTAL ONSLAUGHT : DOMESTIC PERCEPTIONS IN 
SECURITY INTELLIGENCE DECISION-MAKING 
Mr P W Botha became Minister of Defence on the 5th April 1966 and it 
was evident from the start that he took the responsibilities of his 
portfolio yery seriously. Whereas his predecessors, Mr J J Fouche and 
Mr F C Erasmus, had devoted their speeches largely to threats 
specificaily directed ~gainst South Africa, Mr Botha's speeches were 
characterised by a broader vision of security, encompassing the 
East-West conflict and South Africa's role in it. From the outset, 
three tnemes dominated Mr Botna's speeches; first, that the West was 
being threatened by Soviet expansionism, and secondly, that South 
Africa was part of the West. This led Mr Botha to the third theme -
that Soviet strategy called 
I 
for the subjugation of Europe by 
subjugating Africa, thus cutting Europe off from its vital raw 
materials. Both because of South Africa's mineral wealth, and because 
of its strategic position on the oil routes, South Africa, Mr Botha 
therefore concluded, had a dual responsibility - to defend itself and 
thereby to assist in the defence of the West. (1) 
~t was a source of irritation and chagrin to Mr Botha that the West 
failed, on the whole, to share his view of Soviet strategy and thus 
to appreciate South Africa's role in their defence. Indeed, several 
attempts had been made by Mr Botha' s predecessors to bind the West 
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closer to South Africa by means of defence treaties; notably the 
Middle East Defence Organisation in 1951/52 (which never got off the 
ground) and the Dakar Conference on Defence Facilities in 1954 (which 
never proceeded beyond the talking stage). (2) The closest which 
South Africa was able to come to securing a Western commitment to its 
defence, was the Simon's Town Agreement, signed in 1955. 
Even then, this hardly "bound" the West to South Africa's defence. 
While the agreement provided for the supply of naval vessels and 
other hardware to South Africa and for joint SA Navy and Royal Navy 
co-operation, it was, in fact, so vaguely worded as to make the 
treaty almost meaningless. ( 3) Indeed, according to one interpre-
tation, the Simon's Town Agreement of 1955 actually facilitated 
Britain's disengagement from South Africa's defence, since it revoked 
the arrangement, contained in the 1921 Smuts-Churchill treaty, 
whereby the Royal Navy was given "the right of perpetual use for 
naval purposes" over the Simon's Town base. (4) 
If the West's responses to South Africa's overtures were lukewarm 
while South Africa was still a member of the Commonweal th, the 
reaction after Sharpeville and the departure of South Africa from the 
Commonweal th was openly hostile. In 1963 and 1964, the Security 
Council of the United Nations adopted three major resolutions urging 
(although not compelling) member states not to supply arms to South 
Africa. (5) The Democratic administration in the United States 
immediately signified that they considered themselves bound by the 
resolutions, and the British Labour government which came to power in 
1964 fulfilled a pre-election promise by refusing to supply any 
further arms to South Africa, notwithstanding the provisions of the 
Simon's Town Agreement. (6) 
The "voluntary" arms embargo against South Africa did not materially 
affect South African arms acquisition. South Africa was still able to 
buy arms from France, Spain, Italy and Switzerland and even the 
government of Mr Wilson allowed the delivery of arms which had 
already been ordered. The alienation of the Western powers from South 
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Africa, already apparent in the early 1960's was, however, a bitter 
pill for the Government to swallow; that a country so demonstrably 
anti-communist should be rejected summarily in this way. This feeling 
was expressed most clearly by a Government senator in 1961 -
11 Mr President, are we not a member of the Western bloc? 
Are we not ... the country amongst the Western nations 
which is convincingly anti-communist? Have we not 
proved,, by word and by deed that we stand on the side 
of the West? ... Will the Western nations not respect 
such a ·friend in their midst and situated in a 
strategic place?" (7') 
There was, however, a persuasive lobby in "the West" which denied the 
strategic importance of South Africa. A world war, they argued, would 
be a rapid affair, and over long before the Soviet Union could deploy 
ships to cut off the West's oil supplies. In any event, oil supplies 
could as effectively, if not· more effectively, be cut off by a 
blockade of the Straits of Hormuz, the Arabian Sea or even the ports 
of Western Europe. As far as strategic minerals were concerned, the 
lobby argued that the Soviet Union did not itself need the minerals, 
and if the Soviet Union wanted to put pressure on the West, it could 
do so more effectively, and with less cost, by occupying the 
oil-producing Gulf States. The lobby was also unimpressed by South 
African protestations of anti-communism; both communism and apartheid 
were, in their view, equally objectionable. Finally, the lobby argued 
that in the struggle against communism it was more important to 
foster ties with the newly independent black states in Africa than 
with South Africa; indeed, support for what black states saw as a 
morally repugnant regime might induce these states to seek aid from 
the Soviet bloc. Spence summed up the position neatly in a 
contemporary account -
"Given the nature of the struggle, the Western powers 
are unlikely to welcome South Africa into an anti-
communisi alliance; nor can the latter 'threaten 
unfaithfulness' as the Republic requires Western 
support far more than the West requires any strategic 
or military advantages possessed by it." (8) 
\ 
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The Government responded in four ways to the apparent lack of 
appreciation by the West for South Africa's strategic worth. The 
first was to test the British government's commitment to the Simon's 
Town Agreement. This it did in January 1967 by submitting a "shopping 
list'' of maritim~ de~ence equipment that it would require during the 
next ten years in order to fulfil its obligations in terms of the 
Agreement. The British Prime Minister responded on the 14th December, 
and merely reiterated to the House of Commons his government's 
/ 
commitment to the arms embargo. ( 9) This provoked Mr Vorster to 
state, in turn, during his New Year's Message for 1968, that -
"We now know after a long time of stalling and hedging 
exactly where we stand with the Wilson government and 
in the coming year I will look anew at the Simon's Town 
Agreement." (10) 
Secondly, the Government responded by stepping up the local 
production of arms. In April 1968 Mr Botha introduced the Armaments 
Development and Production Act, which repealed the Munitions 
Production Act and set up the parastatal corporation, ARMSCOR. Mr 
Botha told Parliament that -
"It is the Government's pol icy to make the country 
self-sufficient in the field of defence as soon as 
possible." ( 11) 
The third respqnse was to attempt to involve other countries in the 
defence of the Cape Sea Route-and, by implication, in South Africa's 
defence. Mr Botha told Parliament that the British withdrawal east of 
Suez had caused a power vacuum, which worried the South African 
government -
"If this situation is taken into account, along with 
the importance of the southern sea routes and the 
apparent preoccupation of certain Western nations with 
their own political objectives, with which they are 
saddled, we must ask ourselves whether the time has not 
come to encourage greater co-operation among friendly 
nations in the southern ocean area." (12) 
L. 
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Mr Botha revealed that contact had been made with various countries 
·"at service level". These were followed up by a visit by Dr Hilgard 
Muller to Brazil in March 1969, during which the possibility of a 
defence treaty was raised. 
Dr Muller flew on to Argentina and held talks with Mr van· Peborgh, 
the Argentine Minister of National Defence. In May 1969, Admiral 
Pedro Alberto Jose Gnavi visited South Africa to make arrangements 
for joint South Africa/Argentinian naval exercises. In July, Dr 
Caetano expressed interest in a Southern Atlantic Defence Pact 
\ 
involving Brazil, Portugal and South Africa. (13) 
The final response was more subtle, and involved stressing the 
gradual natur.e of the Soviet strategy to ensure world domination. The 
factors which denied South Africa's s·trategic value referred almost 
exclusively to a full-scale conventional war between East and West, 
but Mr Botha started to propagate the idea that war was in ~rogress, 
even if it had not been declared -
"In the world in which we live the dividing line 
between war and peace is generally no longer a clear 
one, and the South African Defence Force, as indeed the 
defence force of every free country in the world, must 
take that situation into account. In a recently 
published article, somebody put it as follows -
terrorism gives way to guerilla war, then to full scale 
war." ( 14) · 
And later, he put it differently -
"One must include here an East-West conflict even 
though it is not at the moment a direct conflict of 
military force." ( 15) 
Mr Botha bemoaned the fact that few Western governments appreciated 
this. (A notable exception was the Portuguese government of Mr 
Salazar, whose speeeches Mr Botha used to cite from time to time 
approvingly). (16) In order to persuade the West of the seriousness 
I 
of this creeping war, it was necessary for Mr Botha to quote concrete 
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examples of its manifestation. This Mr Botha did for the first time 
in 1970. (17) He argued that there was a global struggle between the 
"forces of communism" on the one hand, and the "forces of stability, 
security and progress" on the other. He said that the 11 forces of 
communism" had a long term strategy to subdue the West, and that the 
campaign would be conducted in a variety of spheres. The threat, he 
said, covered all spheres -
"It is operative in the economic sphere. It manifests 
itself in the form of incitement to boycotts and 
illegal strikes. It manifests itself in the sowing of 
confusion in government ranks, such as by means of 
student unrest,· etc. It manifests itself, consciously 
or unconsciously, in the news media of the world. It 
manifests itself through subversion, infiltration and 
the sowing of disorder, and in terrorism in its various 
forms ... The military and economic fronts are but two 
of the ways in which that onslaught is being made on 
the Western World, but there are numerous others. 
Today, virtually every sphere of life is part of that 
overall strategy and that total onslaught on the free 
world and the people of the West." 
This, Mr Botha argued, was merely the first stage of a wider 
campaign -
."The unconventional onslaught will increase until bases 
are in readiness for a conventional onslaught. The 
subversion, the sowing of confusion, the creation of 
disorder, will increase until the death blow can be 
struck by conventional forces. This is the essence of 
the struggle we are involved in." 
Mr Botha was careful to stress the gradual and indirect nature of the 
Soviet strategy, and was at pains to point out Africa's role in this 
strategy. Africa was Europe's "soft underbelly" - the supplier of 
Europe's raw materials, without which European industry would 
collapse. The object of stressing the gradual nature of the Soviet 
"onslaught" was to persuade Western governments that the Soviet Union 
was unlikely to embark on a conventional attack against the. West 
until it had control, either directly, or more likely, through puppet 
regimes of those areas of the Third World crucial for the supply of 
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raw materials. Obviously, Mr Botha argued, South Africa occupied a 
key position in Soviet strategy, both because of, her supply of 
strategic minerals and because of her position on the Cape Sea Route. 
Nor was the subversion in any way connected with the policy of 
apartheid -
"It is not primarily a matter of apartheid or parallel 
development. The struggle against South Africa is not 
primarily concerned with that, because in Rhodesia it 
is not a matter of apartheid, neither is it in the 
Portuguese areas north of our borders. Apartheid does 
not exist there." (18) 
This motivation for the "onslaught" against South Africa was perhaps 
best expressed by Mr Vorster somewhat later in this way -
"The ultimate aim of the communist and leftist powers 
is not Rhodesia, Mozambique or Angola - their ultimate 
aim is South Africa. The ultimate aim is what can be 
taken from South African soil. But what is perhaps more 
important to them is the control over the Cape Sea 
Route in the event of another conventional war." (19) 
This campaign was given considerable impetus by the election of the 
Conservative Party government in Britain in 1970. In February of that 
year, a committee of the Conservative Party under chairmanship of Sir 
Frederick Bennett had recommended to the leadership that the Simon's 
Town Agreement should be "reactivated"; that a Royal Navy Commander-
in-Chief should be reappointed; that the advisability of extending 
the NATO area of commitme~t to include the Cape Sea Route should be 
canvassed; failing this, that a separate alliance be concluded 
between Britain, several of the South Amer:ican states and South 
Africa to guarantee this Route; and finally, that at least one 
aircraft carrier and one nuclear submarine of the Royal Navy ought 
permanently to be stationed at the Cape. (20) 
Mr Heath was not prepared to commit himelf to the recommendations of 
the committee, but talked vaguely of resuming the sales of "1 imi ted 
categories of arms for maritime defence" to South Africa. Under 
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pressure from various groups he moderated his position still further; 
he was prepared to sell arms to South Africa only when "very full 
consultation" with other members of the Commonwealth had taken place. 
(21) 
It was clear, however, that the Commonwealth was far from unanimous 
on the issue of arms sales to South Africa. At the Conference of 
Commonwealth heads of government held in Singapore between the 13th 
and 20th February 1971,· the matter was debated extensively and at one 
stage threatened to split the C6mmonwealth. Mr Heath's view was that 
a significant build-up of Soviet naval power had occurred in the 
Indian Ocean and that, since a quarter of British trade and half its 
oil supplies came via the Cape Sea Route, the supply of maritime 
defence equipment was both justified and in Britain's interests. The 
formE;ir Dominions - Canada, Australia and New Zealand - generally 
accepted this reasoning, but the African states, supported by India 
and Ceylon, were outraged that the arms embargo was to be breached. 
They argued that the arms supplied to South Africa could easily be 
used for landward aggression, and this constituted a threat to the 
territorial integrity of the independent states north of the Zambezi. 
A compromise wa~ eventually reached; a study group, consisting of 
representatives of Australia, Britain, Canada, India, Jamaica, Kenya, 
Malaysia and Nigeria, was set up to investigate the matter and report 
~to the Commonwealth Secretary-General as soon as possible. Mr Heath 
announced, however, that he refused to be bound by the study group's 
recommendations, and argued that it was his government's right -
"to take such action as it considers necessary to give 
effect to its global defence policy, in which the 
facilities at Simon's Town constitute an important 
element." · 
Mr Heath added that -
"The British Government has received from the South 
African Government an assurance that the South African 
Government has no aggressive intentions and that it 
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will not use any i terns , of maritime equipment supplied 
by the British Government for purposes other than those 
for which they have been supplied." (22) 
Simultaneously, the British government released a White Paper, 
entitled Legal Obligations of HM Government arising out of the 
Simon's Town Agreements, in which it was argued that the British 
government did have definite, if limited, legal obligations to supply 
certain maritime defence equipment. Principally this involved an 
obligation to supply "sufficient number of helicopters to equip the 
three anti-submarine frigates supplied under the Sea Routes Agreement 
if these are requested by the South African Government." The 
White Paper was careful, however, to point out that there was no 
continuing obligation on Britain to supply any further arms -
"It would not be reasonable to impute to the 
parties an intention to include a term in the Sea 
Routes Agreement which would place any general and 
co'ntinuing legal obligation on HM Government to permit 
the supply of arms to the South African Government." 
(23) 
In accordance with the assurance contained in the White Paper that 
helicopters would be supplied, Mr Botha promptly placed an order for 
seven Westland Wasps on the 22nd February 1971. ( 24) 
Mr Botha was, however, enough of a realist to take note of the White 
Paper's conclusion that there existed no "general and continuing 
legal obligation" on Britain to provide any further arms. By this 
stage, this issue of arms procurement was certainly less serious than 
it had been in the 1960' s; indeed, Mr Botha was able to entertain 
Parliament during the 1971 Defence Vote with an account of the extent 
of the development of local arms production. He said that South 
Africa was self-sufficient in the manufacture of explosives and 
propelling agents, a wide variety of types of ammunition, air-borne 
bombs and rockets, rifles and submachine guns, mortars and certain 
artillery pieces, armoured cars and most recently an anti-aircraft 
missile. (25) A month later, he travelled to France where he sign~d a 
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licence agreement with Dassault providing for the South African 
manufacture of the Mirage III and Mirage Fl jet fighters. (26) 
Why then did Mr Botha not consider scrapping the . Simon's Town 
Agreement? In part, as Spence has argued, this action would have 
spelt the end of "the only military link of any significance with the 
Western Powers" and "would have left the Republic completely isolated 
in strategic terms". ( 27) Certainly, Mr Botha would have been loath 
to give up the Agreement while there was still a chance that a 
subsequent Conservative administration might interpret its provisions 
differently. 
Did he perhaps hope that France, which was now South Africa's major 
supplier of arms, might listen sympathetically to the arguments of 
Soviet expansionism he had fruitlessly been propagating? This might 
have been the case, but, ac1cording to Johnson, the arguments cut no 
ice with the Gaullists. Johnson argues that France had no interest in 
a defence alliance with South Africa, but was prepared to supply arms 
which South Africa needed, both to obtain gold, and also, more 
significantly, as part of a deliberate strategy of fostering "special 
relationships around the world with major second-ranking powers", so 
that France could "deal equally with the two super powers". The key 
to this policy was being able to dump the client states quickly if 
the costs of the association outweighed the benefits, as France had 
shown it could do with Israel in 1967. ( 28) Any hopes, then, of 
replacing the Agreement with a pact with France were doomed to 
disappointment. 
Mr Botha might also have entertained fond hopes that a Southern 
Atlantic Treaty Organisation could still be set up, following the 
service links which had been established in the late 1960's. However, 
the obvious participants in such a treaty (Chile, Argentina, Brazil, 
Pa,raguay and Uruguay) were already members of the Organisation of 
American States and signatories of the Treaty of Rio (the Inter-
American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance) (29) and it made little 
sense to exchange the patronage of the United States for the 
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opprobrium of an association with South Africa. A Southern Indian 
Ocean Treaty Organisation was equally unthinkable not only were 
Australia and New Zealand already members of ANZUS, but also members 
of the Commonwealth, whose mood had been made clear in Singapore. 
Mr Botha and the South African government were thus obliged to be 
satisfied with defensive arrangements with the other "pariah" states 
threatened by "Soviet expansionism" in Southern Africa - Rhodesia and 
Portugal. Units of the SA Police, initially numbering 50 members, 10 
armoured cars and four helicopters, were dispatched to Rhodesia in 
September 1967, ostensibly, in Mr Vorster's words, to fight against 
men, "who originally came from South Africa and are on their way back 
to commit terrorism in South Africa". (30) Mr Botha said late in 1972 
that military assistance to supplement the police presence would be 
"given freely on request" to Rhodesia and the Portuguese colonies, 
(31) and limited numbers of SA Defence Force personnel were stationed 
near Lake Kariba in 1974. (32) At the same time, two frigates and a 
submarine paid what was described as "an operational visit" to 
Lourenco Marques from the 29th March to the 7th April 1973 (33) and 
on the 4th July 1973 General Kaulze de Arriage, the Chief of the 
Armed Forces in Mozambique, visited South Africa and held discussions 
with Mr Botha and Admiral Biermann. (34) 
Of course, the South African government's offer of troops to the 
Portuguese colonies, and the deployment of troops in Rhodesia was 
only partly motivated by an anti-communist "crusade". Of more 
practical importance was the fact that these states formed an 
effective buffer against direct foreign intervention by force of 
arms. Indeed, the desire to keep the "defence 1 ine" as far away from 
South Africa itself as possible had always been an important security 
consideration for the Nationalist government, as Geldenhuys has 
correctly identified. (35) While this "defence line" had been growing 
progressively closer to South Africa's borders ever since 1948 (in 
the early 1950' s the line was at Suez; by the late 1950' s it had 
become the Sahara; and by 1964 it had reached the Zambezi), the 
cordon sanitaire formed by Angola, Rhodesia, Mozambique and the BLS 
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countries was still comfortable enough for the South African 
government safely to ignore the possibility of direct military 
pressures emanating from beyond the country's northern borders. 
Nor was military aid the only advantage which the Portuguese colonies 
and Rhodesia derived from acting as South Africa's buffer. Substan-
tial aid was forthcoming, too. In Rhodesia's case, fairly obviously 
the fact that South Africa was her sole source of imports confirmed 
her client status vis-a-vis South Africa. But South Africa also 
provided the capital for the construction of the Cunene Dam in Angola 
and for the Cabera Bassa Dam in Mozambique. Aid, in the form of a 
loan for the construction of the town of Lilongwe was also granted to 
Malawi, while Portugal received remitted Mozambican miners' w?ges in 
gold. 
.. 
The fact that Mr Botha's preoccupation with South Africa's place in 
super power strategy had, in practical terms, to be scaled down -
thanks to Western indifference - to merely bolstering the buffer 
states, did not mean that he lost this interest; indeed, on the 
contrary. Much of his introduction to the 1973 Defence White Paper 
was devoted to this subject. 
Stressing the integral part which he believed South Africa played in 
world politics, he wrote -
"The RSA is part of the modern world, and as such, 
involuntarily involved in the prevailing international 
struggle for power. Furthermore, as a result of the 
relative check-mate obtaining between the super powers 
in the sphere of nuclear weapons, we find ourselves in 
a position of increasing strategic importance in that 
struggle Geographically the RSA is part of the 
Third World; in the military and cultural spheres it is 
a captive ally of the West, and ideologically a direct 
obstacle in the path of communism." (36) 
Later in the preface, he returned to this theme again -
"In the view of the Government, the RSA's survival is 
closely interwoven with the future of the present Free 
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World. Cons~quently, the measures instituted for our 
defence are designed constantly also to assist in 
promoting the security of the Free World in general." 
(37) 
He went further, again developing the familiar theme of the Soviet 
Union's use of "indirect strategy" -
"Like the rest of the Free World, the RSA is a target 
for international communism and its cohorts - leftist 
activists, exaggerated humanism, permissiveness, 
materialism, and related ideologies ... Because the RSA 
holds a position of strategic importance, these 
ideological attacks on the RSA are progressively being 
converted into more tangible action in the form of 
sanctions, boycotts, isolation, demonstrations and the 
like. This renders us - and the Free World - the more 
vulnerable to the indirect strategy applied by the 
radical powers in the form of undermining activities 
and limited violence, whether employed openly, or 
dissimulated behind ideological fronts." (38) 
Nor was this solely an ideological battle. South Africa was, Mr Botha 
said, already engaged in a "low-intensity war" and warned that -
"This .situation will probably continue for some 
considerable time to come. There is no cause for 
anxiety or fear but there is every reason for each of 
us to take note of the situation and to contribute his 
share towards ensuring our safety. A proper apprecia-
tion of the.dangers is essential." (39) 
This call to arms - however muted - was emphasised elsewhere in the 
White Paper -
"The conclusion to be stressed is that our defence is 
not a matter for the Defence Force only, but also for 
each department and citizen; it demands dedication, 
vigilance and sacrifice - not only from the Defence 
Force, but from all who are privileged to find a home 
in .this country." (40) 
It was all very well to ~aution against panic in 1973, but the sudden 
and, for the South African government, totally unexpected, coup in 
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Portugal on the 25th April 1974 brought South Africa's defence line -
and the concomitant threat ~f large-scale insurgency - right up to 
its borders, and this changed the Government's perceptions of foreign 
affairs and security in a very dramatic way. Writing at the time, 
Schlemmer et al argued that it was -
-,..----,... I 
"Almost impossible to overestimate the significance for 
Southern Africa of the military coup in Portugal ... it 
has meant that at least one, and possibly two of the 
buffer zones between South Africa and the independent 
African states have been removed. This means that 
anti-government South African guerilla movements would 
at least potentially have direct access to South 
Afric§l' s borders." ( 41) 
A similar observation was made by Hirschmann -
"South Africa was also confronted with dramatically 
changed circumstances. Not only had two long-standing 
buffer zones collapsed, but in consequence, a third, 
Rhodesia, suddenly looked extremely vulnerable; and in 
addition, the nature of Namibia's long border with 
Angola has altered." (42) 
The drastic effects of the collapse of the two Portuguese colonies as 
buffer zones for South Africa was felt most keenly by top 
decision-makers in the South African Defence Force. 
Admiral Biermann, the Chief of the SADF, said, during a radio 
interview on the 16th June 1974 that -
"As far as the RSA is concerned, there certainly never 
has been a precedent to the current vast number of 
events with potential impact, individually and collec-
tively, on our national security." 
Fu.J;"ther, while he was quick to point out that "the change which has 
occurred in Lisbon •.. does not ipso facto portend an aggravation of 
the threat against our security", and while he stated that South 
Africa had no aggressive intentions towards whatever governments were 
established in Mozambique and Angola, he nonetheless said that there 
( 
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were many factors which militated against pro-South African govern-
ments coming to power in the ex-colonies.- He concluded that these 
factors had -
"been constant factors in the appreciation to determine 
our strategic policy. In the short and intermediate 
terms, the SADF is prepared to meet any challenge that. 
could emerge on these fronts." (43) 
This feeling of apprehension was expressed even more clearly by other 
senior officers in the Defence Force. The Chief of Army Staff 
Operations, Maj-Gen J R Dutton told the Pretoria branch of the 
National Council of Women on the 2nd August 1974 that -
"the intensity of our present war will most probably 
escalate, and every effort must be made to ensure that 
we as a nation are ready for this new onslaught." (44) 
While Commodore W N du Plessis was reported to have told an 
Afrikaanse Studentebond Seminar on the same day that pressure would 
be brought to bear on the two ex-colonies "to open their doors for 
the establishment of terrorist pases. The current terrorist onslaught 
is only the tip of' the iceberg". ( 45) In an editorial, Paratus, the 
official journal of the SADF, commented -
"The RSA is their (the communists) ultimate objectiv~, 
.and one has seen two approaches to their rich prize : 
via Angola and SWA, and via Mozambique (with Rhodesia 
en route ••. ) . The revolutionary war against Southern 
Africa does not consist, therefore, of isolated wars in 
neighbouring territories, but of phases of one war -
with the RSA as the final goal." (46) 
If these views were held by the top decision-makers in the SADF, they 
were evidently not shared uniformly by Mr Vorster nor other key 
politicians in the Cab~net. Neither Mr Vorster nor Dr Mulder 
mentioned the Portuguese coup or its implications when Parliament 
reconvened at the beginning of August 1974. When Mr Vorster did deal 
with the issue during his Vote, his remarks were low-key and 
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conciliatory. He said that it was "inevitable" that an "indigenous" 
government would be established in Mozambique, and that "it was not 
South Africa's policy to lay down what kind of government they should 
have there". He continued -
"It goes without saying that South Africa will take the 
first opportunity to make contact with that government 
and to reach an understanding with that government. It 
is not only in South Africa's interests to do so, but 
pre-eminently, in the interests of that government as 
well" 
and went on to outline the advantages which would flow from 
co-operation with South Africa. Mr Vorster was careful to point out 
that South Africa's policy was one of non-interference in the affairs 
of neighbouring states, and concluded that -
"The only thing that South Africa will ever do is to 
defend itself with its full striking power in the event 
of its being attacked." (47) 
This theme was also emphasised by Dr Hilgard Muller, the Foreign 
Minister. He said of the Portuguese coup that -
"these events 
sub-continent. 
regarded as a 
threat." 
may hold benefits for us and for our 
What has happened should rather be 
challenge and not as a di"saster or a 
He said that he based his confidence that co-operation between South 
Africa and the ex-colonies was possible on the fact that South Africa 
had co-operated with the states for a considerable length of time, 
and thus that the region was economically interdependent. He 
concluded by stating unequivocally -
"The Government's attitude in regard to these develop-
ments on our borders amounts to the hand of friendship 
being extended ·anew by South Africa to all African 
states, irrespective of whether they are already 
independent or whether they are gaining their indepen-
dence, as is the case with the two neighbouring on our 
boraers. " ( 48) 
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This spate of conciliatory speeches culminated in Vorster's cele-
brated address to the South African Senate on the 23rd October 1974. 
Stressing the need for all African countries to co-operate thereby to 
promote development, Mr Vorster argued -
"I believe that Southern Africa has come to the 
crossroads. I think Southern Africa has to make a 
choice. I think that choice lies between peace on the 
one hand or (sic) an escalation of strife on the other 
Southern Africa should guard against its heading 
for chaos. However, this is not necessary and I think 
hon. Senators will agree with me that it is not 
necessary, for there is an alternative, there is a way. 
That way is the way of peace, the way of normalisation 
of relations, the way of sound understanding and normal 
association. I believe that Southern Africa can take 
that way. I have reason to believe that it is prepared 
to take that way, and I believe that it will do so in 
the end. In fact .•• I have never been more optimistic 
that the climate and the will to do so is there." (49) 
The next day, Mr Pik Botha, at that time South Africa's Permanent 
Representative at the United Nations, told the Security Council 
that -
"my Government does not condone. discrimination purely 
on the grounds of race or colour. Discrimination based 
solely on the colour of a man's skin cannot be 
defended. And we shall do everything in our power to 
move away from discrimination based on race or colour." 
He also reiterated the view that -
"A Black Government in Mozambique holds no fear for us. 
We · are surrounded by Black Governments and we are 
ourselves in the process of creating more by leading 
our Black territories to independence." (50) 
Did the sanguineness displayed by Mr Vorster, Dr Mulder and Mr Pik 
Botha compared to the near panic which was evident from statements 
from the top decision-makers in the Defence Force signify a 
difference of opinion within the Cabinet at that time? At first 
glance, the differences appeared to concern tactics and emphasis 
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rather than fundamental approaches to the problem. Both Mr Vorster 
et al and Mr Botha wanted a strong Defence Force, and Mr Vorster had 
made it clear both in his Assembly and in his Senate speeches that he 
was prepared to use the Defence Force if South Africa was in any way 
threatened. As if to mirror this determination, an amount of 
R692 025 000 was provided for Defence in the 1974/75 estimates, an 
increase of 43% over the previous year. Yet Mr Vorster did not want 
to use the Defence Force unless he was provoked - he hoped, by 
dramatic diplomacy, to reach a modus vivendi with the black-ruled 
states on his borders that would effectively replace the buffers 
previously provided by the Portuguese colonies. Thus, he embarked on 
the celebrated policy of detente. 
It goes beyond the scope of this study to examine the detente policy 
in any depth, and it will suffice to say that in the latter part of 
1974, Vorster visited a number of African countries privately and 
received a special emissary from President Kaunda. The objective of 
this diplomatic activity only became clear later. Vorster did not 
want to become involved in a protracted war in Rhodesia, the outcome 
of which would be far from certain, and the advantages of which would 
be doubtful. Instead, he hoped to create a commonwealth of Southern 
African states, and thereby a more permanent buffer than Rhodesia, 
the Portuguese colonies and the BLS countries had proved to be. For 
his part, he was prepared to exert pressure on Mr Ian Smith, the 
Rhodesian Prime Minister, to negotiate a settlement with the black 
nationalist organisations with a view to an internationally recog-
nised settlement. 
He was also prepared to grant financial and other aid to the 
co,untries to the north of South Africa. For Kaunda, the idea of 
sett~ing the guerilla war in Rhodesia was attractive, since the war 
had alr:eady proved costly to him, and was likely to become more so 
the more the war esc~lated. He also genuinely _hoped to prevail upon 
Mr Vorster to make domestic changes to the political system within 
South Africa. He, was prepared to put pressure on the Rhodesian black 
nationalist leaders to negotiate with Smith, and was prepared to 
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reiterate the principles contained in the Lusaka Manifesto that 
whites in South Africa were not settlers. Of course, neither of the 
participants was prepared to give in to the other's major demands -
Mr Vorster was not interested in doing away with apartheid, nor was 
President Kaunda interested in being a member of a South African-
dominated economic community ( 51) - but this did not stop their 
co-operation on the issue of Rhodesia. (52) 
Yet there seems no doubt that Mr P W Botha's conception that there 
was a total onslaught against the Republic was at least temporarily 
no longer official policy. It made little sense, after all, to accuse 
states to the north of South Africa of being part of a communist-
inspired plot against the Republic while at the same time coaxing the 
same states ~nto a pro-South African alliance. In addition, there is 
evidence which suggests that not all the key decision-makers in the 
National Party were convinced of the totality of the "onslaught". Mr 
Pik Botha, for example, in one of his last speeches in Parliament 
before becoming Ambassador to the United Nations, asked whether it 
was -
"not possible for us to have a measure of consensus in 
respect of those aspects of security which are a threat 
to us" ( 53) 
while Dr Connie Mulct.er said, during a visit to Rhodesia that South 
Africa would not be sending troops to Rhodesia as this would be 
interpreted as "involvement in total war" and he did not think that 
this was the case. (54) 
Mr P W Botha' s reaction was very interesting. He certainly did not 
compromise his position that the world as a whole was threatened by 
Soviet expansionism. He said, at the beginning of 1975, that -
"the present tension in the world has its origin in 
Russia's expansionist urge and in its indirect strategy 
and militaristic intimidation of peoples" (55) 
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and argued that detente between South Africa and states to the north 
of its borders would not lessen this Soviet expansionism one iota. 
This theme he followed up in the preface to the 1975 White Paper on 
Defence -
"It is ... an irrefutable reality that no country - and 
this certainly holds true for the RSA - can escape 
events elsewhere in the world. We are all inevitably 
involved .•. and are intimately affected by interwoven 
economic patterns, diminishing resources and militant 
ideologies." 
He continued by referring somewhat disparagingly to the likely 
success of the policy of detente, which he gratuitously described as 
"a wise policy to pursue", but was quick to point out that -
"On the other hand, appeasement is a policy of 
weakness. The preparedness of the SA Defence Force is a 
guarantee that a policy of weakness and appeasement 
need n~t be followed." ( 56) 
It is almost certain that these muted differences marked a much more 
significant Cabinet split, the significance of which will be 
discussed in more detail later, which was to have its resolution in 
the ill-fated South African invasion of Angola. Mr Vorster was by 
1975 already ill, and there must have been speculation about his 
successor. Up until then, the detente policy had been a product, 
largely, though not exclusively, of the Department of Information and 
this · had rebounded to the credit of Dr Mulder, the responsible 
Minister and the Transvaal leader of the Party. Mr Botha, by that 
time the most senior Cabinet Minister, wanted to participate in an 
independent foreign policy venture which would redress the balance in 
his favour. He saw his chance in Angola. 
Personal ambition was, however, not only not Mr Botha's only consi-
deration, but may not have been the most important. On the 16th June 
1975, the Simon's Town Agreement was finally terminated by the 
British Labour Party government (57) thus realising Mr Botha's worst 




termination of the agreement was particularly painful to Mr Botha 
since it signified that the British government did not believe that 
the Cape Sea Route was strategically vital to the defence of the 
West. It was therefore necessary to demonstrate by some other means 
South Africa's strategic importance and the country's bona fides as 
an ally of the West. 
I:P, in hindsight, it seems absurd for Mr Botha to have imagined that 
the invasion of a sovereign black African state could have restored 
South Africa to its position within the Western alliance, there is 
evidence which suggests that Mr Botha was secretly encouraged to do 
so by both the United States and France, al though for radically 
different r~asons. The involvement of the United States can be traced 
back to the acceptance by the Nixon administration in 1969 of the 
National Security Council's "Option Two" as the basis of its security 
appraisal of Southern Africa. ( 58) "Option Two" was based on the 
premise that whites were firmly in control in the sub-continent, and 
that blacks were unlikely to overthrow the minority regimes by force; 
moreover, support for military blacks would "only lead to chaos and 
increased opportunities for the communists". As soon after the 
Portuguese coup, therefore, as May 1974, Admiral Biermann visited the 
United States and met both the Secretary of the Navy and the chairman 
of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff. ( 59) It is naturally impossible to 
ascertain what was discussed at these meetings, but Stockwell makes 
it clear that both Kissinger and the CIA were not only aware of South 
Africa's involvement in the Angolan civil war, but indeed saw South 
Africa's support of UNITA as a complementary strategy to their 
support of the FNLA. (60) Mr Botha himself admitted to Parliament 
during 1976 that th~ United States -
"knew about our actions in Angola and tacitly approved 
of them. Not only did they do so tacitly, but at one 
stage they also adopted a 'standpoint against the 
Russians and Cubans in theory as well as in practice" 
(61) 
while two years later, he went still further -
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"We are being condemned because we were in Angola on a 
limited scale, but there was a time when American 
aircraft offloaded arms at military bases and positions 
in Angola which were held by South African troops. I 
was there myself and I saw those arms being offloaded." 
(62) 
France's role in prompting a South African invasion was significant 
but far less definitive. Amongst all the commentators on Angola, it 
appears that only Johnson has speculated on it, but he advances a 
well-reasoned case. He bases his case on the incomprehensible 
pheno~enon of France continuing to supply both sophisticated arma-
ments (five Daphne class submarines, an unspecified number of 
corvettes and Mirage Fl fighter/bombers) and atomic know-how in the 
face of UN and vociferous Afro-Asian opposition. For France to have 
taken such a diplomatic risk, Johnson argues, the pay-off must have 
been considerable, and he identifies three advantages which accrued 
to France. In the first place, France earned South Africa's 
gratitude, and, as a result, South Africa's clientage. This Johnson 
sees as part of a deliberate policy by France of establishing a 
series of alliances with a series of second order powers (China, 
Israel, Pakistan and South Africa), but without involving any long 
term commitment to these states' survival - a necessary implication 
of long·term economic investment. In the second place, South Africa 
could, unlike Israel, pay for her arms purchases in hard gold 
bullion, a proposition which appealed to the French government. 
Thirdly, and more germane to the issue of Angola, Johnson maintains 
that France was at that time trying to diversify the sources of her 
supply of oil and to reduce her dependence on the Arab bloc. French 
policy-makers saw in the chaotic conditions prevailing in Angola the 
chance to establish a French monopoly in the oil-rich enclave of 
Cabinda. 
For this strategy to succeed, the Angolan civil war would, in fact, 
have to be promoted so as to allow the French, from bases in Zaire, 
to patronise the Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda. 
Only South Africa could promote the civil war in Angola and was 
accordingly asked to do so. (63) 
- 62 -
Although Johnson admits that there is no hard evidence to support his 
view, he does suggest that "the elements" of a deal between Pretoria 
and Paris "stare one rudely in the face". He also correctly argues 
that for arms "Pretoria might well have been willing to pay in 
blood". (64) Johnson could further have substantiated his case if he 
had considered the nature and the timing of the Sou~h African orders 
for defence equipment. The cancellation of the Simon's Town Agreement 
left South Africa isolated from the Western Alliance; however, 
. • submarines and corvettes could re-establish South Africa's strategic 
worth as the custodian of the Cape Sea Route. For that, Mr Botha 
would indeed have been prepared to pay in blood. 
One should not ignore Mr Botha's official explanation of the inva-
sion. He told Parliament that it had been necessary for a 11 limi ted 
force" to enter Angola to achieve "limited objectives". He said that 
South African investments at Calueque needed to be protected, as did 
the inhabitants of Ovamboland, from acts of terror. He also 
maintained that certain indirect benefits had accrued to the SADF as 
a result of the invasion - it had provided the Defence Force with 
practical experience and it had shown the rest of Africa South 
Africa's military power. Finally he argued that it had demonstrated 
conclusively the willingness of South Africa to shoulder its 
responsibilities as an ally of the "free world". (65) 
However "limited" Mr Botha regarded the "objectives" of the SADF in 
Angola, it was most certainly not a "limited force" that invaded the 
country, nor was this force's task - by any stretch of the 
imagination - confined to the protection of South African investments 
at Calueque. To be sure, South African troops were dispatched to 
Calueque towards the beginning of August 1975, but these troops were 
intended to protect Calueque from the FNLA and UNITA forces, who were 
slogging· it out for mastery of Southern Angola. ( 66) The main South 
African force - Task Force Zulu - only left Rundu on the 14th October 
1975, and consisted initially of approximately 1 000 troops and 
eventually, during December, of between 4 000 and 5 000 men. (67) 
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Mr Botha' s other statements are equally difficult to substantiate. 
Africa could hardly h~ve been less impressed with the fact that South 
Africa's much vaunted army advanced virtually all the way to Luanda 
before being forced to retreat. South African defence equipment was 
shown to be obsolete (their artillery, particularly, which dated from 
the Second World War) and their logistical support system a shambles. 
It was only thanks to particular resourcefulness shown on the part of 
the South African commanders and the inexperience on the part of 
their opponents, that disaster - in the form of visible defeat - was 
avoided. Furthermore, the "free world", even the most conservative 
elements of it, could hardly have blessed the South Africans for the 
presence of an estimated 25 000 Cubans whose presence in Angola the 
South African invasion had helped to justify. 
The white electorate in South Africa was fed a careful diet of 
propaganda which portrayed the SADF either as victorious, or else, 
where this clearly was not the case, as having performed magnifi-
cently under very difficult circumstances. ( 68) During the Durban 
North by-election, fought in the early months of 1976, the Nation-
alist candidate boasted publicly that the SADF "were in fact knocking 
the hell out of the Cubans". ( 69) A special television documentary, 
entitled "Brug 14" depicted a minor skirmish in the most favourable 
light. Even Mr Botha suggested that the SADF had not want~d to pull 
out of Angola, but that -
"When it became clear to us that we would be left in 
the lurch, we decided that we would not fight to the 
last South African on behalf of the free world, if they 
themselves were not prepared to fight." (70) 
Others, however, perceived things differently. On the one hand, the 
reverses which had been inflicted on the SADF did not escape the 
voteless blacks in South Africa, more particularly as these reverses 
had been inflicted by black, or at the very least, Third World 
troops. Previously, the SADF had been assumed to be invincible, and 
this had reinforced the attitude of powerlessness felt by many blacks 
in the late 1960's and early 1970's. The events in Angola induced a 
- 64 -
greater feeling of confidence which in no small way contributed to 
the riots in Soweto and elsewhere later in 1976. (71) 
The other actor whose perceptions were radically changed by the 
events in Angola was the SADF itself. The top decision-makers in th~ 
SADF were very well aware that neither their equipment nor their 
tactics were appropriate to the type of war which had been fought. In 
addition, the discipline of the troops left much to be desired, while 
the logistical support system was so chaotic that troops in the 
front-line were often without essential ordinance for long periods of 
time. It had always been boasted .that the SADF was the strongest army 
on the African continent; suddenly, the generals weren't sure. 
This new real ism induced, in turn, far-reaching changes within the 
SADF itself, and changes in the relationship between the SADF and 
other agencies. In the second half of 1976 an enquiry was conducted\ 
into the discipline of the Defence Force which recommended substan-
tial tightening up of discipline. At that time, the enquiry found, 
South Africa's Defence .Force could be compared favourably only with 
those of Italy and Greece. ( 72) Secondly, planning went ahead with 
the acquisition of a suitable terrain for the SADF, and particularly 
its ground forces, to tr~in in the techniques of conventional war. 
The Army Battle School was thus established at Lohatlha, and brigade 
exercises were conducted there in the last months of 1978. Such was 
the importance attached to this project that the Officer Commanding 
of the Battle School was given the rank of Brigadier and the status 
of an Officer Commanding a Command, with direct access to the Chief 
of the Army. (73) The logistics system was,also thoroughly overhauled 
and the concept of "log-ops" - logistics in support of operations -
introduced. (74) 
As was to be expected, the set-back in Angola, and the perceived 
spinelessness of the West, also found expression in the 1977 Defence 
White Paper. Writing somewhat moodily, Mr Botha noted that -
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"During the past two years there have been far-reaching 
political, economic and military developments in both 
the global and regional contexts, with direct implica-
tions for the Republic of South Africa. Marxist 
militarism is casting a shadow over Africa. Neverthe-
less the Western countries still take part in a 
senseless arms embargo against the RSA." (75) 
However, this apparent lack of interest did not seem to affect the 
desire to project South Africa at the centre stage of East-West 
relations. The White Paper commented -
"Developments in Africa and elsewhere have today thrust 
the R,epublic of South Africa against its will into the 
foreground, where the attainment of the National 
Security Aims is directly affected by occurrences and 
trends of thought beyond our borders." (76) 
It continued -
"World peace rests mainly upon the balance of military 
might between the Western democracies and the Marxist 
powers, and it is this very balance which is the 
foundati<:>n of a stable international order. Paradoxi-
cally, however, the state of international stability, 
based largely on the essential nuclear balance between 
the two super powers, lends itself to instability at 
lower levels, and Southern Africa is one of the many 
~ictims of this •.• insecurity." (77) 
The White Paper bemoaned the fact that "minority governments" had 
been established in both Angola and Mozambique, but that whereas the 
latter's transformation to -independent status had been "compara-
tively" peac~ful -
"The circumstances in Angola were quite different and 
had a considerable effect on the RSA's security 
interests." (78) 
This had had the effect of requiring South Africa's involvement in 
the Angolan Civil War and had resulted in Soviet and Cuban 
interventiqn in that war on the MPLA side. The White Paper deprecates 
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this development most strongly. The reason for this unwarranted 
involvement was -
"with the aim of bringing to power a government which 
would be well-disposed towards the Marxist cause. This 
is a clear indication of Soviet imperialism which will 
confront Africa in the future. One can justifiably say 
that there is a Soviet shadow over parts of Africa." 
(79) ' 
The White Paper was careful to point out that while the developments 
in Angola did not in themselves materially affect the "form and 
substance" of the thr:-eat as it had been exposed in the 1973 White 
Paper, subsequent events had -
"led to an increase in the tempo of developments and 
this has brought the threjits nearer in time." (80) 
The .White Paper concluded that this increased tempo would of 
necessity have to affect the State's response thereto, and -
"Adaptations must continually be made in order to keep 
the degree of readiness in balance with the various 
threats." (81) 
The White Paper was equally explicit in its view of the nature of the 
attack on South Africa, an exposition characterised in equal measure 
by its simplicity and its naivety. The "Strategy, Policies and Aims 
of the RSA' s Enemies" are specified as ,follows: 
"a. The expansion of Marxism by fomenting revolution 
in Southern Africa. 
b. The overthrow of the white regimes in Southern 
Africa so that the militant Africa bloc can 
realise its aspirations with regard to the 
destruction of so-called colonialism and racialism 
and the establishment of Pan-Africanism. In its 
desire to destroy alleged racism, the Arab bloc 
can, with certain exceptions, be regarded as the 
partner of the Africa bloc in its hostile actions 
as far as this serves its own purpose. / 
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c. The striving after an indirect strategy in order 
to unleash revolutionary warfare in Southern 
Africa and, by means of isolation, to force the 
RSA to change its domestic policy in favour of 
Pan-Africanism. 11 (82) 
) 
These statements ~re extraordinary, not least because no African 
leader of note, far less a Soviet one, was at that stage promoting 
"Pan-Africanism". But more significantly, this was the Defence 
Force's first serious mention of the concept of "indirect strategy", 
which was to become so central in Mr Botha' s proposed counter-
revolutio~ary strategy. 
Nor was this mere sophistry aimed at convincing Mr Botha's colleagues 
that he would make a tough, "kragdadige" and worthy successor to Mr 
Vorster as Prime Minister. Had this been so, one would have expected 
the rhetoric promoting the "total onslaught" to have diminished once 
the correspondent notion of "total strategy" came to be the accepted 
modus operandi of the State to deal with perceived security threats, 
once Mr Botha became that successor. However this missionary zeal did 
not diminish; indeed, just the reverse. Now that Mr Botha had become 
Prime Minister it was necessary to persuade, not only the public at 
large, but more crucially, the rest of the State machinery, that the 
onslaught was real and all-embracing. 
In the 1979 White Paper on Defence, tor example, the writer records 
"increased political, economic and military pressure on the RSA", and 
says that "the military threat against the RSA is intensifying at an 
alarming rate". (83) In another place, the White Paper argues that 
"the total onslaught such as is being waged against South Africa" 
r~quires "highly co-ordinated action" if it is successfully to be 
counteracted. (84) The following year, General Malan, who was shortly 
to become Minister of Defence, addressed the University of Pretoria's 
Institute of Strategic Studies specifically on the subject_ of the 
"total onslaught". (85) 
He argued that the Republic was the subject of a co-ordinated 
J 
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onslaught aimed specifically at what he termed "die RSA se vier 
magsbasisse". 
The bases of power were the political/diplomatic, the economic, the 
social/psychological and the security bases. The political/diplomatic 
onslaught was specifically directed at driving a wedge between South 
Africa and the West, between South Africa and the rest of Africa and 
between the Government and certain parts of the population. It was 
clear that the United Nations was the catalyst of this onslaught, and 
that the United Nations itself was under communist domination. 
Because the Western countries did not take a firm line on communism 
in ·the UN -
"Daar kan met reg beweer word dat die Westerse 
moonthade hulleself as handlangers van die kommunisme 
beskikbaar stel en indirek besig is om mee te werk aan 
die vernietiging van kapitalisme en die vestiging van 
wereldkomrnunisme." 
The economic "onslaught" consisted of attempts to isolate the 
Republic economically, and of the imposition of codes of conduct on 
South African business. The arms boycott, General Malan maintained, 
was only the precedent of other, more serious boycotts. (86) 
While the economic onslaught was fairly easy to discern, the 
"social/psychological c;mslaught" was a more subtle campaign, "vanwee 
die bedekte aard daarvan". In part, the onslaught was directed at 
instilling a mood of defeatism in the ruling class in South Africa, 
but more importantly, it was aimed at creating a "revolutionary 
climate" in the working classes in the Republic. The aim of this 
was -
"by nie-blanke groepe die gevoel te skep dat geweld, en 
nie onderhandeling nie, die enigste oplossing is." (87) 
Finally, there was, he argued, a very well-developed "onslaught" on 
the security bases of the Republic. This was quite simply a campaign 
of aggression, involving (again in a multi-dimensional way) terror-
J 
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ism, semi-conventional operations and sabotage, directed against the 
government and people of South Africa. The proof of Soviet designs in 
this area lay in the large numbers of troops and weapons which it 
pushed into the front-line states, as well as in the assistance which 
it gave to the principal terrorism organisation, the ANC. 
General Malan concluded his analysis of the onslaught against the 
Republic with the words -
"Die ontwerp van 'n totale aanslag, meesterlik deur 
Rusland gehanteer, ontneem die voorgenome slagoffer die 
luuksheid van voorbereiding vanaf mobilisasie tot 'n 
formele oorlogstand. Die RSA het die noodsaaklikheid 
besef van h voortdurende gereedheidstand om die aanslag 
op sy vier magsbasisse te bekamp. Hiervoor is 'n totale 
strategie n~dig; aangesien die totale aanslag teen die 
RSA slegs afgestaan kan word deur 'n koordineerde 
aanwending van al die middele tot die RSA se beskik-
king." (88) 
The idea that the total onslaught was ~irected against these four 
"bases of power" enjoyed a brief period of official sanction. In the 
semi-official publication, Mili taria, for example, a Lt-Cdr Meyer 
attempted to demonstrate that all revolutions the world had ever seen 
had been started by propaganda which had exploited political, 
economic, social or military grievances. Like General Malan, his 
analysi~ convinced him that revolutions might be avoided if 
"noodwendige veranderinge deur evolusionere ontwikkeling" were 
accomplished in the "poli ties-staatkundig, ekonomie, nasionale 
veiligheid en maatskaplik" areas of governmental activity. (89) 
However, this approach seemed to be regarded as too sophisticated for 
the average man-in-the-street. By 1982, the official line appeared to 
have reverted back to a blanket total onslaught, encompassing not 
only onslaught against these four bases of power, but on the whole 
fabric of society. In a special series of articles in Paratus, 
headlined "Total Involvement", the SADF built up ,a picture of the 
Soviet Union having definite and comprehensive aims in Southern 
Africa, which undeniably involved the military overthrow of the South 
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African government. (90) Using Marxist-Leninist and Maoist doctrines 
interchangeably, the articles argued that the Soviets, by means of a 
grand design, encouraged terrorist organisations to infil tra,te the 
rural areas, exploited conditions of unrest in the towns, made use of 
surrogate forces to step up the insurgency war into a semi-conven-
tional war, and then -
"the enemies of the RSA will eventually try to deliver 
the coup de grac.e by means of a conventional onslaught 
from one or more of the neighbouring states .•. This 
onslaught woµld include maritime action and be accom-
panied by large-scale internal unrest. The USSR is for 
this reason using the so-called threat that South 
Africa's military potential holds for its neighbouring 
states as an excuse to supply huge quantities of arms 
to those countries. This build-up also includes the 
gradual increase in involvement by Soviet-bloc military 
personnel as well as the development of these coun-
tries' infrastructures for war." 
The article concluded with the familiar theme : that South Africa was 
merely a pawn in the Soviet grand design. This was to cut off the 
West from its strategic minerals and to control the Cape Sea Route. 
It was thus justified to infer that "the RSA is Moscow's stepping 
stone to world conquest." (91) 
The extent of the onslaught seemingly knew no bounds. In February 
1982, the Defence Force announced that a new programme of sports 
promotion would be introduced, inter alia to enhance the image 
projected by the organisation. But, in announcing this programme, the 
SADF could not resist bringing the theme of a total onslaught to 
bear -
"With the total onslaught against the country, . the SA 
Defence Force also has the duty to develop the talents 
of its top sportsmen to the utmost, so that the 
onslaught may also be resisted in the field of sports." 
(92) 
The imagination boggles at the idea of a Kremlin strategy to bring a 
"sports onslaught" to bear on South Africa, but its reality was 




At the same time, the Steyn Commission Report was tabled in the House ~ 
of Assembly. This 1 367 page Report nominally dealt with the subject 
of the South African Media; in fact, it was probably the most 
comprehensive treatment of the idea of a "total onslaught" ever 
assembled. (93) 
The Steyn Commission "found" that there was a total onslaught against 
the West by the Soviet Union, and that South Africa occupied a 
pivotal position in this onslaught. Indeed, it went further, 
suggesting that a Third World War was already in progress. It 
argued - using terminology borrowed from the 1973 and 1977 Defence 
White Papers - that "we are involved in a war against our will and 
whether we like it or not". (94) 
According to the Commission: the Soviet Union's aim was world 
domination. Seldom, if ever, did the Soviets commit their ground 
forces, relying instead on methods of subversion and the employment 
of surrogate forces. Their methods, according to the Commission 
were -
''subversion, disinformation, psychological war, espion-
age, diplomatic negotiations, military and economic aid 
programmes, terrorism and guerilla war." (95) 
The Commission established that the surrogate forces which the 
Soviets were employing in South Africa included the ANC, SllJAPO, the 
PAC, the SA Communist Party and related subsidiary organisations. The 
methods used by the organisations included political warfare (the 
fomenting of political instability, disorder, chaos and disruption, 
so as to achieve a revolutionary climate), psychological warfare 
(described as subverting "the mental structure and fundamental 
beliefs of people living in a society"), infiltration and subversion. 
( 96) The Commission found that the "nerve centre" of the total 
onslaught was the KGB, described in the Report as "the terrible 
irtstrument of torture, suppression, murder and subversion". ( 97) The 
KGB, so the Commission believed, transmitted its orders from the 





Embassies in Lusaka and Dar-es-Salaam. 
The Commission summed up its findings on the total onslaught as 
follows : 
"From the above wide-ranging survey, it is clear that 
the threats and dangers of varying nature and degree 
are simultaneously besetting the dynamically developing 
and aggressively heterogeneous South African Community, 
some of those dangers and threats being more visible 
and tangible than others and consequently more easily 
detectable and capable of being handled and countered, 
while others are less so, and consequently of possibly 
greater potential danger." (98) 
While it is true that the Government neither accepted nor outrightly 
r.ejected the Report and its recommendations, this near hysterical 
treatment served a useful socialisation process, not least for 
members of Mr Botha's own Party. 
The total onslaught theme was dutifully reiterated in the 1982 White 
Paper on Defence, the first to be tabled under the new administration 
of General Malan. For the first time, the White Paper had a separate 
section entitled "The Threat", with a sub-heading dealing with the 
"Onslaught against South Africa". The writer, presuming it unneces-
sary to support his contentions with any proof, blandly states, as if 
self-evident, that -
"The ultimate aim of the Soviet Union and its allies is 
to overthrow the present body politic in the RSA and to 
replace it with a Marxist-orientated form of government 
to further the objectives of the USSR. Therefore all 
possible methods and means are used to attain this 
objective. This includes instigating social and labour 
unrest, civilian resistance, terrorism attacks against 
the infrastructure of the RSA and the intimidation of 
Black leaders and members of the Security Forces. This 
onslaught is supported by a world-wide propaganda 
campaign and the involvement of various front organi-
sations, such as trade unions and even certain church 
organisations and leaders." (99) 
It did not evidently occur to the writer that, while he may have 
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correctly identified some of the manifestations of political 
discontent (and these were evident, for example, from the demonstra-
tions surrounding the Republic Festival in 1981), these might more 
correctly be ascribed to the absence of legitimate political 
platforms on the part of the majority of the population, than to the 
efforts of the Soviet Union. 
1982 probably marked the high point of the total onslaught propa-
ganda, a~d the reason for this was not difficult to discern. In that 
year, a Defence Amendment Bill was introduced to Parliament, which 
provided for very comprehensive extensions to the periods of service 
required to be completed by white males in terms of the Defence Act. 
The service commitment for the Citizen Force was increased from 240 
days to 720 days, and that of the regular Commandos from 240 days to 
1 000 days. In addition, provision was also made for the registration 
and call-up of all white males who had hitherto not done military 
service, Such persons were required to undergo an initial training 
period of 30 days, and subsequent periods of 12 days a year until the 
age of 55 years, in what became known as the "area commandos". 
This then, was the "total involvement" of the population in the 
defence of the country, about which Paratus had talked. It amounted 
to an extraordinary militarisation of the South African society, on a 
hitherto unprecedented scale. But it did not stop at white males, 
ei t.her. The 1982 Defence White Paper sets, as one of the goals of the 
SADF, the policy of militarising the entire society -
"It is policy that all population groups be involved in 
defending the RSA. This means the representation of all 
population· groups in the SA Defence Force, in other 
words, a Defence Force of the people for the people." 
(100) 
In practical terms, this meant the expansion of the existing 
facilities of the SA Cape Corps near Faure, so as to accommodate more 
recruits, and the estabJishment of battalions in each of the national 
states. In the latter case, it was envisaged that such battalions 
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would form the nucleus of the post-independence defence forces of 
these states. (101) 
Militarisation was a goal in respect of (at least) white females as 
well. While formal training facilities existed for white women, both 
permanent force and volunteers, at George (in the case of the Army) 
and Fish Hoek (in the case of the Navy), attempts were increasingly 
made to involve women in defence activities on a non-formal basis. In 
a recruiting document, distributed through the medium of women's 
organisations in the Eastern Cape, mention is made of the necessity 
for the "preparedness of women". The document advances several 
reasons why "preparedness" is desirable -
"The onslaught against SA is only 20% 
nature. The other 80% takes the form 
economical and social actions. It is 
field that the woman can play a valuable 
of a military 
of political, 
in the social 
role." (102) 
The document continues by pointing out that the woman can contribute 
materially to winning the battle against the onslaught, inter alia by 
adopting a positive attitude to national service -
"If the woman wants to contribute to the elimination of 
the revolutionary onslaught, it is essential that she 
has a deeper and broader understanding of the problems 
and the solutions thereof. She ·must also have a 
complete understanding of the need for military service 
(National Service). In these ways, she will be equipped 
to morally support her husband when he carries out his 
duties for his country. Through training, women will be 
able to identify with the contribution that men are 
making in respect of defence and will thus be able to 
give absolute moral support." (103) 
What did all this amount to? We have seen that in the 1940' s and 
1950' s, South Africa's defence policy was based on the assumption 
·that it was an integral part of the West, and that in super power 
conflicts it would throw in its lot with the West, as it had done in 
the Second World War and in Korea. With the increasing distaste by 
the West for South Africa's internal policies becoming evident, the 
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defence' planners came to realise that the West did not require South 
Africa as an ally. As this perception became more rooted, official 
statements began to portray the West more and more as an unwitting 
ally of the Soviets, and as a collective in,sti tut ion which did not 
realise when its own interests were being vitally affected. This, in 
turn, caused South African government spokesmen to seek to develop 
domestic resources, firstly in the area of armaments provision, and 
---
secondly in terms of manpower. The successful "sale" of this to the 
political establishment and to th~ public was made possible by means 
of the assiduous marketing of the concept that South Africa was the 
subject of a "total onslaught". 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE SECURITY INTELLIGENCE APPARATUS 
PRIOR TO P W BOTHA 
The contemporary formal structure of the security intelligence 
apparatus conceals the changes which have occurred within it both 
over time and as a result of the domestic political power-play. From 
' 
the time of the Union of South Africa in 1910 until the Second World 
War, successive South African governments relied heavily on the 
British Military Intelligence for external intelligence. (1) A 
military intelligence section was established as part of the Union 
Defence Force by General Smuts during the Second World War, and in 
addition to its tactical duties with the South African forces during 
the war, it had additional responsibilities for internal security. Of 
particular importance was the role which this section played in 
combating the acti vi ti~s, and interning the members of the Ossewa-
brandwag, a militant, · pro-Nazi organisation which had loose links 
with the National Party. ( 2) Unfortunately for General Smuts, the 
military intelligence section continued to submit reports about 
cert~in right-wing politicians long after the war had ended, and some 
of these reports fell into the hands of the National Party after the 
1948 election. (3) Perhaps because of the outrage of the Nationalists 
when they discovered that the military intelligence section had been 




Shortly before this, however, it was decided to establish a section 
of the South African Police to deal specifically with the perceived 
internal security th:reats. The "Special Branch", as it was then 
known, was formed as a plainclothes unit, its members being employed 
as undercover agents, often infiltrating organisations suspected of 
being subversive. (4) Much of their work involved the implementation 
of the Suppression of Communism Act of 1950. This Act gave such an 
extraordinarily wide definition of the term "communist", that the 
Special Branch spent much of its time and energies monitoring the 
activities of trade unions, civil liberty organisations and opposi-
tion political parties advocating non-racial policies. (5) 
During the early years of its existence, the Special Branch had 
little formal organisation, and no legal provision to circumscribe 
its responsibilities. Initially consisting of no more than a dozen 
officers, the Branch gradually expanded until it had branches in all 
the centres throughout the country. (6) In recognition of its growing 
size and importance, the Branch was also given legality by the 
insertion, in 1955, of a further function of the South African !' 
Police, into the Police Act, viz. "the preservation of the internal 
security of the Union". (7) During the unrest in the 1960's following 
Sharpeville, the Special Branch played an integral role in internal 
security operations, more particularly under the energetic leadership 
of Genel;'al H J van den Bergh, who was appointed head of the Branch in 
196.3. (8) Amongst their successes could be counted the effective 
neutralisation, within the country, of Umkhonto we Sizwe and Poqo, 
the military wings of the African National Congress and the 
Pan-Africanist Congress respectively, and the rounding up of the 
leadership of the South African Communist Party while they were in 
the process of plotting armed insurrection, in 1965. The name of the 
Spe.cial Branch was changed to that of Security Police when General 
van den Bergh became its commander. 
During the same period, the intelligence section of the SADF was 
revived. The withdrawal of South Africa from the British Commonwealth 
and increasing repugnance amongst Western nations of South Africa's 
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racial policies meant that the limited military co-operation which 
had exif?ted between South Africa and some NATO countries, notably 
Britain, was severely curtailed. One of the implications of this was 
that South Africa was no longer privileged with intelligence from her 
"anti-communist allies", and in recognition of this fact, the 
Commandant-General of the Defence Force established an intelligence 
staff which fell initially under the Chief of the General Staff, in 
1960~ During 1964, this section was given independent status as the 
Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI). (9) 
After a very short while, it was clear that, while the DMI and the 
Security Police ostensibly had different responsibilities, there was 
considerable overlapping in-their functions. The DMI's responsibili-
ties were primarily external; the "revolutionary war" in which the 
SADF perceived itself - even at that stage - to be engaged, however, 
demanded that some of its intelligence had to be obtained inside the 
country. Similarly, as the headquarters of the ANC and PAC were 
outside the country, the Security Police were obliged to monitor 
activities of these organisations there, rather than inside the 
country, despite their formal responsibility for exclusively internal 
intelligence. To complicate the matter still further, other govern-
ment departments, notably the Department of Foreign Affairs, received 
intelligence in the normal course of events which could have been of 
use to either or both the DMI or the Security Police. As a -r'esul t of 
this , confusion, the head, of the DMI ,. ·General Retief, submitted a 
memorandum to his superiors in-1963; which proposed the establishment 
of a central body to co-ordinate intelligence. ( 10) The Government 
reacted positively to the suggestion, and a State Security Committee 
was set up to streamline procedures and present evaluated intelli-
gence to the Cabinet. (11)· 
Unfortunately neither this body nor its successors, the State 
Security Advisory Council and the Intelligence Co-ordinating Section, 
operated at all efficiently. All these bodies relied on regular 
meetings of the Ministers of State and permanent civil service heads 
of the various government departments concerned with security 
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intelligence. The personalities concerned were as often as not too 
occupied with other responsibilities. An attempt was made to provide 
a permanent secretariat, but this too, foundered owing as much to 
lack of specific direction from above, as to a lack of statutory 
recognition, which made co-operation by other state bodies a favour 
rather than an obligation. (12) 
Accordingly, in 1968, another attempt was made to streamline the 
security intelligence apparatus. Mr Vorster, the Prime Minister, 
summoned General van den Bergh, and instructed him to establish a 
permanent and professional central intelligence organisation. (13) 
Between August 1968 and May 1969, General van den Bergh P,roceeded to 
establish this organisation, and on the 1st May 1969, the new 
department, known as the Bureau for State Security, was formally · 
established by a proclamation of the State President. 
The duties assigned to the Bureau in the proclamation were as wide as 
they were vague. The Bureau was to -
"(1) Investigate all matters affecting the security of 
the State, to correlate and evaluate the information 
collected and, where necessary, to inform and advise 
the Government, interested government departments and 
other bodies in regard thereto; and . 
(2) perform such other functions and responsibilities 
as may be determined from time to time." (14) 
The actual operations of the Bureau, too, were shrouded in secrecy 
right from the start. By virtue of amendments to the Public Service 
Act (15) passed by Parliament in 1969, the Minister responsible for 
the Bureau (the Prime Minister) was allowed to make regulations for 
the Bureau without referring these to Parliament. (16) Further, none 
of the usual provisions which regulated the civil service (e.g. 
dismissal for misconduct, promotions, etc.) applied to the Bureau. 
( 17) In addition, Section 10 of the General Laws Amendment Act, 
passed in the same y~ar, placed the activities of the Bureau within 
the ambit of the Official Secrets Act, thus precluding the press from 
,, 
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reporting on the activities of the organisation. Moreover, Section 29 
of the General Laws Amendment Act provided that no information need 
be given in a court of law if the Prime Minister or any other 
Minister of State certified that this information would be preju-
dicial to the security of the State in general or that of the Bureau 
in particular. 
Finally, Parliament simultaneously passed the Security Services 
Special Account Act, which created a new, secret account to cover the 
expen~es - even to the extent of the salaries - of the Bureau. 
When the Public Service Amendment Act was introduced to Parliament, 
the Minister of the Interior referred to the lack of co-ordination 
which had existed in the intelligence services,' and said that the 
Bureau was being established to facilitate such co-ordination. 
Referring to the wide powers of the Prime Minister in making 
regulations for the Bureau, he somewhat blandly remarked -
"The functions of such an organisation are necessarily 
of a confidential nature, which necessitates avoiding 
any unnecessary disclosure of such functions in 
broad outline, the amendments propose to vest the 
Minister who is responsible for the Bureau with the 
power, inter alia, to make regulations and in general 
do what is necessary in order to enable the Bureau to 
function." (18) 
Sir de ·Villiers Graaff, at the time the Leader of the Opposition, 
gave the establishment of the Bureau his blessing, albeit with 
certain misgiving. He warned that, because the Act removed the 
control of Parliament over the activities of the Bureau -
·"A great responsibility is placed on the Government .•. 
a great responsibility is placed on the Minister 
concerned ... I think it is right that I should express 
the hope that those few thoughts will always be borne 
in mind in the application of this legislation." (19) 
The provisions .of the General Laws Amendment Act which afforded the 
Bureau protection under the Official Secrets Act and indemnity from 
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court proceedings were, how.ever, bitterly criticised by the Oppo-
sition. It was pointed out that the provisions could be employed to 
protect the members of the Bureau from civil proceedings, and that, 
given the nature of the responsibilities entrusted to tHe Bureau, the 
organisation could operate in complete steal th over just about the 
whole of South African society. 
Mr Mike Mitchell, the Chief Opposition spokesman, argued -
"Let me say that you subvert your internal security 
perhaps more when you disregard the normal processes of 
justice, tQan you do when you try to produce some law 
which is an iron fist of the Executive . . • Surely if 
you subvert those processes .YOU provide for such 
insecurity amongst the in di victuals who make up the 
State, as to subvert the very State itself. Such a 
situation cannot strengthen the State. This Bill 
reflect(s) the difference which exists between the two 
sides of the House. We believe that the State exists 
for the benefit of the individual, and not vice versa." 
(20) 
Whereas the United Party moved a reasoned amendment to the Act, Mrs 
Helen Suzman, at that time sitting as the lone Progressive Party 
member, invoked the strongest form of Parliamentary opposition, 
moving that the Bill be read "this day six months". She warned, with 
remarkable foresight, that the provisions of Section 29 could be 
employed to suppress information which could be germane to inquests 
into the deaths of detainees held under the already wide security 
legislation. (21) In his reply, the Deputy Minister of Justice 
retorted that the Act merely provided statutory codification for an 
already existent prerogative of the Executive, and the measure passed 
into law after a division. The Security Services Special Account Act 
was passed shortly afterwards without opposition. 
The Bureau was thus legally· created and vested with wide and vague 
powers, protected from public scrutiny from both the press and the 
courts, and funded by a secret account, the details of which could 
not even be disclosed to Parliament. As Graaff had said, an enormous 
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responsibility had been placed on the Government and the Prime 
Minister to ensure that the Bureau, exempt as it was from public 
control, was at least controlled by the Government and the Prime 
Minister. The Opposition was at that time prepared to trust the Prime 
Minister - Sir de Villiers and Mr Vorster had a very trusting 
relationship - to perform this function. 
They hoped that the Bureau would facilitate the co-ordination of the 
intelligence and security agencies in South Africa, and were prepared 
to trade their, and the public's, control over the Bureau in the 
interests of greater efficiency. 
Their trust was sadly misplaced, for a number of reasons. In the 
first place, the Prime Minister, Mr Vorster, and General van den 
Bergh were personal ;frends, having been fellow internees together 
during the Second World War for displaying pro-Nazi sympathies. This 
meant that, far from controlling the activities of the Bureau, Mr 
Vorster allowed General van den Bergh pretty much of a free hand in 
running it. Secondly, the system relied on the vigilance of the Prime 
Minister to exercise proper control, and while Mr Vorster might have 
been able to exercise that control, in the latter years of his 
administration, he assumed responsibilities (e.g. in the field of 
Foreign Affairs) which allowed him very little time to attend to 
administrative details in his own department. He was also dogged by 
bad health in those years which affected his powers of concentration. 
Thirdly, account must be taken of the extraordinary personality of 
General van den Bergh himself. From evidence which was submitted to 
the Commission of Inquiry into Alleged Irregularities in the former 
Department of Information (the Erasmus Commission), it becomes clear 
that General van den Bergh had wildly inflated ideas of his own 
im~ortance, and of his central role in South African politics. In his 
testimony to the Erasmus Commission, he remarked (translation) -
"Mr Commissioner, I want to tell you in all honesty 
that my Department and I are capable of doing the 
impossible. This is not boasting • . . I can tell you 
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today, not for the records, but I can tell you that I 
have enough men who will commit murder if I order them 
tO •••II (22) 
Throughout his testimony, he referred to meetings with Cabinet 
Ministers and the Prime Minister which were conducted entirely on 
first name terms. 
He boasted that he had direct access to the Prime Minister at all 
times, and represented himself as a sort of confidant cum confi-
dential messenger for Mr Vorster. (23) At the same time, the 
Commission revealed that he had deliberately disobeyed some of Mr 
Vorster's orders. (24) 
Finally, the terms of reference of the Bureau contained in the 
proclamation which established it, required it "to investigate all 
matters affecting the security of the State·" and to "correlate and 
evaluate" such information. Whatever Mr Vorster's intentions may have 
been, the implication of this was that the Bureau had an investi-
gative function over and above the function of security intelligence 
co-ordination for which it had ostensibly been created. The 
description thus allowed the Bureau to interfere with, and take over, 
functions formerly performed either by the Security Police or the 
DMI. Indeed, for a short period between September 1968 and April 
1969, the Government toyed with the idea of absorbing the DMI into 
the Bureau, but the scheme was later dropped. (25) By 1972, for 
example, the Bureau had six divisions dealing, respectively, with 
subversion, counter-espionage, political and economic threats, 
military threats, administration, and research and special duties. 
(26) This was resented, particularly by the DMI (27) who could see no 
valid reason for the Bureau's involvement in the evaluation of 
military threats. (28) In turn, this led to unseemly bureaucratic 
wrangling between the DMI and the Bureau, often defeating the very 
objective for which the Bureau had been formed. In short, far from 
establishing an intelligence clearing house, the Government had 
merely created yet another security intelligence organ in competition 
with the two al7eady in existence. (29) 
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General van den Bergh and his Bureau, however, underestimated Mr P w 
Botha, at that stage the Minister of Defence, who possessed two 
qualities which made him a formidable political opponent. In the 
first place, Mr Botha was a seasoned politician who had first come to 
Parliament in 1.g4s, and who had been a National Party organiser 
before that. He understood political in-fighting perhaps better than 
any other member of Mr Vorster's cabinet. Secondly, Mr Botha' s 
political power base was the Defence Force which he had built up very 
successfully since he became Minister in 1966. He was not prepared to 
countenance his department playing second fiddle to the Bureau. 
What subsequently emerged was that the Bureau was instructed to 
submit its evaluated reports to the committee of the Cabinet dealing 
with defence matters. For obvious reasons, it is not possible to 
chronicle the part Mr Botha himself played in securing this 
arrangement, but it seems likely that his part would not have been 
insignificant. While Mr Botha was not chairman of the committee 
unless Mr _Vorster was absent, he did have a number of political 
allies on the committee, and could presumably get his way if he 
wanted it. The committee was later officially designated the State 
Security Council. (30) 
Simultaneously, a Commission of Inquiry was appointed under Mr 
Justice H J Potgieter, a Judge of Appeal, to inquire whether the 
agencies which were concerned with security intelligence "function 
properly and act in a co-ordinated manner". The Judge was further 
asked to recommend amendments, if any, to the existing legislation to 
improve the efficiency of the security services. (31) 
The Commission submitted two reports, one which concerned allegations 
which had been made about the functioning and financing of the Bureau 
by Dr .Albert Hertzog and Mr Jaap Marais,' two members of the 
newly-formed Herstigte Nasionale Party, and another which dealt with 
the substance of its terms of reference. The latter report was 
submitted to the Government in 1971, and after it had been edited by 
a Parliamentary committee to remove details which may have affected 
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the security of the State, it was made available to the public in an 
abridged form in 1972. 
The report was interesting in a number of ways. It gave a brief 
historical review of the security intelligence apparatus up until 
that date, and compared the South African set-up with similar 
institutions in the USA, Australia, New Zealand, Britain, the 
Netherlands, France and Portugal. The report dealt with the powers of 
the Bureau, some aspects of the Bureau's modus operandi and 
extensively with the Bureau's recommendations about how it would have 
liked to operate. It recommended, amongst other things, a more 
precise definition of the Bureau's role vis-a-vis those of the other 
agencies, the statutory recognition of the State Security Council and 
some modifications of Sections 10 and 29 of the General Laws 
Amendment Act of 1969. 
However, the Commission's report was marred by an over-legalistic 
approach to its subject matter. It rejected, for example, allegations 
that the Bureau was assuming executive, functions (e.g. the powers of 
arrest and interrogation) simply on the grounds that the Public 
Service Amendment Act of 1969 did not make provision for such 
functions. Similarly, the Commission rejected the possibility that 
the Bureau was intercepting mail articles, because such an action 
"would require an Act of Parliament". (32) In addition, the 
Commission adopted an interpretation of the words "in the interests 
of the security of the State" which leaned heavily in favour of the 
State and away from the individual. ( 33) Such facile observations 
made the Commission's report seem highly superfic~al. 
On the other hand, it is clear from the report that the mere 
establishment of the Bureau had done little or nothing to co-ordinate 
security intelligence resources, especially between the DMI and the 
Bureau, and important sections of the report recommended what 
amounted t6 a dimi~u~ion of the powers of the DMI. (34) Indeed, the 
Commissioner expressed-some doubt as to whether the activities of the 
DMI were not, in fact, illegal in terms of the Defence Act, however 
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well-intentioned such activities may have been. The Judge summed up 
the lack of co-ordination as follows -
"I do not wish to create the impression . • • that the 
DMI took this task upon its elf because it wanted to 
arrogate powers unto itself which it did' not have or 
which were none of its concern. There was an assumption 
of implied powers ... and the national security was a 
matter with which the South African Defence Force was 
most certainly concerned physically. There was no 
national intelligence agency, and the DMI simply felt 
that it was up to it to assume the responsibility for 
intelligence relating to the security of the State. 
Since, as I have indicated, the South African Police 
were also collecting intelligence on threats to 
internal security through its Security Police, there 
was naturally overlapping of the intelligence activi-
ties of the DMI and the Security Police, as both were 
operating in the same field, a field which in practice 
could not be divided feasibly into two ... The DMI and 
the Security Police often saw the same intelligence as 
intelligence relating to a threat which belonged to 
their particular field ~f operations" (35) 
and expressed the hope that, with better definition of the powers and 
responsibilities of the Bureau, these problems would disappear. 
Needless to say, a more perceptive Commission would have recognised 
the Bureau as part of the problem, and not offered it as a solution. 
Finally, the Commission trusted that statutory recognition of the 
State Security Council would facilitate interdepartmental co-opera-
tion in the field of security intelligence. 
The Government, however, announced that it was accepting the 
Commission.'s report in its entirety, and during the 1972 session of 
Parliament, introduced a number of pieces of legislation designed to· 
give effect to its recommendations. The most important piece of 
legislation was the Security Intelligence and State Security Council 
Act. 
The Act provided for the statutory recognition of the State Security 
Council (SSC), consisting of the Prime Minister, the senior Minister 
of the Republic (if he was not already a member in some other 
/ 
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capacity) , the Ministers of Defence, Foreign Affairs, Justice and 
Police, the Secretaries of Foreign Affairs, Justice and Security 
Intelligence, the Commissioner of the South African Police and the 
Chief of the SADF. In addition, the Prime Minister was given the 
power to co-opt other Ministers or officials as and when he saw fit. 
(36) 
The Act also spelled out the functions of the Council. It was to 
advise the Government with regard to -
11 ( i) the formulation of national policy and strategy 
in relation to the security of the Republic and 
the ·manner in which such policy or strategy shall 
be implemented and be executed; 
(ii) a policy to combat any particular threat to the 
security of the Republic; (and) .•• to 'determine 
intelligence priorities." (37) 
The wording of this section is instructive. For the first time, the 
term "national strategy" was introdyced into legislation - a term 
which, as we have seen, was the particular preserve of Mr Botha. 
However, ·it was made clear that not only was the SSC to formulate 
national strategy, it was also to monitor it. The SSC was to 
determine how such strategy was "implemented" and "executed". 
Clearly, the members of the Cabinet and civil service Secretaries 
could not themselves monitor particular strategies. This task would, 
of necessity, have to be performed by a separate staff, employed for 
that task. 
The Act, however, remained silent on this aspect. In the context of 
the Act, it seems that the Bur~au was intended to hav~ performed the 
task, as Section 2 of the Act laid down more precise powers and 
functions of the Bureau, in line with the recommendations of the 
Potgieter Commission. 
Section 2 of the Act laid down these functions and powers. The Bureau 
was to collect, evaluate, correlate and interpret security intelli-
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gence with a view to detecting threats against the Republic, and to 
prepare intelligence "estimates" for the SSC. They could, in 
addition, at the request of any government department, collect 
"departmental intelligence", which was defined as information 
required by any government department in order to perform functions 
entrusted to it "by law" relating to the security of the Republic. 
Finally, it was empowered to formulate national intelligence policy 
(which had to be ratified by the SSC) and to facilitate the flow of 
security intelligence between departments of state. 
Here was clearly a lapsus in the law which could be exploited by 
bureaucrats. How could the Bureau facilitate the flow of security 
intelligence between departments of state if these departments were 
themselves collecting security intelligence? How could officials at 
the Bureau collect "departmental intelligence" for the SADF, when the 
SADF already had its own staff performing this function? 
To overcome these obvious difficulties, Section 3 was inserted. This 
sectio.n provided that where a particular department of state had 
already been given the statutory responsibility for "combating 
any threat to the security of the Republic", that department was 
empowered to collect, evaluate, correlate and interpret departmental 
intelligence for the purpose of discharging such statutory respon-
sibility. The section goes on, however, to limit this power. Neither 
the SADF nor the SAP was entitled to collect such departmental 
intelligence in a "covert manner", nor was the SADF or the SAP 
entitled to collect such intelligence overseas, without the knowledge 
and approval of the Bureau. This limitation aside, Section 3(3) makes 
it quite clear that the new delineation of the responsibilities of 
the Bureau in no way affected "the continued existence or the 
establishment of any intelligence service attached to any department 
of state." 
Again, more is implied than explicit in Section 3. The prohibition on 
covert operations by the DMI and the Security Police inside the 
country, and the vetting of overseas operations by the Bureau, 
/ ' 
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implied both that the Bureau was going to engage in covert and/or 
overseas operations, and that the DMI and the Security Police had 
done so previously. Seen in this light, the duties of the Bureau to 
collect security intelligence took on a new significance. Despite its 
original mandate as a security intelligence "clearing house", and the 
conceptualisation of the Potgieter Commission, the Bureau was, if 
anything, given additional executive powers by the Act. 
The second reading of the Security Intelligence and State Security 
Council Bill took place on the 24th May 1972. Mr Vorster, who 
introduced the debate, quoted approvingly and at length from the 
Potgieter Commission's report to "prove" that the Bureau was staffed 
only with the best personnel, that the Bureau had no executive 
responsibilities, that the Bureau had acquired its poor reputation 
from ignorant, malicious or misinformed rumours, · and that, as a 
result of the report, these rumours could now be laid to rest. What 
was more interesting was Mr Vorster's justification for establishing 
the SSC. War was no longer formally declared, he argued, but -
"A new element has crept in over the years, i.e. the 
element of softening up the country one wants to attack 
in the first place, there is the revolutionary 
undermining of the authority structure of the State ..• 
In the second place ..• the enemy makes use of people 
who commit sabotage • • . but physical violence is not 
all that is involved. Another aspect ... is the casting 
of suspicion on and the boycotting of a country on 
every possible front so as to isolate that country ... 
In the case of South Africa, considering its strategic 
position as far as the Cape Sea Route is concerned, and 
its strategic position in Africa, as well as its 
natural resources, it has become increasingly important 
to take cognizance of the procurement and organi-
sation of advanced bases or bridgeheads from where the 
country may eventually be attacked." (38) 
The implication seemed to be that the SSC was being instituted 
precisely to "counter" this new method of waging war - the total 
onslaught. The Bill was supported by both opposition parties and 
passed into law. 
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In line with their commitment to accept all the recommendations of 
the Potgieter Commission, the Government also introduced legislation 
to amend (albeit marginally) the secrecy provisions of the General 
Laws Amendment Act of 1969 and to regulate the circumstances ~nder 
which the recording of telephone calls and the interception of mail 
might take place. 
Mrs Suzman was alone in her opposition to the measures. (39) 
However, despite having created more formal procedures regulating the 
gathering and dissemination of security intelligence, the structures 
thus created still demanded strong, unified and goal-directed 
political leadership. But towards the end of 1973, the Cabinet, which 
had formerly provided this leadership, became the scene of intense 
factionalism. This power-play was destined vitally to affect not only 
the structure of the security intelligence apparatus, but indeed the 
very way in which central government decisions were made in South 
Africa. To appreciate the significance of these changes and their 
ramifications, it is important to place them in context, and to do 
this, it will be necessary to digress slightly. 
The reasons for the breakdown of the monolithic political leadership 
~ of Afrikanerdom were highly complex and are worthy of study in their 
own right. (40) One of the most important reasons was the election, 
in September 1973, of Dr Connie Mulder as the Transvaal leader of the 
National Party. This had a special significance. Because of the fact 
that members of the National Party caucus elect the leader of the 
Party, and because the Transvaal commanded the biggest bloc of votes 
in such elections, the Transvaal leader was regarded as the most 
likely candidate to succeed the Prime Minister. Certainly, this had 
secured the election of Mr Strij dom (despite the objections of Dr 
Malan), Dr Verwoerd and Mr Vorster as Prime Minister, and Dr Mulder 
had no reason to believe that this pattern should not repeat itself. 
Dr Mulder was, however, relatively junior, both to be a serious 
contender for the premiership, and, indeed, to be leader of the 
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Transvaal. He was only ranked eleventh in the Cabinet, and of the ten 
more senior Ministers, eight; were from the Transvaal. One of the 
other two was Mr P W Botha, the leader of the Party in the Cape, and 
a person who had been a member of the Cabinet since 1961. 
Both Dr Mulder and Mr Botha were aware that Mr Vorster's health was 
indifferent and both realised the potential fruits which lay just 
within their grasp were he to retire. It was against this background 
of personal ambition that subsequent events unfolded. 
At the stage that Dr Mulder became leader of the Transvaal, he held 
the portfolios of Interior and Information in the Cabinet. Neither of 
these portfolios was particularly politically significant and neither 
was allocated a significant section of the national budget. In the 
1972/73 financial year, for example, the Departments of Interior and 
Information together were allocated R12 559 000 or 0,71% of the total 
appropriation. By contrast, Mr Botha's Defence portfolio affected -
through the system of national service - virtually every white 
household in the country, and in the same financial year, Mr Botha 
'-· 
induced the Exchequer to allocate R335 336 000 or 12, 21% of the 
national budget to the South African Defence Force. (41) If in no 
other way, then certainly in terms of institutional politics, Mr 
Botha was a more credible successor to Mr Vorster. 
Dr Mulder set about redressing this imbalance in a single-minded way. 
The first imperative was to increase his department's responsibili-
ties, and thereby to increase its share of the appropriations. He 
thereby first persuaded Mr Vorster that the Department of Information / 
could undertake important overseas responsibilities. Ironically - or 
perhaps shrewdly - he suggested that the Department could have an 
important role in countering the total onslaught which was being 
waged against the country, as this onslaught also had a propaganda or 
misinformation element. Mr Vorster agreed, and in December 1973, 
minuted the Ministers of Finance, Defence, Foreign Affairs, Bantu 
Administration, Economic Affairs and Police, and Mines, Immigration, 
Sport and Recreation, setting out the new responsibilities of the 
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Department of Information. This read, in part, as follows -
"In die lig van die toenemende poli tieke en propa-
ganda-aanslae teen die Republiek, beide in intensiteit 
en omvang, asook die onortodokse en gesofistikeerde 
vorme wa t di t aanneem, het di t noodsaakl ik geword om 
die funksie van die Departement van Inl igting in die 
bevordering van landsbelang in die algemeen en nasion-
ale veiligheid in besonder dienooreenkomstig aan te 
pas." 
The document went on to outline some of these functions, which 
amounted to "selling" government policy to opinion-formers overseas. 
The document concluded -
"Die uitvoering van die opdrag van die Departement, die 
verwesentliking van sy doelstellings, die metodiek wat 
aangewend word, asook die finansiering van alle aksies 
maak deel u:lt van die portefeuljeverantwoordelikheid 
van die Minister van Inligting in oorleg met die 
Minister van Buitelandse Sake. In die uitvoering van sy 
opdrag, is dit aan die Minister van Inligting oorgelaat 
om te bepaal watter metodes, middele en aksies, hetsy 
openbaar of geheim, noodsaaklik en mees effektief sal 
wees om bogenoemde doelstellings te verwesentlik.'' (42) 
The minute seems so bland, and yet is remarkable in its scope. The 
Prime Minister was delegating to Dr Mulder the responsibility for 
determining the methods, means and actions, whether public or secret, 
to be pursued in this overseas campaign. It was also part of Dr ', 
Mulder's responsibilities to obtain the finances for these methods, 
means and actions. Nowhere, however, in the Department's responsi-
bilities as outlined in the proclamation establishing it, was there 
the implicit or explicit expectation that covert programmes would be 
necessary. More to the point, the Department did not have the 
statutory authority to use secret funds, which would be spent if the 
Department was to engage in secret activities. 
However, having achieved this extended description of his responsi-
bilities, it became necessary for Dr Mulder to increase the 
Department of Information's appropriation substantially, so as to 
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underscore the importance of these new responsibilities. 
This, was not as problematic as it might have been, owing to the 
fortuitous increase in the price of gold on the world markets. After 
maintaining a steady price of $35 per ounce for decades, gold 
suddenly "took off", averaging $57, 42 per ounce in 1972, $96, 99 in 
1973 and $156,65 in 1974. (43) The South African economy was then -
as now - heavily dependent on gold exports, and the increased 
earnings thus derived from gold sparked off an unparalleled programme 
of State spending. Information's formal appropriation rose from 
R7 961 000 in 1973/74 to RlO 651 000 in 1974/75 and R11 801 000 in 
1975/76. ( 44) 
But this was not enough - and this is how the security intelligence 
apparatus became involved. The Department of Information required 
secret funds, but, in 1973, only one department, the Bureau, had such 
funds in terms of the Security Services Special Account Act of 1969. 
Parliament the next year created a similar account for the SADF - to 
facilitate the purchase of defence supplies, parts and related 
equipment bought on what was, in effect, the black market ( 45) but 
Information could not, at this stage, lay claim to such funds. 
It is tempting to speculate why such an account was riot immediately 
created for the Department of Information. One possible explanation 
was that Dr Mulder and his ubiquitous permanent Secretary, Dr 
Rhoodie, did not want the merest hint of their secret projects to 
leak out, especially as projects within the country were, even at 
that sta,ge, being contemplated. (46) It is, however, also possible 
that ~r Mulder wished deliberately to take his secret appropriations 
from the Defence Special Account so as to compromise Mr Botha and 
make him a party ~ however unwilling - to Information's schemes. (47) 
In point of fact, Dr Mulder took from both funds. In 1973/74 R793 000 
was allocated from the Security Services Special Account, in 1974/75 
R2 500 000 from this account and RlO 950 000 from the Defence Special 
Account, in 1975/76 R2 500 000 from the Security Services Special 
' 
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Account and in 1976/77 and 1977 /78 a further R31 000 ·ooo from the 
Defence Special Account. 
Between the time the Department began its secret projects and the 
time it was disestablished, it received thus R5 793 000 from the 
Security Services Special Account and R57 869 494 from the Defence 
~ 
Special Account. (48) 
In the process of obtaining these funds, and subsequently in the 
process of spending them, Dr Mulder contrived to alienate Mr Botha 
and the South African Defence Force, and later, Mr Pik Botha and the 
Department of Foreign Affairs. But during this period, he and General 
van den Bergh became staunch political allies and personal friends. 
They had much in common. Both were unscrupulous and devious in their 
political dealings. Perhaps most importantly, both realised that the 
continued survival of whites in South Africa depended in large 
measure on the rest of the continent accepting them as fellow 
Africans. Both were united in a pragmatic if cynical view that every 
politician - black or white - had a price and could be corrupted. 
(49) 
In fact, Dr Mulder's campaign was remarkably successful, and had he 
kept his subordinates, particularly Dr Eschel Rhoodie, under better 
control, the chances are that he would have been still more 
.successful. In 1974, for example, Dr Mulder went on an extended tour 
of the United States and met President Ford and (whether by 
coincidence or good management) also Governor Carter. ( 50) On the 
same trip, Dr Mulder authorised direct lobbying of US Senators and 
Congressmen and their aides, with the result that when a matter 
affecting South African trade came before the House of Representa-
tives "they did their best to swing the matter in the Republic 1 s 
favour". ( 51) Dr Mulder was also involved extensively with the 
arrangements for the State visit of General Alfredo Stroessner, the 
President of Paraguay, in April of the same year. 
But it was primarily in the field of relations with the rest of 
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Africa that Dr Mulder's swashbuckling style of diplomacy was most 
effective. It was he who pioneered the contacts with the Ivory Coast 
which culminated in a meeting between Mr Vorster and President 
HouphoUet-Boigny in 1975, and it was he who established the link with 
President Bokassa of the Central African Republic. His methods were 
unconventional and he was frequently compelled to make use (as he was 
internally) of unscrupulous intermediaries, but the initial success 
of the detente policy in the period 1974/75 was as much his work as 
that of the Department of Foreign Affairs, which arranged the meeting 
between Mr Vorster and President Kaunda late in 1974. 
One example serves to illustrate the extent to which Dr Mulder was 
able to alienate his Cabinet colleagues. During a tour of the United 
States in June 1975, Dr Mulder "offered" the United States the use of 
the Simon's Town naval base, in a speech to the Washington Press 
Club, apparently without clearing the speech either with Mr Vorster 
or Mr Botha. Not unnaturally, Mr Botha, whose portfolio this matter 
concerned, complained to Mr Vorster. Rapport commented as follows -
"Min. Botha is bekend daarvoor dat hy jaloers en trots 
is op sy portefeulje Verdediging en geen man kan 
ligtelik daar gaan inmeng nie. Daarby sit dr Mulder 
reeds met h probleem met Buitelandse Sake, wat.meen dat 
hy as Minister van Inligting dikwels op sy gebied 
oortree." ( 52) 
However, the successes which Dr Mulder had achieved were undermined, 
and the policy of detente scuppered, by the invasion of Angola. The 
involvement of South African troops on the side. of the UNITA movement 
was a crucial factor not only in facilitating the recognition of the 
MPLA as the legitimate government of Angola, but also in unifying the 
OAU at its summit in January 1976 into a hard-line, anti-South 
A.frican stance, thus cauterising the di visions within the organisa-
tion which had been caused by those states which had succumbed to the 
policy of detente with South Africa. 
It is tempting to speculate why a policy which was so palpably 
destined to fail was embarked upon in the first place. It could be, 
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after all, that Mr Botha desired deliberately to undermine Dr 
Mulder's successes, but even given the very fluid political situation 
surrounding the leadership of the National Party, and the personal 
ambitions of the politicians involved, this seems too melodramatic an 
explanation. What seems more likely is that Mr Botha saw the 
challenge in direct terms, and responded accordingly. Here was a 
chance for Mr Botha to strike a blow against communism, and deliver a 
country to the West out of the clutches of the Russians. While he 
doubtless appreciated the threats posed by internal subversion, 
diplomatic isolation and malicious disinformation, the primary threat 
had suddenly become a threat from external infiltration or even 
invasion. It was a threat with which Mr Botha' s Defence Force was 
competent, and (even given the Potgieter Commission's implied 
derogation of its role) entitled to deal. 
The failure of the "military" option in regional events had powerful 
implications within South Africa, too. It promoted the perception 
amongst blacks that the whites had lost control over events. The 
victories of the Frelimo and MPLA movements were greeted with scenes 
of rejoicing in the black townships. It became increasingly apparent, 
too, that in the light of the new regional realities, the Smith 
regime in Rhodesia would not last long. But most significantly, 
blacks perceived that the SADF had been forced to withdraw from 
Angola - that the South African military machine, formerly assumed to 
be an invincible force externally and an exceptionally powerful 
instrument of repression internally, had suffered a reverse at the 
hands of black troops. (53) 
This perception was recognised by the top structures in the SADF and 
the danger of its spreading appreciated. What had started out as the 
employment of the SADF in a strictly limited foreign policy objective 
had now developed disturbiqg internal political ramifications. 
The Defence Force realised that the two problems were intimately 
intertwined. To solve both problems a multi-disciplined approach to 
security intelligence was required. Clearly a structure was required 
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to provide the requisite solutions, and clearly the State Security 
Council would have to form part of this structure. General Malan put 
it thus -
"The events in Angola in 1975/76 focussed the attention 
on the urgent necessity for the State Security Council 
to play a much fuller role in the national security of 
the Republic than h.i therto." ( 54) 
However, this did not immediately occur. Although .the military chiefs 
began to take a more active role in the formulation of national 
security objectives, as was evidenced, for example, in the appoint-
ment of an interdepartmental committee "to go urgently into the 
matter of the formulation of strategy on the national level, as well 
as the organisational structures necessary for the purpose" and in 
the organisation of a national security symposium, under the auspices 
of the Institute of Strategic Studies of the University of Pretoria, 
(55) national security policy tended to be a matter which Mr Vorster 
preferred to formulate either single-handedly, or after conferring 
with General van den Bergh. The evidence of the Erasmus Commission 
showed ·the extent to which Mr Vorster relied on General van den 
Bergh's advice until at least the end of 1977; perhaps it was only 
when his Security Adviser had been forced to retire in the middle of 
1978, that Mr Vorster began to listen more carefully to the military. 
Certainly, Mr Botha told Parliament that his predecessor had not yet 
made extensive use of the State Security Council in this respect. 
(56) 
But by the middle of 1978, the writing was on the wall for the 
Security Adviser and his Prime Minister. By that time, two 
investigations by Dr Reynders and by Mr Barrie had proved beyond 
reasonable doubt that irregularities had occured in the Department of 
Information. 
Mr Vorster's heal th continued to be indifferent, and in September 
1978 he announced that he would be retiring from the premiership. The 
way was clear for Mr Botha to assume the premiership and to institute 
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a clear system for the management of national security - the total 
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THE TOTAL STRATEGY THE DOMESTIC REPLY 
Mr P W Botha has always insisted that the answer to the total 
onslaught correctly lies in adopting a total strategy, a marshalling 
of the ~reative (and destructive) talents of the modern state. His 
belief in the efficacy of the total onslaught is not, however, 
original, nor does he claim it to be. The concept of a total strategy 
was developed by a French general, Andre Beaufre, in a book, 
Introduction to Strategy, first published in 1965. 
General Beaufre's thesis, written out of experiences of defeats in 
both conventional (World War Two) and unconventional (Indo-China) 
wars is simple. He is convinced that while strategy had hitherto been 
a study largely undertaken by members of the Armed Forces, its place 
lies more correctly with the politicians, who have at their disposal 
not only the resources of the armed forces, but of the whole state 
machinery. Beaufre is convinced that von Clausewitz had been correct 
in suggesting that war was merely the extension of politics, but is 
convinced that the converse was also true - that in waging war, use 
had also to be made of political weapons. (1) 
A state, then, which wishes to win a war needs to develop a strategy 
which encompasses and harnesses the resources at·the disposal of that 
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state as a co-ordinated whole. This is necessary because war itself 
no longer takes place only (or even principally) on the battlefield, 
but in hosts of other spheres. If one wishes to win such a war, one 
ne('!ds to engage the enemy on a variety of fronts. Clearly, because 
the organisation of modern democracies has given rise to a variety of 
autonomous statal actors, it is necessary to co-ordinate their 
activities in pursuit of a common goal. For this it is necessary both 
to formulate a clear strategic plan, and to direct that plan at the 
highest level. Beaufre expresses it thus -
"We are therefore faced with a veritable pyramid of 
differing, though interdependent, forms of strategy; 
these must be clearly defined if they are to be welded 
into the best series of co-ordinated actions, all aimed 
at the same overall object." (2) 
But how are the conductors of these strategies to be qirected towards 
the "same overall object"? Beaufre has no doubt -
"At the top of the pyramid, and under the direct 
control of the Government - i.e. of the political 
authority - is total strategy, whose task it is to 
define how total war should be conducted. Its task is 
to lay down the object for each specialised category of 
strategy and the manner in which all - political, 
economic, diplomatic and military - should be woven in 
together." (3) 
How was this overall control to be exercised, in practical terms? 
Again, Beaufre is unequivocal -
HThis level of strategy is clearly the prerogative of 
Heads of Government, assisted by a Chief of the Defence 
Staff and some high-level Defence Committee or Commit-
tees." ( 4) 
On the "total strategy" level, political direction is given and 
priorities are determined. It is then up to the executive departments 
of state to determine the correct way in which to approach the 
activity -
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"Below the level of total strategy there must in each 
field (military, political, economic or diplomatic) be 
an overall strategy, the function of which is to allot 
tasks and co-ordinate the various forms of activity 
within the field concerned. It should be noted here 
that in the military field the notion of overall 
strategy already, exists; its object is to co-ordinate 
action on land, in the air and on the sea. There is, 
however, no such thing as overall strategy in the 
political field (e.g. co-ordination of general poli-
tical policy, internal policy, external policy and 
propaganda), nor in the economic field (e.g. co-ordi-
nation of production, financial policy and overseas 
trade), nor in the diplomatic field ... For every field 
there should be an overall strategy implemented by the 
Minister concerned, assisted by his Chief of Staff or 
Permanent Secretary." (5) 
Beaufre then expands, at some length, on the strategic imperatives, 
as he sees them, of the superpowers and comes to the conclusion that 
in an era of nuclear capability on both sides of the ideological 
spectrum, very little place exists for conventional military 
operations. This is not to say that strategic gains have not been 
made, particularly by the Soviet bloc. These gains have, however, 
been made by means of what Beaufre calls "indirect strategy". 
He makes it clear that despite being "indirect", this strategy forms 
part of a "total strategy", and is therefore also directed by 
politicians. "Indirect strategy", he argues, "is therefore total war 
played on a minor key". ( 6) I-le continues _,_ 
" (Indirect strategy) is often thought to lie more in 
the realm of politics; people say that the indirect 
strategy of the type I have described is not 'strategy' 
but 'policy'. This terminological argument is of little 
importance in itself, particularly since it is clear 
that indirect strategy will be conducted at Heads of 
Government level." (7) 
Nor should it be haphazard -
"The 'political line' is in fact the general concept 
for a true operational plan . . . it must be worked out 
with the' same ·precision as an operational plan in 
military strategy." (8) 
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"Indirect strategy" is, in layman's terms, guerilla or revolutionary 
warfare, and Beaufre describes its symptoms in a fair amount of 
detail. He maintains, however, that with a carefully worked out 
counter-strategy, such wars can and should be won. Such a counter-
stra;tegy should contain at least three components, a political, a 
psychological and a military. It is essential, though, that the 
. 
counter-strategy should be planned in depth -
"The psychological factor, which invariably plays some 
part in any form of strategy, in indirect strategy 
becomes dominant. Material force not being available, 
its place must be taken by the force of some 
well-reasoned , ideology, and by the effectiveness of 
intelligently and meticulously worked-out plans." (9) 
There are two arenas in. which a state faced with a revolutionary war 
can develop counter-revolutionary strategies. The first is outside 
one's own territory. In sue~ an "exterior counter-manoeuvre", a 
I 
political campaign should "attack the weak points in the enemy's 
ideological system" (10) but the exterior campaign must be primarily 
military. A military campaign could involve "eliminating those 
peripheral bases from which the enemy can carry out indirect 
aggression". { 11) This is "still feasible and possibly extremely 
rewarding - particularly if, as Israel has done on several occasions, 
it can be presented as being defensive in character". (12) The key in 
such a campaign is, however, rapid results, "completed in forty-eight 
hours, the minimum reaction time for international diplomacy". ( 13) 
Equally, "the objective must appear to be of a sufficiently limited 
nature to be acceptable to international opinion". (14) 
Another "exterior manoeuvre" is also feasible, and that is to turn 
the tables on one's en~my by practising the same tactics in reverse. 
The central feature .of such a campaign -
"is to assure for oneself the maximum freedom of action 
while at the same time paralysing the enemy with a 
multitude of deterrent checks, somewhat as the Lilli-
putians tied up Gulliver. As with all operations 
desig~ed to deter, action will, of course, be primarily 
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psychological; political, economic, diplomatic and 
military measures will all be combined towards the same 
end. 11 (15) 
This results in a situation of protracted conflict "so designed and 
organised that it becomes more and more burdensome to the enemy". 
(16) 
Alternatively, or perhaps simultaneously, one can engage the enemy in 
the second, internal arena. In this arena, political and psycholo-
gical weapons are paramount; the use of fo~ce must, however, not be 
excluded. If at all possible, the government should retain control 
without the deployment of large contingents of security forces. 
However -
"In this case' also, the essential factor is the 
political line, the object of which must be to deprive 
the enemy of his trump cards. There are two facets to 
this : we must first maintain and increase our 
prestige, not merely by showing that we have adequate 
force available, but also by showing that the future we 
hold out has possibilities (progress of our civilisa-
tion, international aid, etc.); (and) secondly, by 
thorough-going reforms, we must cut the ground from 
under the feet of the malcontents." ( 17.) 
Beaufre' s thesis had a profound effect on the thinking of the SADF 
top structure, as it became the basis of lectures on strategy at the 
Joint Defence College, the primary socialisation experience for "red 
stream" staff officers in civil-military relations. Through its 
influence on these gentlemen, Beaufre began to have an influence on 
Mr Botha himself. (18) 
Early in the 1970 session, Mr Botha told Parliament that if South 
Africa was successful~y to resist a "diabolical, overall world 
strategy", it would require "an opposing will". That "opposing will", 
he argued, "must be just as total on your side in order to offer 
resistance". People who stood in the way of the Government, he said, 
"are undermining the total strategic will of South Africa in many 
places," and concluded by stating -
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"We must try to realise that we are involved in a total 
struggle in which we must bring to bear our united 
will." (19) 
At this stage Mr Botha's concept of the format of an opposing total 
strategy was hazy; he spoke of the necessity of sound race relations, 
not only between Afrikaans and English speakers, but also between 
whites and "Non-Whites"; of the necessity for a different approach to 
labour and production; and of the necessity for "balanced" news 
coverage. It was, however, primarily through the medium of the 
bi-annual Defence White Papers that his ideas became fully known. 
Thus it was that in his preface to the 1973 White Paper, Mr Botha 
stated -
"The RSA is a target for international communism and 
its cohorts - leftist activists, exaggerated humanism, 
permissiveness, materialism and related ideologies. In 
addition, the RSA has been singled out as a special 
target for the by-products of their ideologies, such as 
black radicalism, exaggerated individual freedom, 
one-man-one-vote, and a host of other slogans employed 
against us on the basis of double standards ... Because 
the RSA holds a position of strategic importance, these 
ideological attacks on the RSA are progressively being 
converted into more tangible action in the form of 
sanctions, boycotts, isolation, demonstrations and the 
like. This renders us - and the Free World - the more 
vulnerable to the indirect strategy applied by the 
radical powers in the form of undermining activities 
and limited violence, whether employed openly or 
dissimulated behind ideological fronts." (20) 
Having thus set the scene, Mr Botha proceeded -
"It is against this global background that the 
Government is developing its policy. Traditionally, a 
country's policy structure comprises three basic 
elements - internal policy, foreign policy and defence 
policy.· The last is determined by the preceding two, 
but these, in turn, cannot.be developed properly unless 
they are sustained by a sound and adequate defence 
policy. These basic elements must therefore be closely 
co-ordinated and integrated; this is of vital impor-
tance, particularly in the present international 
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climate which is typified by total strategy and which 
obliges us to face the onslaught of monolithic 
organisations which are in absolute control of all the 
means available to their states. 
"As this White Paper deals with the 
defence policy, a discussion here of 
foreign policy would be inappropriate. 
Government's 
internal and 
"It is relevant, however, to emphasise the interaction 
and interdependence of these three basic ~lements. The 
conclusion to be stressed is that our defence is not a 
( 
matter for the Defence Force only, but also for each 
department and citizen, it demands dedication, vigi-
lance, and sacrifice - not only from the Defence Force, 
but from all who are privileged to find a home in this 
country." ( 21) 
This theme was amplified by one of Mr Botha's confidants, the then 
Commodore R A Edwards, who later became Chief of the Navy, in an 
article in the semi-official Paratus. Edwards, too, depicted a 
scenario of South Africa beleaguered in a totally hostile world, and 
commented -
"The hostile strategy has been sketched in some detail 
in order to emphasise the totality of that strategy, 
total inasmuch that every means available, including 
armed conflict, is being used against the RSA. 
Countering such a hostile total strategy is not the 
task of the security forces alone - a total onslaught 
requires a total defence, and every means available to 
the RSA must accordingly be used in our defence." (22) 
Here was a far more definite call to arms, a far more specific 
adaptation of Beaufre's work. Edwards continues -
"This means that a total defence strategy must be 
devised to meet and withstand and prevail against the 
total hostile strategy. It then falls to the various 
Government departments to execute such a total defence 
strategy. In other words, departmental and operational 
strategies must be devised within the framework of the 
total strategy." ( 23) 
Edwards goes on to describe the operational strategy which ought to 
be adopted by the SADF. He couches this in careful and conventional 
( 
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terms, but ends with a plea for unconventional tactics within the 
ambit of the total strategy -
"It may be deduced from the Government's statement tha;t 
the maintenance of favourably disposed, or at the very 
least, non-hostile governments in neighbouring coun-
tries is ·an important aspect of the Government's total 
counter-strategy. It could also be deduced that this 
could also be affected (sic) by military means." (24) 
This was a truly extraordinary statement, coming from so senior an 
officer, made all the more extraordinary by the fact that all 
government spokesmen, including his own Minister, were at pains to 
poi'nt out that South Africa had no aggressive intentions towards its 
neighbours. Furthermore, Edwards, in his article, also spelt out how 
this ought to be achieved -
"Should the RSA (not) take the lessons of its own 
history, and that of the state of Israel, to heart and, 
if pr:e-empti ve action is required, to undertake such ' 
action swiftly and with the full employment of all the 
means at its disposal?" (25) 
Here, too, General Beaufre's theory of the "exterior counter-
manoeuvre" had found a receptive student. 
During the next two years, the theme of a total strategy was taken up 
on various occasions both by Mr Botha and by various of Commodore 
Edwards' colleagues. When he opened the Joint Defence College in 
Voortrekkerhoogte in 1973, Mr Botha reiterated that in the struggle 
for existence, a nation. should employ not only its military power, 
but "all the means at its disposal". He continued -
"Sound planning is based on a thorough knowledge of all 
aspects of strategy and on co-ordination and co-
operation between all departments and agencies who 
could make a contribution to the security of the 
State." (26) 
While in August 1974, during a speech given to the Youth Branch of 
' 
- 123 -
the National Party, Mr Botha referred to the fact that defence, 
expressed as armed force, only formed a small part of the means of 
protection of a :;;tate against outside interference. (27) 
Mr Botha also pursued this theme in the 1975 White Paper on Defence. 
In his preface, Mr Botha wrote -
"A credible military capability still remains a 
reqµirement for survival. This does not mean that, in 
the prevailing civcumstances, any country can rely on 
military power alone. All countries must, more than 
ever, muster all their activities - political, econo-
mic, diplomatic and military -:- for their defence. This, 
in fact, is the meaning of 'total strategy'". ( 28) 
While in the section entitled "General Review", the White Paper 
expressed itself thus -
"Defence strategy embraces much more than military 
strategy. It involves economy, ideology, technology and 
even social matters and can therefore only be meaning-
ful and valid if proper account is taken of those other 
spheres. 
"As indicated in the 1973 White Paper, and repeatedly 
stated by the Government, it is not Government policy 
to base our national defence on military capacity alone 
(or even primarily). Consequently, the military means 
do not play the major role in our total defence policy, 
yet it remains the one really vital element since it 
must maintain and ensure that firm base· from which the 
State can employ its other means." (29) 
Mr Botha reiterated this ideal in a speech to the University of 
Stellenbosch in February 1976. He said -
"Our national defence policy must not be based only, or 
even mainly, on our military capacity. Military 
capacity should not be neglected, paralysed or left 
stagnant, it has to be reinforced. But all national 
activities have to be combined into a defence .effort. 
It is a total effort against a total onslaught." (30) 
Later in the same speech, he introduced a new theme -
.. 
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"Military as well as political leaders, and profes-
sionals in all fields, must in increasing measure be 
able to communicate with one another if we are to win 
this struggle. Communication . . . has become a prere-
quisite ' for leaders of a people an? of a sovereign 
state who want to master the art of survival." (31) -
The mention of "social matters" in the White Paper was novel, as not 
even Beau(re had used the term. Later in the White Paper it became 
clear what was meant by this reference -
"Any preventative operation naturally is a costly 
undertaking, but it is also valuable military exper-
ience as well as an exercise in interdepartmental and 
interethnical co-operation. Apart from its primary 
protective task, the SA Army thus constantly endeavours 
to make a positive contribution in the interests of 
good relations. The military resources already in the 
area are employed to this end." (32) 
This "positive contribution" consisted of the deployment of tr<?ops 
with civilian skills in various of the homelands in the north of 
South West Africa/Namibia -
"In the underdeveloped homelands of Kavango and Caprivi 
in South West Africa, call-up soldiers with farming 
backgrounds, or agricultural training, serving on the 
borders of Angola and Zambia, are helping local 
Africans develop the land, repairing broken-down 
tractors and trucks in the pro,cess . . . 'Operation Aid 
for Africans' must ultimately make for better under-
standing between the races and create an atmosphere of 
friendliness." (33) 
This scheme, officially announced on the 27th May 1975, also made 
provision for the deployment of teachers and doctors. (34) 
The necessity for such assistance was underscored in an important 
speech by General G J J Boshoff, the Army Chief of Staff (Logistics) 
in August 1975. He, too, elaborated on the nature of the threa.t .. 
facing the Republic, but argued that many of the conditions in which 
subversion flourished could and should be done away with. The removal 
- - _ _J 
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of coloUr and racial discrimination and "a change of heart" on the 
part of whites would immeasurably assist the "anti-revolutionary 
struggle". He argued further that the whole concept of war had 
changed, and that the objective of war was no longer territory, but 
the "hearts and minds of men". 80% of the "anti-revolutionary 
struggle" was a socio-political effort, and only 20% was military. 
(35) 
This theme was repeated by two other generals in short succession. 
Addressing a Rotary lunch in Durban, the Chief of the Air Force, 
General R H D Rogers, said that to win the revolutionary war, 
psychological and economic measures would have to be taken, and 
injustices corrected. This campaign would require "the co-ordinated 
action of many Government departments" and the involvement of the 
public of South Africa. He concluded that -
"We have to do all we can to win the hearts and minds 
of our indigenous peoples. It is most important to 
convince Africa and the world that we are part of 
Africa. 
"But if we are part of Africa, and particularly 
Southern Africa, we have to learn to live together." 
(36) 
While General Neil Webster, the Army's Director-General of Resources, 
warned that -
"If we do not have all the people of this country 
behind us we will have very serious problems." (37) 
This view was heartily endorsed by the recently-appointed Chief of 
the SADF, General Malan, in a newspaper interview early in 1977. He 
maintained that a campaign to win the "hearts and minds" of the local 
population was an essential part of the total strategy. After 
emphasising that such a campaign was only part of a "united and 
collective effort which includes diplomacy, politics, economics, 






must be defined. These must 
the State and its peoples. 
relationships." 
include the' 
Here I must 
He illustrated what he meant by referring to recent SADF civic action 
operations in Kavango -
"There was no contact between our patrols and the local 
people. Who speaks to a man in uniform? So we sent them 
out with a handful of headache powders, a handful of 
seed, and books. Now there's a two-way system going 
that is fantastic for our boys and beneficial to the 
people. We clear the bush, teach them tp plant and to 
live off the land." (38) 
A semi-official SADF publication published a year later went further, 
attempting to locate this type of activity within accepted concepts 
of warfare. The author argues that -
"In the context of 'total war', which is increasingly 
the form of conflict between nations, it is insuffi-
cient for a military force to defend the country it 
serves merely by preparing itself for conventional 
warfare. 
"If a war is 'being conducted simultaneously in all 
spheres - political, economic, diplomatic and mili-
tary' , as one definition of 'total war' puts it, it 
would seem logical that the military authorities who 
have been entrusted with the task of defending a 
country should try to contribute as much as possible to 
countering this threat, not only in the battlefield, 
but also in other fields of activity. 
"Of course, the military cannot be expected to counter 
all the different types of onslaughts entailed in a 
'total war' on its own : the proponents of this view 
concede that the government of a country must take 
overall responsibility for co-ordinating the campaign 
to counter the total threat. Nevertheless, the military 
authorities in many countries have evidently thought it 
advisable for their forces to make a contribution to 
national development, in order to ensure that their 
preparations for defence in the traditional military 
sphere are not in vain." (39) 
Expressed in this way, one is left with the impression that were the 
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milital".Y authorities to ignore the necessity of national development, 
any military campaigns they may wage would in any event be in vain. 
Indeed, the publication went further : the military preparations and 
"national development" were the prerogative of the military authori-
ties, and the contribution which these authorities could make to 
winning against the total onslaught. 
What was novel about these statements was not only their content : it 
was acceptable by 1975 to be "verlig", even in orthodox Afrikaner 
circles. Yet, these generals had been expressing their "verligtheid" 
in strategic terms. South Africa's survival, they were arguing, was 
threatened, and 80% of the strategic answer to that threat lay in 
t 
political reform. Nor were these maverick generals out of line with 
departmental policy - on the 3rd September 1975, P W Botha himself 
endorsed the 80%/20% theory of counter-revolutionary war (although he 
thought 75%/25% to be a more realistic proportion, at no less an 
occasion than the Cape Congress of the National Party. •(40) 
"Die soldate aan die grens handhaaf die veiligheid van 
die land nie alleen met die wapen in die hand nie, maar 
ook met mediese dienste, onderwysdienste, bybelver-
spreiding en andersins." (41) 
It was, however, principally in the 1977 White Paper on Defence that 
the idea of a total strategy was most fully developed. In his preface 
to this document, Mr Botha recalled that in the 1975 White Paper, he 
had -
"stressed the growing need for a 'total strategy' which 
requires every country in the free world to muster all 
its resources for survival. The passage of time has 
confirmed the validity of this assertion and has also 
illustrated that a credible defence capability is an 
indispensable element of these resources . . . military 
strategy forms part of a broader national strategy ... " 
(42) 
In the body of the White Paper, it is unequivocally stated that -
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"The process of ensuring and maintaining the sover-
eigni ty of a state's authority in a conflict situation 
has, through the evolution of warfare, shifted from a 
purely military to an integrated national action ... 
The resolution of a conflict in the times in which we 
now live demands interdependent and co-ordinated action 
in all fields - 'military, psychological, economic, 
political, sociological, technological, diplomatic, 
ideological, cultural, etc." (43) 
Like Beaufre, the author of the White Paper was convinced that -
"It is therefore essential that a Total National 
Strategy be formulated at the highest level. The 
defence of the RSA is not solely the responsibility of 
the Department of Defence. On the contrary, the 
maintenance of the sovereignity of the RSA is the 
combined responsibility of all government departments 
... The striving for specific aims cannot take place in 
isolation. It must be co-ordinated with all the means 
available to the state." (44) 
\
This necessity for co-ordination had already been recognised by 
l Government, and to effect this co-ordination, it had established 
l State Security ~ouncil -
"As already indicated, one of the functions of the 
State Security Council is to formulate the total 
national strategy for the RSA. Total strategy is, 
however, a complex subject. ~t can perhaps be described 
as the comprehensive plan to utilise all the means 
available to a state according to an integrated pattern 
in order to achieve the national aims within the 
framework of the specific policies. A total national 
strategy is, therefore, not confined· to a particular 
sphere, but is applicable at all levels and to all 
functions of the state structure." (45) 
the 
the 
The White Paper recognised that because one's strategy is determined 
by factors which are in continuous flux, the total strategy, too, 
needs to be "dynamic and interacting". Constant revision of planning 
is therefore required. Also, because the enemy's strategy will also 
not be constant, it is necessary to have "an outstanding intelligence 
service in order to forecast the actions of the enemy" -
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"It is clear that in order to formulate and implement 
military strategy meaningfully, there is a need for a 
total national strategy. This has already been acknow-
ledged by the Government. It is because of the 
complexity of this need ... that co-ordination between 
government departments is of the utmost importance. 
There are few, if any, government departments which are 
not concerned with one or other aspect of national 
security, or which do not contribute to the realisation 
of national security. 11 ( 46 ), 
rvfr Botha and his defence staffs had already identified the areas 
which required interdepartmental action. In the course of 1976, a 
committee of the State Security Council had been established to 
review the national security set-up. This committee had come to the 
conclusion that the State Security Council itself was the proper body 
to undertake the co-ordination of the national security plan~ing, but 
that the SSC ought to be assisted in this task by a permanent working 
committee, as well as by a staff body, to undertake both the staff 
work for the SSC and for its working committee. This committee also 
identified a number of areas of common interest in the national 
security field, which affected more than one government department 
and which would therefore require interdepartmental action. (47) The 
White Paper proceeds to chronicle these areas of "interdepartmental 
action", as follows -









National supplies, resources and 
services 





"Together", the White Paper states, "the above fields cover the whole 
spectrum of national security". (48) 
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Within the ambit of a total national strategy, the White Paper 
continued, the State had certain goals. These included -
"a. the orderly development and maintenance of the 
body politic; 
b. the preservation of the identity, dignity, the 
right to self-determination and the int,egri ty_ of 
all population groups; 
c. the identification, prevention and countering of 
revolution, subversion and any other form of 
unconstitutional action; 
d. the maintenance of a sound balance of military 
power in relation to neighbouring states and other 
states in Southern Africa; 
e. aiming for the greatest possible measure of 
economic and social development, and the maximum 
self-sufficiency; 
f. the creation of friendly relations and political 
and economic co-operation with the states of 
Southern Africa; and 
g. planning total national strategy at government 
level for co-ordinated action between all govern-
ment departments, government institutions and 
other authorities to counter the multi-dimensional 
onslaught against the RSA in the ideological, 
military, economic, social, psychological, cul-
tural, political and diplomatic fields." (49) 
It is worth quoting this set of objectives in full, since these form, 
in broad outline, the job description of the State Security Council. 
However, at the time at which it was written, state action to counter 
the onslaught was anything but co-ordinated, as we have seen. 
However, hubris for Dr Mulder and his allies was not far off. In the 
course of 1978, the rumours that Dr Mulder was heavily compromised in 
the misappropriation of state funds in the Department of Information 
began to gather momentum in the Press, and more accurate account~ 
were available to the Cabinet by means of the investigations of Dr -
Reynders and Mr Barrie. These culminated in the resignation, first of 
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Mr Vors"ter as Prime Minister, which left the way clear for Mr Botha 
to assume the premiership, and subsequently, as the Erasmus-
Commission's investigations revealed the true extent of the scandal, 
in that of Dr Mulder, both as Cabinet Minister and as Member of 
Parliament. Now, with his principal rival disgraced, and with access 
to the instruments of supreme executive authority, the way was open 
for Mr Botha to implement his long-cherished ideals of establishing 
the mechanisms to make the total national strategy a reality. 
The mechanisms for establishing an efficient system of national 
security decision-making had been a matter which the top structure of 
the SADF had been considering for some time, and with more urgency 
since the Angolan campaign had shown up the glaring weaknesses of the 
then operative system. General J R Dutton, the Chief of Staff 
Operations, in addressing a symposium on national security in 1977, 
showed the sophistication of the staff work which had already been 
done by that time -
"In accordance with the strategic concepts.advocated in 
my preceding arguments, there would be a requirement 
for a total strategy on a national level. This would 
embrace the essential guidelines and parameters for 
activities in all spheres of action in a co-ordinated 
strategy directed to converge on the same final goal 
which would be derived from the political objectives 
identified as vital to ensure National Security. This 
would constitute the framework within individual 
strategies, and strategic doctrines would be conceived 
and formulated in the different spheres and on the 
different levels of competence. Within each sphere, and 
on every level, the total concept would be applicable, 
with rational adaptation to the means and the scope. 
"This process would establish vertical lines of 
direction. Apart from the co-ordinated planning at 
national level, there is a further requirement for 
horizontal co-ordination on the various lower levels, 
in order to ensure optimum synergism and orchestration. 
"The envisaged process would also involve the dynamic 
horizontal and vertical interaction; and strategies and 
doctrines would be adapted to obviate contradictions, 
ensure compatibility and to reconcile that which is 
desirable with that which is possible. This would 
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provide the essential base for the identification of 
priorities and for the balanced allocation of resour-
ces, such as manpower, financial appropriation and 
industrial and technological effort." (50) 
Thus it was clear that the net was being cast very wide : it was not 
only the resources and the effort of the State which, it was being 
envisaged, needed central control and co-ordination, but "industrial 
and technological effort" as well. 
General Dutton was sensitive enough to appreciate that "this was not 
an easily attained objective in a society which was organised on a 
democratic basis. He maintained that -
"The only effective strategy to oppose total war is a 
total strategy. It would be comparatively easy to 
explain the concept, and even to formulate general 
guidelines for such a total strategy, but when it comes 
to its functional implementation in a democratic 
society, one comes up against formidable problems. The 
vaunted democratic principles of maximum decentrali-
sation of power, autonomy of competence, free enter-
prise and consensus present serious obstacles which 
inhibit the realisation of the desirable strategy." 
However, he saw no lasting problem in this connection 
said, presumably referring to the SADF, -
"We," he 
• 
"contend that, where survival is at stake, this can and 
must be done." ( 51) 
Another significant contribution to this symposium was made by 
Professor J A Lombard. While his contribution concerned itself with 
the economic aspects of national security, he dwelt at some length 
with the modus operandi which any state would have to deal with in 
maintaining its sovereigni ty and preserving its security. He was 
careful to distinguish ·between two functions which the state 
performs. The one is an order function and the other is a welfare 
function. While welfare functions, he argued, can and must be 
decentralised and democratised as ,far as possible, order functions 
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remain the primary responsibility of the central government - "The 
responsibilities for the maintenance of public order must be 
centralised in the agencies of the sovereign state". Failure to do 
so, he concluded, "under present circumstances would be 
tantamount to the destruction of all freedom in Southern Africa". 
( 52) We will see presently how the National Security Management 
System was able simultaneously to "democratise" the welfare function 
and to "centralise" the order function. 
Subsequent to the acquisition of the premiership by Mr Botha in 1978, 
the SADF contribution towards the formulation of a coherent and 
rational conceptualisation of the total strategy increased in tempo 
and scope. In that year, the Documentation .Service of the SADF began 
to publish position papers, termed "Pointers/Rigtingwysers" which 
concerned themselves with various aspects of the total strategy and, 
more specifically, with the role of the military within such a 
strategy. A "Pointer" written in 1978 by Maj C J Nothling concerns 
itself with "Totale Oorlog", and has the following to say about the 
means to counteract such a total war -
"Strategie kan beskou word as die modus van optrede 
waardeur h land in h bepaalde situasie al die middele 
tot sy beskikking orden en aanwend om 'n konfl ik in sy 
guns te beslag. By implikasie is totale strategie 'n 
alomvattende begrip en daar kan volstaan word met die 
volgende omskrywing •.• 'Strategy (involves) the plans 
for conducting a war in the widest sense, including 
diplomatic, political and economic considerations as 
well as those of a purely military nature'." (53) 
"Pointers" soon, however went further than merely to comment on the 
necessity for a total strategy : by 1979, they were commenting 
variously on "Non-Alignment in Africa" (No 12), "The Military as a 
Contributor to National Development" (No 8) and two tomes on 
"Kommunisme" (Nos 9 and 9b). Later, the "Pointers" became yet more 
ambitious, tackling such abstruse matters as "Special Operations" (No 
14), "The Principles of Modern Warfare Reflections and Views in 
Perspective" (No 19) and "Wisselwerking Tussen die Mili tere Organi-
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sasie en die Politieke Orde" (No 18). Most recently, "Pointers" have 
become far more immediately relevant, commenting on current events, 
normally in one or other of the front-line states and customarily in 
the most mendacious fashion (for example, "Genocide in Zimbabwe : 
Looking for Scapegoats" (No 40), "Southern Africa's Real Destab-
lisers" (No 21) and "Jonas Savimbi - Truly a Man for All Seasons" (No 
45)). 
These were clearly the vehicle through which the SADF expressed its 
newly found confidence, and they provide a very interesting insight 
into the prevailing thinking within the SADF at that time. For 
example, in treating the topic of civil-military relations, Lt (SAN) 
E M Meyers remarks -
"Betrokkenheid van die soldaat in landspoli tiek en dus 
op die terrein · van die burgery is 'n saak wat tans al 
hoe meer aandag geniet. Die tradisionele onderskeid 
tussen oorlog en diplomasie was absoluut • • . Daar is 
onder meer gevrees dat die professionele soldaat 
burgelike beheer sou bedreig indien hy bui tengewone 
politieke inspraak oor landsake sou verkry. Sedert die 
einde van die Tweede Wereldoorlog tot vandag het die 
poli tieke betrokkenheid van die professionele mili ter 
egter toegeneem. ~ Nuwe siening wat as polities-
mili tere samesmel ting bestempel is, het die oue 
uitgedaag." (54) 
Here was an ex post facto explanation for arrangements which the SADF 
and its personnel had helped to establish; what was worse, in 
pseudo-academic language, the authors were trying to justify the 
structures as if they were the norm in states throughout the world. 
What was, however, even inore chilling was the "Pointer" which dealt 
with "Special Operations".- In this article, the author makes it clear 
that insurgency is a legitimate basis of modern warfare within the 
framework of a total strategy, largely since it had "become the 
principal communist form of warfare". The author argues -
"Because of the politically sensitive state prevailing 
in the world, the state wishing to expand its power 
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into another country has to act covertly, by means of 
infiltrating, organising and training dissatisfied 
elements of the , population into resistance/terrorist 
movements, so as not to become openly involved. The 
task of infiltration and organisation of such movements 
wiil fall to the special forces." (55) 
A little while later,· the "Pointer" refines its arguments still 
further -
"Today, many countries in the Third World find 
themselves under attack from terrorist/guerilla forces 
based in neighbouring hostile states. In most cases 
these hostile states, which are harbouring and suppor-
ting such terrorist or guerilla forces, have internal 
guerilla forces originating from dissatisfied sections 
of their own populace. These 'friendly' guerilla forces 
could well be utilised to assist conventional forces in 
counter-guerilla operations." (56) 
We shall see presently how this concept came to be operationalised. 
However, on taking office, Mr Botha's immediate problem was to 
operationalise his ideas, and those of his military staffs, on 
security management. One of Mr Botha' s strengths lies, and lay, in 
political organisation, but the system, not only of security 
management, but of the entire central government, which he had 
inherited, was chaotic and the exact opposite of the sleek and 
co-ordinated structure he needed for the total strategy to be 
successful. There were 40 government departments and at least 20 
Cabinet committees which had been established to monitor various 
aspects of government activity, and this was only on central 
government level. Beneath this reposed four provincial departments 
and no fewer than 952 statutory bodies, employing roughly half a 
million workers. As often as not, state activity was duplicated or 
even triplicated by different agencies on different levels of 
government. (57) 
In his speech on the Senate steps, immediately after his election as 
Prime Minister on .the 28th September 1978, and subsequently in his 12 
point plan, Mr Botha committed the Government to "clean and efficient 
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administration". One of his first actions as Prime Minister was to 
summon the members of the then Public Service Commission and instruct 
( 
them to undertake an analysis of possible rationalisation which could 
cause the public service to be more efficient. ( 58) As a result of 
this analysis, the number of central government departments was cut 
from 40 to 18. Al though the number of public servants remained 
constant and nobody was retrenched in the process, for the first time 
' 
in recent history, the public service was organically arranged so 
that public servants who had roughly similar responsibilities worked 
at least for the same Minister. 
Far more significant was Mr Botha' s re-organisation of the Cabinet 
decision-making structures. The Public Service Commission recorded 
the process as follows -
"In October 1978, the Cabinet decided that, with a view 
to increasing the efficiency of the central 'consul-
tative and decision-making process, the relatively 
large number of Cabinet committees then existing should 
be reduced and placed on a permanent basis. At the same 
time it was decided to create a Cabinet Secretariat in 
order to provide a more effective basis for channel-
ling, as well as. for keeping record of, Cabinet 
matters." ( 59) 
The result of this was the reduction of the number of Cabinet 
committees (which had formerly been appointed on an ad hoc basis as 
specific' needs had materialised), to five permanent sub-committees of 
the Cabinet, each with very distinct spheres of activity. The five 
were the Cabinet Committee for National Security (or the State 
Security Council), the Cabinet Cammi ttee for Economic Affairs, the 
Cabinet Committee for Social Affairs, the Cabinet Committee for 
Finance and the Cabinet Committee for Constitutional Affairs. 
Even the operations of these Cabinet committees became formalised. 
Instead of addressing themselv:s to ad hoc problems and actions, as 
had been the case in the past, these committees dealt with specific 




minutes kept. In order to promote greater co-ordination of planning 
and decision-making, the Directors-General of the relevant depart-
ments were also co-opted onto the committees, as were certain other 
top officials as the need arose. The idea behind this was to ensure 
that matters of detail were discussed at Cabinet committee level, 
leaving the Cabinet free to deal with issues of policy, or to decide 
between options. (60) 
None of the re-organisation was, however, as impressive nor as 
far-reaching as the organisational changes which took place in and 
around the workings of the State Security Council. Supported by the 
staff work that had already been completed by the SADF, Mr Botha 
moved swiftly to implement what has become known as the National 
Security Management System. This system became effective on the 16th 
August 1979, and has operated in substantially unaltered form ever 
since. (61) 
Apart from the Cabinet itself, which obviously forms as integral part 
' . of the Secur1 ty Management System, the System comprises five major 
elements. The first of these and the apex of the System, is the State 
Security Council, whose membership and statutory functions have been 
described elsewhere. As we saw, the Council's chairman is the Prime 
Minister, and its mem~ership is the senior Minister of the Republic, 
the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Defence, Justice, Police, the 
Director of the National Intelligence Service, the Chief of the SADF, 
the Commissioner of the SA Police, and the Secretaries of Foreign 
Affairs and of Justice. The Security Intelligence and State Security 
Council Act also provides that the chairman can co-opt additional 
members from time to time. According to the Secretary of the State 
Security Council, Mr Botha has made extensive use of the co-option 
provision so as to enable any Minister who wishes to raise matters of 
national security to attend meetings of the Council -
"The composition (of the Council) is also as defined in 
the Act, but has been considerably increased by the 
· present Prime Minister in terms of the co-option 
provisions of the Act ... Furthermore, any Minister who 
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at any time wishes to 
national security on the 
then attend such Council 
place a matter relating to 
agenda can do so and of course 
meetings." (62) 
,__. 
Grundy has provided some interesting suggestions about the way in 
which the co-option operates -
"A number of important people not directly responsible 
to Parliament participate in the decision-making 
process the Ministers who chair the other four 
cabinet committees are also co-opted attendees. Others 
in government and in private life may be invited to 
attend the individual meetings, depending on the 
subject at hand and the nature of the expertise they 
might be expected to apply. If, for example, weapons 
development is on the agenda, the Director of Armscor 
may be asked to attend. If the topic of regional 
economic growth as it impacts on foreign policy, the 
General Manager of the South African Transport Services 
may be co-opted." (63) 
However, according to Geldenhuys and Kotze, there are different 
categories of co-option. During 1983, there were eight Ministers 
serving on a permanent basis on the State Security Council, three 
Ministers more than the Act makes provision for. Mr Botha himself 
admitted in Parliament that these three Ministers were the Ministers 
of Finance, of Constitutional Development and of Co-operation and 
Devel~pment. (64) In addition to these eight "permanent" members, the 
Prime Minister also allowed Ministers to attend as "observers", but 
such observer members were not allowed to participate in the 
deliberations of the Council. This differs from the modus operandi of 
other Cabinet committees, which are free to co-opt more or less 
whomsoever they wish. (65) 
While the State Security Council existed prior to the election of Mr 
Botha as Prime Minister, it was merely another one of a number of 
Cabinet committees. Since the rationalisation of the Cabinet 
committee system, there is no doubt that the Council occupies a very 
much more important role than hitherto. Geldenhuys and Kotze adduce 
several reasons for the increase in importance. First, they argue, 
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the SSC is the only one of the Cabinet committees which has been 
established by law and, as such, cannot simply be disestablished at 
the will of the Cabinet. Secondly, the SSC is the only one of the 
Cabinet committees to be chaired by the Prime Minister/State 
President. The consequence of this is that the decisions of the 
Council will carry the authority of the Prime Minister/State 
President, and few, whether in the Cabinet or in the civil service 
will feel free to challenge the decisions for this reason. Thirdly, 
they suggest that because of the extraordinarily wide circumscription 
of the powers and responsibilities of the Council, there is virtually 
<no area of state activity in which the Council would not feel 
competent to venture an opinion, if not to draw up a strategy. 
Fourthly, the SSC is, they say, supported by an awesome machinery 
responsible only to the Council itself, consisting of the Secre-
tariat, the Interdepartmental Cammi ttees and the Joint Management 
Centres. The Council is therefore in a position to have its dictates 
carried out promptly and effi~iently, which is an ability the other 
committees lack as they do not command the same bureaucratic 
infrastructure. Finally, the authors suggest that because the SSC is 
not free to co-opt in the same way as the other Cabinet committees 
and that the decisions of the SSC are not subject to confirmation by 
the Cabinet, the SSC occupies a uniquely more important position than 
the other Cabinet committees. The position of the SSC is, as they 
say, primus inter pares, relative to the other committees. (66) 
All these factors are very suggestive, but some at least, are not 
conclusive. If the chairmanship of the Prime Minister/State President 
is an important factor in elevating the SSC above the position of the 
other Cabinet committees, why was this not the case while Mr Vorster 
was chairman of the Council? The same argument could be used 
regarding the terms of reference of the Council : if these were given 
statutory format· in 1972, why did the wide terms of reference only 
gain special significance since Mr Botha became Prime Minister? Yet 
Geldenhuys and Kotze merely note that "the SSC under Vorster 
apparently tended to confine itself to security matters in the narrow 
sense of the word". ( 67) 
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The authors might have mentioned a further pointer to the important 
position of the SSC. The SSC is a body which draws together senior 
politicans and senior civil servants. The official members in 
particular ar.e in the unique position to draw on a weal th of 
experience and expertise, as well as upon the collective wisdom of 
the NSMS as 'a whole. They are additionally able to sell their 
recommendation,s to the SSC a day before the Cabinet meets. When a 
proposal emanates from the SSC, based as it is on expert advice and 
evaluation, it would be a foolhardy ordinary member of the Cabinet 
who might feel inclined to reject such proposals with no counter-
active expertise at his disposal. 
Nonetheless, the suggestion that recommendations of the State 
Security Council are exempt from approval by the Cabinet ·has be' en 
expressly denied by General van Dev enter. In his briefing to the 
media on the 21st September 1983, he stated unequivocally -
"Finally, it must once again be pointed out that 
whereas the State Security Council is charged with the 
responsibility for advising the Government on national 
security, the ultimate responsibility rests with the 
Cabinet. and decisions taken by the State Security 
Council are subject to final approval by that body." 
(68) 
Mr Botha himself also denied the contention. Speaking in Parliament, 
the then Prime Minister said -
"The group (the State Security Council) meets every 14 
days, at fixed times. Its recommendations are submitted 
to the Cabinet in the form of minutes. The Cabinet 
takes decisions on them. The Cabinet also has the right 
to change them. After all, we know that in terms of our 
system, all matters are discussed by members of the 
Cabinet ... " (69) 
What is true - and this may be where Geldenhuys and Kotze have been 
misled - is that· the State Secur.i ty Council meets regularly every 
fortnight on the day preceding meetings of the Cabinet. (70) The fact 
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that meetings of the SSC precede those of the Cabinet enables the 
Cabinet to. be presented with fresh national · security related 
recommendations in the form of a series of resolutions or minutes 
which need only to be endorsed. Further, Mr Botha admitted that there 
is no formal voting procedure on the Cabinet, leaving him free to 
interpret the opinion of the Cabinet. ( 71) If Geldenhuys and Kotze 
concerned themselves primarily with the power of the SSC relative to 
other Cabinet committees, other scholars have sought to evaluate the 
Council's position in the total power equation. Thus, for example, Dr 
Frankel has described the Council as ''the focal point of all national 
decision-making and governmental power". ( 72) Professor Grundy, who 
describes this as "a bit of overstatement", has himself indulged in 
something of a hyperbole, arguing that the relationship between the 
State Security Council and the Cabinet in South Africa is analogous 
to the relationship between the Politburo and the Council of 
Ministers in the Soviet Union, (73) and suggesting that politicians 
regard membership of the SSC as more important than membership of the 
Cabinet. 
Neither of these interpretati9ns seems correct. There is little doubt 
that the State Security Council is more important under Mr Botha' s 
administration than it was under Mr Vorster's but the answer to its 
rise in prominence lies in the fact that it is the primary agency 
responsible for drawing up and implementing the total strategy, as 
the means of meeting the security challenge facing, or perceived to 
be facing, the South African state. It is only because Mr Botha 
himself is a whole-hearted believer in the total strategy concept 
that the SSC has risen to prominence; another Prime Minister who 
believed in the centrality of, say, economic development, might have 
elevated the Cabinet Committee on Economic Affairs to similar 
prominence in the central decision-making structures. 
Besides, an analysis of the relative importance of the State Security 
Council vis-a-vis the other Cabinet committees begs the· question of 
exactly what type of decisions or recommendations the State Security 
Council takes. General van Deventer states that the SSC is 
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responsible for advising the Government on national security, but 
omits to mention what the form is which this advice takes. 
According to the \/Jhi te Paper on Defence and Armaments Supply 1979, 
the SSC is responsible for the "national strategic planning process" 
which involves drawing up "guidelines, total national strategy 
directives and total national strategies concerning national secur-
ity". The object of these guidelines, directives and strategies is to 
~ffect the necessary planning without which the State would not be 
able to engage in the "highly co-ordinated - action" necessary to 
counteract the "total onslaught such as is being waged against South 
Africa". (74) Although this is perhaps vague, General Malan broadened 
out on the SSC's functions in the following terms -
"Daar is op 'n fondament van gesonde bestuurbeginsels 
gebou. Dit behels doeltreffendheid ten opsigte van die 
proses waarvolgens nie-verwante bronne geintegreer word 
in h totale stelsel vir doelwitbereiking asook die 
toepassing van die stelselbenadering op die staats-
opset. Laasgenoemde gee aanleiding tot die begrip van 
gesamentlike staatsbestuur." (75) 
What all this amounts to is the fact that the State Security Council 
has primarily a co-ordination function. Security considerations are 
brought to the Council's attention, either by its membership or by 
the intelligence community. The Council then decides what appropriate 
steps are necessary to deal with the situation. As these steps as 
often as not involve the activities of more than one government 
department, co-ordination is necessary. The Council then advises a 
course of action encapsulating this co-ordinated activity. If the 
course of action is likely to be a once-off campaign, it is termed a 
directive; if it is likely to re-occur in other guises, it is termed 
a guideline or a strategy. Should the advice be accepted by the 
,, 
Cabinet, the directive or strategy is then applied, in the requisite 
co-ordinated fashion, by the executive departments concerned. 
It is, however, important to understand that co-ordination is not the 
only function of the State Security Council. Dr Hough, borrowing 
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rather liberally from General Beaufre, expresses the various roles of 
the Council as follows -
"Bo aan die piramide en onder die direkte beheer van 
die regering is totale strategie ... waarvan die taak 
is om te bepaal hoe totale optrede uitgevoer moet word. 
Die oogmerk vir elke gesp'esialiseerde kategorie van 
strategie (b.v. ekonomiese, militere, politieke, maat-
skaplike en intervensie) moet neergele word, asook die 
wyse waarop hulle ineengeskakel moet word Op 
hierdie vlak mag die relatiewe belangrikheid van die 
verskillende gebiede (ekonomies, militer, ens.) aan-
sienlik varieer ooreenkomstig die omstandighede." (76) 
, It is thus clear that the State Security Council has three functions. 
The first, as we have seen, is the co-ordination of state activity in 
the area of national security. However, the SSC is also involved in 
implementation of total strategies, as well as the formulation of 
ational security policy. 
The dir.ecti ves of the Cabinet are normally generalised, and do not 
spell out exactly what is required. Thus, for example, late in 1981, 
the Cabinet decided to take advantage of the gains made by the SADF 
during Operation Protea and thereby create a de facto buffer zone 
north of the South West African/Namibian border, which would extend 
SWAPO's logistics lines and which would enable SWAPO movements to be 
relatively easily monitored. The directive of the Cabinet was -
"om suidelike Kunene Provinsie gedestabiliseer te hou 
en herbesetting van Xangongo en Ongiva te verhoed 
sander om die dorpe fisies te beset." (77) 
This was a very wide and inexplicit mandate. The State Security 
Council was left with the job of determining the mix of departmental 
strategies necessary to achieve this : obviously the Defence Force 
was involved, but diplomatic and information initiatives were also 
. ' 
required, inter alia to substantiate the claims of the UNITA movement 
to be regarded as a significant force in the Angolan civil war, to 
deny in world forums and elsewhere that South African troops were 
occupying the area, and so on. 
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Dr Hough has correctly termed the di rec ti ves of. the State Security 
Council "algemene of oorkoepelende strategiee", since they fuse 
. together a number of disparate activities in a number of fields of 
state activities. ( 78) General van Deventer says in this respect 
that -
"The philosophy upon which the organisation is based is 
that the Republic is confronted by a multi-dimensional 
threat - multi-dimensional in the sense that the 
Republic's enemies attack the constitutional, the 
economic, the social and the security bases in 
accordance with a co-ordinated plan or strategy. It is 
the conviction of the Government that this threat can 
only be met and turned back by the application of 
strategies using, in the same way as the enemy, the 
four main elements : constitutional, economic, social 
and security. Hence the underlying theme in the 
management of national security is joint state manage-
ment involving not only the security services, but also 
all the other government departments and organisations. 
These are brought together in the functions of 
management to ensure that all their energy and efforts 
are directed towards and focussed upon the achievement 
of the national security goals." (79) 
This integrated approach to state activity carries Mr Botha's 
endorsement. Speaking of the .activities of the State Security 
Council, General van r:ieventer stated -
"The Prime Minister believes in team work and in the 
old adage that the product of a team will always be 
better than that which is achieved by an individual. He 
also believes that team work should cover the whole 
process of management, i.e. planning, development, 
execution and through to the monitoring of execution 
and if necessary the replanning." (80) 
While Mr Botha described the State Security Council as -
·~a body which advises 
ordinates matters with 
should be taken. " ( 81 ) 
the Cabinet and which co-
regard to the action which 
It is very clear from these statements that the SSC does not have a 
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purely advisory function. Some government spokesmen ·coyly suggest 
that as the SSC does not have statutory defined executive responsi-
bilities, it must therefore be nothing more than an advisory body. 
This seems to be splitting hairs unnecessarily both from the 
admissions of Mr Botha and General van Deventer, and because Cabinet 
members do not have to be meeting as the Cabinet before being able to 
take decisions regarding the <:!-Ctions their departments should be 
taking, we are justified in inferring that the SSC is both an 
advisory and an executive agency. Before 'actually carrying out "total 
strategy", though, it will - out of courtesy more than anything 
else - wait for the formal approval of the Cabinet. 
The second element in the National Security Management System is the 
Working Committee of the State Security Council. This ,body has 
escaped the attention of most commentators, perhaps because many 
regard the Working Committee's role to be little more than 
secretarial. This perception may have been bolstered by the fact that 
each of the Cabinet committees has its own working committee. 
However, the role of the Working Committee ought not to be 
underestimated. Its basic membership consists of the heads of the 
government departments represented in the State Security Council and 
the chairmen of the other working committees of the other Cabinet 
committees. In the same way as the State Security Council, it is 
permitted to co-opt additional members as and when the need arises, 
either on a temporary or a semi-permanent basis. Its permanent 
membership consists therefore of the Secretary of the State Security 
Council (who is the chairman) and the Directors-General of Foreign 
Affairs, of Justice and of the National Intelligence Service, the 
Commissioner of Police and the Chief of the SADF. By 1983, at least 
eleven members were attending its meetings, demonstrating that the 
co-optiori provisions had been interpreted liberally. (82) 
Its functions are, however, far more important than merely secre-
tarial. Like the Sta.te Security Council, it meets every fortnight, a 
few days before meetings of the SSC, and its main function is. to 
'\ 
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discuss the matters which form part of the agendas of meetings of the 
SSC and to make recommendations regarding the advice which the SSC 
should give to the Cabinet. (83) Access to the Working Committee is 
open to any head of a government department who wishes to place an 
item regarding national security on its agenda such head of 
department is then free to attend the meeting or meetings of the 
Working Committee at which this item is discussed. 
If General van Deventer's statements are correct - and as chairman of 
. the Working Committee he ought to have been able to speak authorita-
tively on its behalf - it would seem that the Working Committee acts 
as a type of management committee of the State Security Council, 
caucussing in advance and making recommendations to the SSC. In 
fulfilling this task, the heads of government departments are 
extremely well-placed, since they normally are better able to advise 
the Cabinet on the capacity of their various departments to carry out 
·"total strategies" than are their political masters. Al though the 
fact that the National Party has been in power for an inordinately. 
long time by Western democratic standards, and this has served to 
allow Ministers to become more versed in the day-to-day management of 
their departments, it is nonetheless still true that the permanent 
heads of departments are far more capable of determining the courses 
of action which their departments are likely to be able to carry out 
successfully than are the political heads. It is accordingly very 
likely that the recommendations of the Working Committee are followed 
closely. 
The Working Committee is assisted not only by the respective 
departments whose Directors-General make up its membership, but also 
by the Secretariat of the State Security Council, the third element 
in the Security Management System. The Secretariat consists entirely 
of civil servants drawn either permanently or on secondment from 
other government departments. (84) It consists of relatively few 
officials - probably not in excess of 100 - of which 11% are drawn 
from the Department of Foreign Affairs, 1% from the Prisons Service, 
56% from the National Intelligence Service, 11% from the Security 
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Police, 5% from the Railways Police and 16% from the SADF. (85) When 
the Security Management System was first brought into operation, the 
Secretariat was styled the Security Planning ·Branch, and resorted 
under the Office of the Prime Minister. It was renamed the 
Secretariat of the State Security Council on the recommendation of 
the Commission for Administration on the 1st August 1981. (86) 
From that date, while it continued to report directly to Mr Botha, it 
has for purely administrative purposes been the responsibility of the 
National Intelligence Service. (87) 
. According to General van Deventer, the Secretariat has two primary 
functions. The first is to ensure that the input of all the agencies 
responsible for security management is co-ordinated, and that that 
co-ordinated input is made available to the State Security Council 
via the Working Cammi ttee. This obviously involves obtaining the 
co-operation of agencies which can make a contribution to the 
resolution of security problems, and the involvement of these bodies 
in the identification of security problems and in the suggestion of 
ways to resolve such problems. This task is, as we shall see, 
.... undertaken largely by means of the Interdepartmental Committees. 
The Secretariat's second major 4function is to ensure that the total 
strategies or strate~ic directives of the Cabinet are communicated to 
the executive departments for their action. While these departments 
get instructions as a matter of course from their Minister or 
Director-General, the Secretariat ensures that the co-ordination of 
action which is required to realise specific goals, in fact takes 
place. (88) 
General van Deventer is at pains to point out that the Secretariat as 
such has no executive responsibility and can only request the 
required qegree of co-operation and co-ordination. Much as was the 
case with the State Security Council, this disclaimer seems 
unnecessarily pedantic, since no civil servant would be likely to 
wilfully disregard the request of a person with direct access, not 
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only to his Minister, but to the Prime Minister/State President as 
well. Obviously the Secretariat does not have the staff to act as an 
executive agency, but a "request" from the Secretariat or its 
Secretary is likely to be speedily executed. 
In its internal organisation, the Secretariat is sub-divided into 
four branches. The first and least significant of the branches is the 
administrative branch which simply provides secretarial back-up to 
the Secretariat and accounts for its expenditure. The others are, 
however, of cardinal importance. 
The National Intelligence Interpretation Branch is, to use General 
van Deventer's words -
"responsible· for meeting the requirements of the 
Cabinet and the State Security Council with regard to 
the interpretation of national security intelligence, 
as well as the provision of intelligence reports on the 
basis of which strategies and other plans can be 
formulated." (89) 
This branch is crucial, according to the General, because -
"no planning can be done without intelligence. It is 
therefore a prerequisite that the Cabinet and all 
decision-makers be provided with timely, unbiased and 
objective intelligence." (90) 
General '(an Deventer is careful to stress that the collection of 
intelligence in its raw form is not the responsibility of the 
Secretariat, but remains the responsibility of the executive 
departments (the SADF, the SA Police, the National Intelligence 
Service and the Department of Foreign Affairs) which have always 
performed these· functions. Now, however -
"The interpretation thereof on a national level is ... 
done by the Secretariat and by a joint effort by 
members of the intelligence community seconded from 
their respective departments." (91) 
- 149· -
The chairmanship of the National Intelligence Interpretation Branch 
rotates on a two-yearly basis, and has already been chaired by an 
individual from the National Intelligence Service, the Directorate of 
Military Intelligence and the Security Police. The chairmanship will 
evidently pass in due course to ah official from the Department of 
Foreign Affairs. 
The necessity of having reliable, objective intelligence organised on 
a centralised basis has been emphasised not only by General Beaufre, 
in theoretical terms, but.also, within the South African context, by 
Dr L D Barnard, the head of the National Intelligence Service. He 
argued -
"di t is broodnodig dat die nasionale inligtingswaar-
dering sentraal gekoordineer moet word; die inlig-
tingsfunksie by staatsdepartemente kan byvoorbeeld 
subjektief beinvloed word deur, hulle funksionele 
lynfunksie en hulle inligtingswaardering sal in sodan-
ige gevalle nie vry van die beperking van departemen-
tele oogklappe wees nie. Vanwee die fei t dat 'n sentrale 
intelligensiediens geen uitvoerende verantwoordelikhede 
het nie, en omdat sy hooftaak 'n bemeestering van die 
waarheid op grond van veiligheidsinligting behels, is 
hy minder blootgestel aan die versoeking van subjek-
tiwi teit." (92) 
Dr Barnard also warns against decision-makers basing their decisions 
9n raw intelligence, arguing that experts in intelligence evaluation 
have to interp~et this to establish its veracity -
"Lede van 'n intelligensiediens se evaluasiebeen (word) 
gewoonlik as lessenaarbeamptes ingespan, 6f op 'n 
geografiese, land-vir-land basis, 6f as deskundiges op 
funksionele basis, met toespitsing op die staatkundige, 
die militere, die- ekonomiese of die maatskaplike 
bedreiging, 6f 'n vermenging daarvan." (93) 
It is reasonable, therefore, to assume that the National Intelligence 
Interpretation Branch performs this function - providing interpreted 
intelligence both in terms of the countries from which threats are 
perceived to emanate, as well as of the threats against what General 
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.Malan (and others) have called the "security bases" - the constitu-
' tional, the military, the economic and the social. An interdisci-
plinary approach to the evaluation of intelligence is therefore 
facilitated by the simple expedient of having all the experts in 
various fields evaluating intelligence simultaneously. It also 
ensures that a "co7 ordinated approach", which is continuously 
emphasised as necessary in the formulation and execution of the 
"total strategy" also takes place in the crucial area of the 
evaluation of intelligence. 
The efficient and streamlined evaluation of intelligence was, as we 
h.ave seen, a point over which much controversy has raged in the past. 
It was precisely the facilitation of this process which was the 
subject matter of the Potgieter Commission. We saw that despite the 
recommendation of this commission, intelligence evaluation continued 
to be a controversial issue, notwithstanding the more explicit 
delineation of the functions of the Bureau for State Security. How is 
it possible that the intelli~ence gathering agencies which were 
formerly at loggerheads, are now engaged in co-operative co-exis-
tence? ' 
In part, as we saw, the problem of the Bureau's poor relationship 
with the other intelligence organs lay in the personality of General 
van den Bergh. When, shortly after Mr Botha' s elevation to the 
premiership, he appointed a complete outsider, an intellectual from 
' the University of the Orange Free State, Dr Niel Barnard, to head the 
newly constituted National Intelligence Service, a new spirit of 
professionalism and non-partisanship was able to permeate through the 
by then notorious department. Dr Barnard made it clear from the start 
that he was not interested in creating a bureaucratic empire for 
himself; his sole ambition was to provide "neutral", unbiased and 
factually cor~ect evaluated intelligence to the decision-makers. He 
expresses himself unequivocally on this point -
"Die evaluering van veiligheidsinligting mag nooit deur 
politieke oorwegings en/of persoonlike oortuigings 
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beinvloed word nie . . . geen owerheid sal op die lang 
duur h manipulasie van veiligheidsinligting vir momen-
tele gewin oorleef nie. Die leierskorps van h intelli-
gensiediens moet dus onkreukbaar die ware inligting 
aanbied, wetende dat die boodskappers van minder goeie 
nuus nie altyd populer is nie." (94) 
One cannot help wondering whether Dr Barnard was not directly 
referring to his predecessor in advancing this homily. By contrast, 
his own philosophy is simple -
"Die verhouding tussen die sentrale intelligensiediens, 
aan die een kant, en departementele inligtingsorgane en 
die res van die staatsdepartemente, aan die ander kant, 
i.s belangrik. In nasionale belang moet die nasionale 
diens se evaluering van onvleiende veiligheidsinligting 
op die termeine van inligting wat die ander departe-
mente raak, billik, redelik en korrek wees sodat daar 
nooi t 'n wantroue in die nasionale intelligensiediens 
onstaan en van homself h beeld gevestig word as sou hy 
h lopende sonderegister byhou nie. Dit is slegs 
moontlik in h gees van wedersydse vertroue en h 
vestiging van begrip vir die belang van veiligheids-
inligting." ( 95) 
This broad-minded attitude by Dr Barnard has certainly assisted in 
breaking down interdepartmental jealousies, but it is also true that 
Mr Botha would not have tolerated interdepartmental rivalries amongst 
agencies whos~ ta.sk was so fundamental to the concept of a total 
strategy. The /spectre of General van den Bergh, who had within a 
space of months fallen from being the all-powerful Secretary of 
Security Intelligence to being a simple farmer minus a passport, 
testified to the political determination of Mr Botha to crush 
opponents who came between himself and his cherished ideals. Whatever 
the reason for the new. spirit of co-operation amongst the intelli-
gence agencies, it is manifest in the workings of the National 
Intelligence Interpretation Branch of the Secretariat, so much so, 






of ' the State 
Intelligence Section, among 
be agents of sorts of the 
Security Council, relaying 
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intelligence to its National Intelligence Interpre-
tation Branch. It can be justifiably asked whether 
these other bodies in practice readily convey their 
sometimes painfully gathered information to the SSSC. 
Professional jealousies might obstruct the smooth flow 
of information to the SSSC's National Intelligence 
Interpretation Branch, the highest body for the 
collation of intelligence. The SSSC, however, appears 
satisfied by the 'neutral' way in which the Interpreta-
tion Branch discharges its functions." (96) 
The third branch is that of Strategic Communication. The purpose of 
this branch is to devise strategies to counteract what General van 
Deventer calls "the battle of words" -
"An element of the threat which requires specific 
attention is the battle of words or, to call it ~y its 
name, the propaganda campaign against the RSA. There is 
no question but that the vanguard of modern warfare is 
psychological. It is therefore necessary that this 
matter also be addressed in joint planning and 
co-ordination the Strategic Communications Branch 
is responsible for advice and co-ordination with regard 
to the departmental efforts in combating the war of 
words." (97) 
The necessity to counteract a propaganda "onslaught" had, of course, 
as we have seen, given rise to the ill-fated Department of 
Information. The collapse of the department, its emasculation and 
absorption, with what might be termed bijwoner status, within the 
Department of Foreign Affairs, was the result more of the deliberate 
political disgrace of Dr Mulder - so essential to enable Mr Botha to 
consolidate his position as Prime Minister - and of the fact that 
financial irregularities had been committed by departmental offi-
cials, than of denying a role to a central information agency. 
Indeed, the concept of a "total strategy" accepted unreservedly that 
there was a propaganda "onslaught" which needed to be counteracted, 
not only from outside the country, but within it as well. 
Furthermore, this task needed to be centrally controlled if it was to 
effect the degree of co-ordination which total strategy demanded. The 
problem was to find an agency to perform this function which was 
uncontaminated by the unenviable reputation of the Department of 
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Information. Hence, when the Security Management System was estab-
lished, an agency was c.reated within it to perform this crucial task. 
The SADF had recognised the importance of good public relations, 
albeit within tightly controlled parameters. By the early 1970's, and 
at Mr Botha's initiative, the SADF and the Newspaper Press Union had 
concluded an agreement in terms of which Defence correspondents of 
the media could become accredited to the SADF, and thereby obtain 
authoritative, if classified, background briefings. For its part, the 
SADF ap.pointed a series of media liaison officers who, again within 
the constraints of departmental policy, were able to expedite the 
flow of official information to the public. 
This type of liaison had obvious advantages for the SADF, and it was 
the model on which the Strategic Communications Branch based its 
-modus operandi. 
• 
The business of providing clear and factually correct information has 
always occupied an important place within SADF operations. It is 
termed communication operations, or "comops" in SADF parlance. 
\ 
Although "comops" involves a great deal more than mere press liaison, 
this is its most important aspect. Internal corporate communication 
is also excellent, . and by 1983, no fewer than 29 "authorised" 
publications were being published by the SADF, aiming at target 
markets as diverse as coloured youths, military academy students and 
professional histori_ans. ( 98) "Comops" within the SADF was, however, 
and still is, a departmental strategy; similar strategies were being 
conducted by a wide range of other government institutions, and there 
existed a necessity for co-ordinating these all on what is termed the 
"total level". 
The fourth and last branch of the Secretariat formulates "total 
strategies". In doing so, it obviously relies on the intelligence 
provided by the National Intelligence Interpretation Branch, since no 
"total strategy" can be formulated without a perceived "total 
onslaught". It is known as the Strategy Branch. (99) 
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The Strategy Branch's functions are two:-fold. According to General 
van Deventer, it is -
"responsible essentially for the formulation of stra-
tegies and development plans and for the co-ordination 
of monitoring of the implementation of policies by the 
executive depar:-tments." (100) 
It is clear that it is the responsibility then, of this part of the 
Secretariat, to ensure that each government department to which 
responsibility for an aspect of a total strategy has been entrusted, 
carries out that portion, within the overall strategy. General van 
Deventer has stressed that -
"The Secretariat has no executive powers and only 
co-ordinates the implementation to ensure the reali-
sation of the set goal. This is achieved through a 
monitoring action carried out with the full support of 
the executive departments." (101) 
It is, however, equally clear that while formally the Branch does not 
have executive powers - they do not, for instance, have staff who can 
actually carry out their instructions - the Branch is very powerful 
on account of their access, through the Secretary of the State 
Security Council, not only to the political heads of the respective 
departments, but also to the State President himself. Much as was the 
case in the examination of whether the State Security Council was an 
"advisory" or an "executive" agency, the claim by General van 
Deventer that the Secretariat, and specifically its Strategy Branch, 
does not have executive functions seems again unduly pedantic : it is 
clear that its "monitoring" action includes instructions to carry out 
strategies which have been formulated on State Security Council 
level. 
It is the Branch's second function which is especially interesting, 
as it is here that the Secretariat slots into the next element in the 
Security Management System, the Interdepartmental Committees. The 
Strategy Branch is responsible for the formulation of total strate-
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gies, but the formulation of such strategies cannot occur in a 
vacuum. Only the "executive departments" are in a position to 
determine the extent to which they can assist in these total 
strategies. 
The Strategy Branch simply formalises the suggestions of the 
interdepartmental committees for submission first to the Working 
Committee and thence to the State Security Council and the Cabinet. 
We saw earlier that a series of areas of state activity embracing 
activity from more than one government department had been identified 
as early as 1977. These have become formalised into 13 areas, each of 
which has its own interdepartmental committee. The areas cover a very 






National Supplies and Resources 
Government Funding 
National Economy 
Telecommunications and Electrical Power Supply 
Science. and Technology 
Community Services 
Culture, and 
Political Affairs." (102) 
These committees draw their personnel mostly from the central 
government departments, and participation on such a committee is a 
part-time job, in addition to their normal line functions. However, 
it is clear that agencies other than central government departments 
are involved in the deliberations of these committees; for example, 
the Interdepartmental Committee on Telecommunications and Electrical 
Power Supply must draw on staff not only of the General Post Office 
(itself not technically a central government department) but also of 
the Electricity Supply Commission, a parastatal corporation. 
The terms of reference -0f these committees are vague. When asked what 
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the terms of reference of the Interdepartmental Committee on 
Political Affairs were, the Minister of Defence replied -
"The Poli ti cal Committee provides advice to the 
Secretariat of the State Security Council on matters 
pertaining to national security arising from interna-
tional, interstate and internal political development. 
The term 'political' has the same meaning as in 
'political science' and has no bearing on party-poli-
tical activities." (103) 
General van Deventer is equally vague. He maintains that -
"Co-ordination and planning covers such a wide field 
that it is impossible for the Secretariat to do it on 
its own. Co-ordination of the planning and implemen-
tation of policies is therefore achieved by means of 
the interdepartmental committees, which are consulted 
by the Secretariat at all stages of planning, develop-
ment and implementation. The interdepartmental commit-
tees ... corisist of representatives from the government 
departments which have a direct interest in the 
particular field of activity concerned." (104) 
General van Deventer makes it clear that the interdepartmental 
committees are an adjunct of the Secretariat, and key in, as we have 
seen, into the Strategy Branch. The role of the committees must 
therefore be to devise interdepartmental strategy to deal with 
specific security threats within the specified fields. But the 
interrelationship between the committees and the Secretariat is more 
complex than merely the Secretariat rubber-stamping recommendations 
of the respective committees. According to one source, a total 
strategy has been formulated for the security problem of Mozambique. 
(105) This obviously embraces joint action within a number of 
interdepartmental areas. Security is obviously relevant, as is 
Manpower (on account of Mozambican labour on the mines) and Transport 
(on account of the involvement of the SA Transport Services in the 
Komatipoort-Maputo rail link and in Maputo harbour). The Telecommu-
nications and Electricity Supply Committee would also be involved, in 
respect of the Cabera- Bassa hydro-·electric power project, and the 
Political Committee, to analyse the political developments within the 
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State. Each of these ar&. interdepartmental responsibil~ties, but the 
strategies these committees derive will only be interdepartmental 
strategies. The task of the Secretariat is to weave each of these 
interdepartmental strategies into a total strategy for dealing with a 
global security threat. It is the task of the Secretariat to 
conceptualise total strategy, and it is the task of the interdepart-
mental committees to give concrete form and content to the total 
strategies. 
The five elements of the Security Management System discussed so 
far - the Cabinet, the State Security Council, the Working Committee, 
the Secretariat and the Interdepartmental Committees - operate, as we 
have seen, on central government level. The final element is the 
Joint Management Centres. 
According to General Malan, there are eleven Joint Management Centres 
which have been constituted in the following centres : Durban, 
Kimberley, Pretoria, Port Elizabeth, Bloemfontein, Walvis Bay, 
Johannesburg, 
Their location 
same places as 
Cape Town, Potchefstroom, Pietersburg and Nelspruit. 
is instructive, as they are centred largely in the 
the headquarters of the SADF commands. (106) It is, 
however, evidently the intention eventually to reduce the number to 
nine which will correspond to the nine economic development regions. 
Beneath the Joint Management Centres are 60 sub-management centres 
and 354 mini-management centres. (The location of these are 
reproduced in Appendix A). (107) According to General van der 
Westhuizen, two further subsidiary bodies, namely local management 
centres and liaison forums have been constituted, but the number and 
location of these are unknown. (108) The delineation of the 
boundaries of the sub-management centres seem to be fairly arbitrary 
at the moment, but, just as the Joint Management Centre boundaries 
will change to correspond with those of the economic regions, the 
intention is to constitute sub-management committees with boundaries 
the same as those of the still-to-be-instituted Regional Services 
Councils. ( 109) 
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According to Geldenhuys and Kotze, another four Joint Management 
Centres have been established with responsibilities for certain 
Southern African countries, including one for South West Africa/ 
Namibia. ( llO) While this might have been the case when Geldenhuys 
and Kotze wrote their article, it is almost certain that the tasks 
which these JMC's performed have been taken over by new JMC's which 
have now been constituted, in line with the re-organisation of the 
military command structure in January 1984. It seems that the 
security "problem" constituted by Mozambique, for example, is dealt 
with by the JMC stationed at Nelspruit, whose chairman, General 
Paetzold, is also General Officer Commanding, Eastern Transvaal 
Commanc::l. 
Each Joint Management Centre appears to consist of between 40 and 60 
officials, drawn, according to General Malan, from "all government 
ins ti tut ions which may have an interest in the activities of the 
Management Centres". He added that where community organisations can 
and wish to make a contribution to the activities of the Management 
Centre, "the necessary liaison" with such organisations is estab-
lished. ( lll) However, it appears as if the 1 iaison takes place 
primarily on the level of sub- and mini-management centres, and not 
on the level of the JMC's themselves. According to General van der 
Westhuizen -
"Die PBS of Mini-GBS'e kan. voorts nog skakelforums stig 
waarmee nie-amptelike geskakel kan word, soos byvoor-
beeld vroue-org)misasies, Rotar1ers, Rapportryers, 'n 
landbouorganisasie, ouer-onderwysersverenigings en be-
lastingbetalersverenigings." (112) 
By contrast, only government officials can become full members of 
Joint Management Centres -
"Al die lede van 'n GBS is staatsamptenare of amptenare 
van h ander bestuursinstansie soos die Provinsiale 
Administrasie of die stadsklerk van 'n munisipali tei t. 
Hulle verteenwoordig die bestuursinstellings in die 





According to General Malan, the chairmen of the Joint Management 
Centres are (with the exception of the much smaller centre 
established for Walvis Bay) all at least brigadiers in either the 
SADF or the SA Police. (114) Despite this preponderance of chairmen 
drawn from the security forces, General van der Westhuizen maintains 
that this is purely fortuitous, as elections for the post of chairman 
take place o~ a democratic basis -
"Die voorsitters van die GBS'e word almal deur lede van 
die betrokke GBS verkies. So 'n GBS kan bestaan ui t 
sowat viertig lede. Die feit dat die huidige voorsit-
ters almal weermags- of polisiehoofde in die betrokke 
gebied is, is omdat die lede van die GBS' e di t tot 
hulle voordeel vind. So 'n hoe offisier beskik oor 
verbindings, ~ infrastruktuur en~ organisasie. 
"Tans is elke Weermagslid wat voorsi tter van 
1
n GBS is, 
die kommandement-bevelvoerder in die gebied. In die 
geval van die SAP is hy 'n afdelingskommissaris. Maar 'n 
verteenwoordiger van .. ·,~·n ander departement kan ook 
verkies word. Die voor~Jtter hoef nie 'n polisieman of 'n 
lid van die Weermag te''."'wees nie." ( 115) 
The fact that there is no impediment to officials of other 
departments becoming chairmen of the Joint Management System is 
perhaps ·reassuring, but the bland assurance does not explain why a 
non-police or defence representative has never to date become such a 
chairman. The explanation for this lies not only in the infrastruc-
ture which the military or police officer controls, but also in their 
appreciation of the concept of security management, a quality which 
is not evidenced to the same degree by representatives of the other 
departments. We shall see presently the relationship of the Joint 
Management Centres vis-a-vis the State Security Council; suffice, at 
this stage, to say that it would not do to have a chairman of a Joint 
Management Centre who did not believe in the total onslaught, and the 
necessity for counteracting such an onslaught with a total strategy. 
Each Joint Management Centre meets approximately once every three 
months in plenary session, for formal presentations and for seminars 
whose aim it is to build up a consciousness of a "total" approach to 
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Security Management. (116) However, the real work of the Joint 
Ma~agement Centres is done by its standing committees, of which there 
are three. 
The most important of these committees is known as the GIK 
( Gesamentlike Inl igtingskomi tee). As was the case in the National 
Intelligence Interpretation Branch of the Secretariat, the role of 
the GIK is to ensure that intelligence which is gathered on a local 
level is properly evaluated, by means of a multi-disciplined 
approach, encompassing the contribution of the local representatives 
of' the Secu~ity Police, the Directorate of Military Intelligence and 
the National Intelligence Service. Evidently, the quality of the 
intelligence is extremely high, and through the efforts of the GIK, 
the Joint Management Centres are able to do planning on the basis of 
very detailed and accurate intelligence. 
The second committee is called the SEMKOM (Staatkundige-, Ekonomiese-
en Maatskaplikekomitee). Its task is to formulate joint strategies 
covering the constitutional, economic and social aspects which 
counteract any particular local security threat which might have been 
identified by the GIK. Over and above this responsibility the SEMKOM 
is required to oversee the implementation of total strategies which 
might have been devised on the level of the State Security Council, 
and have been applied on a country-wide basis. Its membership 
consists of representatives from the government departments which 
concern themselves with constitutional, economic and social develop-
ment on a local level. Obviously the Department of Constitutional 
Development is integrally involved in this committee, but represen-
tatives are also drawn from institutions as diverse as the town 
clerks of certain towns and the Sports Promotion Br'anch of the 
Department of National Education. (117) 
The third committee is known as the KOMKOM (Kommunikasiekomitee). It 
performs a roughly paralle1 function on regional level to the task of 
the Strategic Communication Branch of the Secretariat - the dissemi-
nation of ''accurate" information about the activities and intentions 
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of the Government. It seeks by such information to convince the 
"reasonable" or "silent" majority that negotiation and consultation 
with the Government will achieve more durable and satisfactory 
results than confront~tion. 
The KOMKOM has, in the past, also overseen the implementation of 
selective disinformation campaigns, although these are now recognised 
to be counter-productive. An example of such an attempt at 
disinformation was the publication in 1982 of a facsimile of the 
journal Cahac Speaks. While in outward form the two publications 
seemed·ident{~al, key sentence~ in the version produced by the JMC in 
Cape Town differed significantly. The headline of the message from 
the chairman, for instance, read, in the original, "We need to be 
strong and well-organised", while in the JMC version this headline 
changed to "We need to be strong, well-organised and responsible". 
Similarly, a caption under the picture of· a protest meeting in the 
original read, "We showed at the rally on Sunday, January 10 that we 
can stand together". In the substituted version, this sentence read 
"Support your Local Management Committee. You voted them in". Similar 
bogu~ pamphlets were employed during the spate of unrest in the Cape 
Peninsula in June 1980, and on an occasion in 1983, when a 
non.:..authentic version of Campus News was produced. In the former 
case, the Minister of Foreign Affairs admitted that his officials had 
been involved in the compilation of the pamphlet, which he said, was 
aimed at providing "correct information to counter false and inciting 
propaganda". He said further that "whenever the Government considered 
it essential, for the sake of peace and order, it would distribute 
pamphlets of that n~ture. I can add that we have done it in the past 
and we will do it again in the future." (118) 
Each Joint Management Centre also has an executive which consists of 
the chairman of the Centre its elf and the chairmen of the three 
committees. This executive is regarded as the "dagsbestuur" and meets 
regularly in order to monitor progress in the implementation of 
strategies and to enable the chairman of the Centre to report 
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progress to the Secretary of the State Security Council. The GIK, the 
SEMKOM and the KOMKOM meet approximately once every two weeks, 
al though in certain situations, for example during the State of 
Emergency in 1985, the committees met weekly. (119) 
The formal terms of reference of the Joint Management Centres have 
been disclosed to Parliament. In reply to a question in 1983 Mr Botha 
said that -
"The aim of the JMC' s is to ensure the necessary 
co-ordination on security matters at regional and local 
levels through the Departments concerned." (120) 
While, in 1986, General Malan merely replied that their task was "to 
co-ordinate joint government action at regional level". ( 121) It 
would seem unlikely that the JMC's co-ordinate all government 
action - more particularly given their structure, outlined above. It 
is clearly government action in relation to counteracting security 
threats which the JMC's co-ordinate. 
Yet even this more limited description of the terms of reference of 
the JMC's is capable of an extraordinarily wide interpretation, more 
particularly, as we have seen, given the wide conception of the 
"total onslaught". As virtually anything might be included within the 
ambit of the. total onslaught as it manifests itself on a regional 
level, so virtually anything might technically be the subject of the 
scrutiny of the JMC's. 
It is clear, too, that the JMC's have at least two primary functions 
which are not specifically mentio~ed in the terms of reference. 
First, the JMC's co-ordinate and monitor the implementation of total 
strategies which have been devised by the Secretariat, and approved 
by the State Security Council/Cabinet, at regional level. General van 
der Westhuizen maintains that -
'"n GBS vergader om insette van die Staatsveiligheids-
raad te ontleed, of om optrede te bepaal en te 
besluit wie dit moet uitvoer." (122) 
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But it is the second function of the JMC's which is more interesting. 
The JMC's are the eyes and ears of the Security Management System, 
and, in order to carry out this task, the JMC -
"ko-ordineer voorts die opstel van die veiligheids-
meesterplan op streekvlak en doen verslag op die 
toepaslike vlak. Hy stuur situasie-rapporte na bo, hoe 
di t vorde'r en watter inl igting daar is. Hy doen ook 
verslag oor hoe met die beslegting van 'n problem 
gevorder word." (123) 
It seems, then that in addition to their functions as purely 
co-ordinating institutions, the JMC's are also responsible for 
determi~ing the security priorities in their own areas and for 
communicating suggested strategies to deal with these priorities to 
the "toepaslike vlak", presumably the Secretary of the State Security 
Council. If this interpretation is correct, it would seem that the 
JMC's are not merely passive and administrative, but pro-active as 
well. 
This interpretation seems to be substantiated by the example quoted 
by General van der Westhuizen to illustrate the workings of a Joint 
Manage'ment Centre. A large meeting is arranged by "revolutionary 
elements" and the possibility exists that this will develop into 
rioting and public violence. The intelligence of this meeting is 
acquired by the JMC, who informs the head offices of government 
departments and the State Security Council. The JMC then co-ordinates 
the response to the problem with both the civi
0
l and security 
authorities. 
Stripped of all their verbiage, the terms of reference of the JMC's 
are simple. They have been established to counteract what is termed 
"the revolutionary climate". General van der Westhuizen expresses 
this aspect of their work as follows -
"Di t gaan hoofsaaklik oor die verlaging van die 
revolusionere klimaat, die voorkoming/ontlonting van 
onrus en die bestryding van terrorisme, en ander 
revolusionere optrede." (124) 
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The "lowering" of "the revolutionary climate" is an extraordinary 
concept with which to get to grips, more particularly in the light of 
the example given by General van der Westhuizen, quoted above. It has 
as its basis the assumption that all action taken by organisations 
who oppose the Government outside the parameters of "acceptable" 
opposition (those parameters being determined by the Government 
itself) is revolutionary action, or at very least action which raises 
"the revolutionary climate''. This, of course, takes on a special 
significance during a state of emergency, where the "acceptable" 
parameters of opposition become more heavily circumscribed. Any 
organisation which then is guilty of operating beyond these 
parameters is faced with the prospect of joint state action 
orchestrated by the JMC's. 
The power to determine, seemingly arbitrarily, what is and is not 
raising "the revolutionary climate" makes nonsense of the oft-
repeated claim by government spokesmen that the JMC's have no 
executive powers. While this may be technically true - as we saw it 
was in the case of the State Security Council and the Secretariat -
the same counter-argument is equally valid. The JMC's bring together 
in one organisation all the top officials within their respective 
regions, and such officials control formidable executive powers. It 
seems pedantic to suggest that it is the civil servants, and not the 
JMC, which determine· the executive action, when the same civil 
servants are all members of the JMC. Of course it is self-evident 
that •between 40 and 60 Officials Cannot themsel VeS execute action I 
but those 40 or 60 officials have the ability, through the resources 
they control, to carry out any strategy a JMC may elect to follow. 
Besides, General van der Westhuizen makes it clear that, even if the 
JMC 's do not have executive power, they should be regarded as the 
directors of state activity. He says -
"Die GBS moet self-organisasie en prosedure ontwikkel 
sodat die volle gewig van die staatsmasjien, met al sy 
staatsdepartemente, enige situasie in streekverband kan 
hanteer. Organisasies en prosedure moet op die regte 
tyd en regte plek aangewend word." (125) 
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Perhaps this coyness can be_ ascribed to an unwillingness on the part 
of the JMC's to disclose the extent of their involvement in the arena 
of politics, even if this involvement is only to "lower the 
revolutionary climate". The civil service in South Africa, and 
particularly the Defence Force, inherited a strong tradition, if not 
of being n?n-political, then at least of being non~partisan, from the 
British. The total strategy applied to external "onslaught" at least 
provides the civil service and army with the fiction that this is in 
the interests of all South Africans and is therefore "non-political 
action". However, "countering" internal "onslaught" or "lowering the 
revolutionary climate" brings the organs of the State into direct 
political controversy in a way which makes it very difficult to 
maintain the facade of formal political neutrality. 
The JMC's are, therefore, scrupulous to avoid any personal publicity, 
preferring to work in the background, and reserving the kudos for 
"legitimate" politicians. Thus it was that towards the end of 1985, 
the Joint Management Centre in Cape Town was involved in the 
provision of food parcels to the unemployed in Atlantis, so as to 
undermine the influence - of Mr Noel Williams' Atlantis Residents' 
Association, and thereby to "lower the revolutionary climate". 
How~ver, the JMC was not remotely involved with the physical 
presentation of thes~ parcels : this pleasant task was reserved for 
Mr Abe Williams (no relation), the MP in the House of Representatives 
for the constituency of Mamre, and Defence spokesman for the Labour 
Party. ( 126) This modus operandi had at least two advantages : it 
served to enhance Mr Abe Williams' reputation, and thereby served to 
emphasise the advantages of working within the system; secondly, it 
allowed the JMC's role in the provision of the food parcels to pass 
unnoticed, and thus for them to escape any possible political 
controversy. 
Sometimes the JMC's will be required, as we noted earlier, to carry 
out the instructions of the State Security Council, and this 
inv~riably draws the JMC more directly into controversy. In June 
198~, for example, the Natal JMC was instructed by the State Security 
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Council to assist the campaign to have Ingwavuma incorporated into 
Swaziland, as follows -
"Natal GBS word getaak om grensaanpassings van Swazi-
land en veral t.o.v. Ingwavuma gebied d.m.v. komops te -ondersteun." (127) t.o,.,..Mu.t.J1<Jt"t;C*J O'i'~T·~ 
In carrying out this instruction, the SADF incurred the wrath of 
Chief Buthelezi, who maintained that armed soldiers were intimidating 
the villagers in the area. The Chief Minister alleged that soldiers 
had been telling villagers that the Defence Force had helped them 
with water supplies during the 1980 drought and with medical supplies 
when there was a cholera epidemic in 1981. 
The soldiers were pointedly asking what Inkatha had done for them. In 
addition, Chief Buthelezi accused the Security Policy of having 
attempted to intimidate the local population in Ingwavuma to renounce 
their membership of Inkatha. Finally, Dr Oscar Dhlomo, the Minister 
of Education and Culture in KwaZulu, stated that soldiers had been 
spreading "propaganda" in schools in the area. Chief Buthelezi said 
that he could not understand the motivation behind these actions, but 
that he considered them "very provocative". (128) 
Chief Buthelezi was no push-over, and after threatening to withdraw 
his delegation from the Commission of Inquiry set up to adjudicate 
the proposed land deals with Swaziland, the SADF backed down and 
withdrew -their personnel from the area. Rather lamely, the Officer 
Commanding Natal Command explained that the soldiers had been going 
from house to house in the Ingwavuma area to compile statistics which 
would help to combat the cholera epidemic. Chief Buthelezi replied 
that such statistics would easily have been obtained from the 
Department of Health in Ulundi. (129) 
The relationship between the local JMC 's and the State Security 
Council is also made more complicated by the domestic politic al 
constraints under which members of the SSC operate. During the unrest 
in the Cape Peninsula in the latter half of 1985, the JMC in Cape 
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Town suggested that the s~burb of District Six should be reproclaimed 
a group area for coloureds. The idea behind this was that a dramatic 
announcement of this nature would go a long way towards "lowering the 
revolutionary climate" in Cape Town's coloured townships and thereby 
help to restore calm. The suggestion was turned down flat : Mr Botha 
himself had been responsible, while Minister of Community Development 
in 1966, for the original proclamation and had no interest in 
reversing it. (130) 
Not all the activities of the. JMC's are, however, politically 
controversial. Some merely aim to facilitate administrative co-ordi-
nation in the management of security problems. During the height of 
the riots in the Cape Peninsula in 1985, for example, the security 
forces encountered the problem of youths who hid behind the bushes on 
either , side of the N2 freeway outside Cape Town, emerging only to 
throw stones at passing cars. The removal of these bushes became a 
, 
tactical necessity, and the problem was brought to the attention of 
the Cape Town JMC, which sought the co-operation of the roads 
engineers of the Cape Town City Council, the Divisional Council of 
the Cape, and the Cape Provincial Administration, all of whom 
controlled various portions of the road. The bushes were cleared 
within 24 hours. (131) 
It was a little unusual in this instance for a JMC to have become 
involved with municipal officials, since the interface between local 
government (whether of "white" or "non-white" areas) occurs primarily 
when local government officials co-operate with either sub- or 
mini-JMC's. Like the JMC's themselves, sub- and mini-JMC's are 
divided into three committees, again known by their Afrikaans 
abbreviations as the VEIKOM (Veiligheidskomitee), the SEMKOM and 
K.OMKOM. Attached to each is a GOS (Gesamentlike Operasiesentrum), a 
body of officials which gives practical effect to the decisions of 
the sub~ or mini-JMC concerned. (132) 
On this level, the membership of the committees appears to be less 
rigid than is the case with the JMC's themselves, and officials and 
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other· interested parties seem free to attend the meetings of 
committees other than that of which they are formally members. In 
additiop, sub- and mini-JMC's meet more regularly in plenary session; 
depending on the situation, they may meet as often as twice per week. 
Furthermore, the KOMKOM appears to meet irregularly and usually only, 
to discuss a specific communication project assigned to it. 
Further evidence of the flexibility of the sub- and mini-JMC's is the 
relative weight of membership of the committees themselves. In 
situations of unrest or large-scale conflict, the sub- or mini-JMC 
goes into a security mode, and accordingly the security force 
participation increases at the expense of the officials involved in 
social, economic or constitutional programmes. However, when "stabi-
lity" or "normality" - and these terms have specific meanings within 
the JMC context (133) - has been re-established, the sub- or mini-JMC 
reverts to a welfare mode, as a consequence of which the memberships 
are inverted. The transition from the one mode to ·the other appears 
to occur effortlessly, and without particular antagonism by offi-
cials. 
At mini-JMC level, membership of the body rarely exceeds 20, with 
representatives drawn from the local offices of the Departments of 
Posts and Telecommunications, Health and Welfare, Manpower, Home 
Affairs and whatever Education department is appropriate to the area 
served by the Centre. In addition (obviously) , there are represen-
tatives of the SAP - normally the station commander and the "field 
commander" if there are extra SAP uni ts deployed in the area - and 
the SADF. Parastatal corporations, such as Escom or SATS, are 
included if appropriate. From the City Council or Town Council some 
five representatives normally attend meetings of the JMC, usually the 
Mayor/Town Clerk/Administrator, and a representative from the 
engineering, technical, financial and law enforcement branches. 
(Where black local authorities have effectively collapsed, the 
Administrator will attend instead of the Mayor; however it is 
accepted that this is a temporary phenomenon, and as' soon as the 
Ci ty/T?wn councils become re-established, the Mayor will return to 
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his "rightful" place on the JMC). Where circumstances warrant this, a 
representative from the ambulance services may also be co-opted. 
As we saw in the case of the JMC'S themselves, the activities of the 
sub- and mini-JMC's are aimed at co-ordinating government action with 
the object of "lowering the revolutionary climate" within their area 
of competence. Such activities - aside from straight security fQrce 
action - will normally take the form of improving the quality of life 
of the. inhabitants of the area. This derives from the openly-
expressed belief by key security intelligence policy-makers (most 
recently by General Malan in an interview with Die Suid-Afrikaan 
( 134) ) that t.he disenfranchised sections of the population are not in 
the fi~st place intepested in political rights, but in socio-economic 
upliftment. Hence a typical programme of action of a mini-JMC 
attached to a black local authority would focus on the provision of 
new schools and the upgrading of existing ones, heal th promotion 
programmes, the provision of electricity and water-borne sewerage, 
the tarring of roads, the provision of play parks and a sports-
promotion programme, the installation of telephones and training 
schemes for the unemployed. 
·However, even within these welfare mode upliftment programmes, 
participation by the security forces in this process is considered 
both desirable and, indeed, essential. For, since the NSMS as a whole 
is intimately involved with security management, as we have seen, it 
is assumed that socio-economic upliftment programmes themselves form 
part of wider, security-related objectives. 
That means that the security forces are required to create the 
essential stability it is assumed is necessary for meaningful 
upliftment programmes to occur. Accordingly, the activities of the SA 
Police and/or the SADF and/or the municipal law enforcement agencies 
are similarly co-ordinated, not only to achieve basic stability per 
~· but also to mesh in with the upliftment programmes. Hence, the 
security forces may be involved in activities as diverse as manning 
road-blocks, guarding construction teams and participating in patrols 
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whose object it is to disc.over what the local population thinks and 
to communicate the intentions of the JMC. (135) 
The security forces do not confine themselves to this executive 
fµnction either. As was argued above, the NSMS depends for its 
efficient functioning on accurate, evaluated intelligence, and the 
security forces' role, at sub- and mini-JMC level, is to provide raw 
intelligence for onward transmission and evaluation along the 
channels the NSMS provides. This enables the higher levels in the 
System to monitor the progress of the "revolutionary onslaught" and 
to determine whether individual intelligence reports constitute part 
of a wider canvas (requiring a country-wide "total strategy") or 
whether this is a local grievance, the resolution of which can be ' 
left to a sub- or mini-JMC in the area concerned. 
Such then, are the structure and functions of the National Security 
Management System. It is a formidable apparatus, drawing together 
, •' I 
officials and politicians who wield formidable power and influence in 
South Africa. It ·is, as we can clearly see, the manifestation, in 
operational terms, of the ideas of General Beaufre, probably one of 
the few times that the ideas of a single theoretician have been 
translated into reality in the modern world. We have also seen that 
it is effective : it has effected a very high degree of co-ordination 
within.the civil service, which, when Mr Botha became Prime Minister, 
was widely engaging in disparate pursuits. It has induced a much 
higher degree of efficiency in coping with perceived security, 
threats, and has infused, in a new generation of public servants, the 
awareness of a "total onslaught" and a commitment to a "total 
strategy'·' as a means of dealing with the onslaught. We will now have 
to examine whether the institution of the Security Management System 
has, as many commentators allege, involved a "takeover" by the 
military, and whether this System is likely to have an enduring 
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For a variety of reasons, the public pronouncements of politicians 
are often disbelieved. This, in its elf, is a heal thy occurrence, 
since politicians are inclined to the use of hyperbole. Politicians 
tend to engage in hyperbole because overstatement of a case generally 
means that half of what they say is accepted, which is, as often as 
not, what they were aiming for in the first instance. 
I 
In South Africa, this general rule is, predictably, somewhat 
different. Not that South African politicians do not exaggerate; on 
the contrary, the tendency is probably more pronounced here than in 
other democracies, whose leaders' statements face a more intensive 
examination in public forums and in the media. But in South Africa, 
politicians tend to be absolutely believed or absolutely disbelieved, 
depending on what side of the political spectrum the recipient of the 
message is located. This aggravates our already complex problems; 
political debate is made additionally complicated by the fact that 
both sides talk past each other, neither accepting the other's basic' 
points of departure. 
In no field of public debate has this phenomenon been more apparent 
than in that surrounding the objective threats facing the Republic. . . 
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Official spokesmen have, as we have seen, consistently punted the 
view that South Africa is the subject of a total onslaught, 
masterminded by the Kremlin, and encompassing a wide spectrum of 
fields. Opponents of the Government - both liberal and radical - deny 
that there is such a total onslaught. Liberals would argue that while 
there are legitimate security concerns inherent in, for example, the 
presence of relatively large numbers of Cuban troops in Angola, such 
security concerns need to be dealt with in a piecemeal fashion and do 
not, in themselves, constitute pro.of of a malevolent intent on the 
part of the Soviet Union. Both liberals and radicals regard the 
domestic dimension of the perceived total onslaught as little more 
than an understandable and even legitimate reaction to the policy of 
apartheid. 
Because no consensus exists on the nature and scope of the security 
threat, none exists on the response of the State. The· National 
Security Management System has, then, for example, been described by 
Mr Colin Eglin, then Leader of the Official Opposition in the House 
of. Assembly, as "a very sinister political development". (1) General 
Malan, on behalf of the Government, responded -
"Di t verstom my dat 'n poli tikus en leier van die 
amptelike opposisie so naief en oningelig kan wees .•. 
hy probeer daarvan 'n poli tieke speelbal maak wat dui op 
oningeligheid en naiewiteit. 'n Mens sou kon verwag dat 
'n man in sy posisie beter huiswerk sou doen voordat hy 
verklarings soos hierdie maak. (2) 
In a very large measure, General Malan' s critic ism was valid. The 
Government has never tried to conceal its intention to operationalise 
the concept of a total strategy, and, indeed, has publicised this 
intention repeatedly. The problem was that Mr Eglin did not believe 
that the Government could be serious. 
It was the purpose of this study to show that Mr Botha has been 
wholly consistent and therefore predictable in establishing the 
National Security Management System. He genuinely and earnestly 
believed - and still believes - in the concept of a total onslaught. 
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He has found, in General Beaufre, a theoretician whose ideas match 
his own, and has adopted Beaufre's ideas seemingly without question, 
about how to deal with the onslaught~ He has, in his public 
pronounceme~ts and in his departmental publications, striven to 
expound his theories. Since he became Prime Minister in 1978, he has, 
in a very single-minded fashion, implemented precisely what he said 
he intended to do. 
This predictability notwithstanding, the institution of the NSMS has 
been shrouded in a mystique which is substantially undeserved. This 
mystique has been fuelled both by sensational accounts written about 
it ori the one hand, and. by actions of poorly-informed officials on 
the other. Thus, a recent account, contained in the Weekly Mail, was 
headlined "The ··Army's Quiet Coup", and "The Uniformed Web that 
Spr.awls across the ·country". The writer of this article maintains 
that -
"A massive and little known network of over 500 
committees, effectively controlled by the military and 
police, is co-ordinating government and state activity 
at every level of South African l~fe." (3) 
This interpretation, while factually correct in the sense that there 
are 500 committees and that certainly the more important of these are 
controlled by the SADF or SAP, is extravagant. Clearly not all state 
activity is co-ordinated by the NSMS, but merely activity in the area 
of security intelligence. Admittedly, as we have seen, the inordi-
nately wide definition of the total onslaught has provided avenues 
for action by the NSMS in areas unrelated to state security, but the 
point remains that there are areas of state activity which are not 
regulated by the System. 
On the other hand, the official reluctance to disclose details of the 
activities of the NSMS fuels speculation about the extent of its 
involvement in civil government. For example, on 9th October 1986, 
Cllr Tony Leon asked the Johannesburg Management Committee (as he was 
entitled to do in terms of Section 28 ( 1) of the Standing Orders 
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governing the conduct of debates in the City Council), whether there 
was a sub-JMC for the Johannesburg area, and if sq, whether any 
officials of the city served on this body. 
The reply of the Management Cammi ttee was simultaneously ingenuous 
and evasi~e, as follows -
"Section 4 of the Protection of Information Act (No 84 
of 1~82) makes it ~n orfence for a person to disclose 
any information knowing that it relates to a security 
ma·tter, to ariy person other than a person to whom he is 
'authorised to · disclose it, or to whom it may be 
. lawfully ~aisclosed, or to whom in the interests of the 
Republic i;t is his duty 'to disclose it; and provides a 
penalty on convi'ction of a fine not exceeding RlO 000, 
or to imprisonrnent not exceeding ten years, or both. 
Without any admission that the Council has, or has not, 
such infbrmation' it is considered that the informa-
tion, in the form requested, would fall within the 
scope of the prohibition of the aforesaid section." (4) 
If this reply had b~en furnished by any other corporation than the 
governing body of the largest city in the Republic, its incompre-
hensibility might be excused. For, earlier in that year, General 
Malan had told Parliament that a sub~JMC existed for Johannesburg and 
had told the press that "daar is niks geheim of sinister" regarding 
tpe NSMS. For th'.e Man~gement Cammi ttee to have hidden behind the 
provisions of the Protection of Information Act sh0ws either 
dange~ous n~ivety or equally dangerous ignorance; neither quality is 
recommended for the City Fathers controlling the centre which 
produces fully half South Africa's GNP. 
In part, however, this reticence is understandable given the 
controversial nature of the NSMS as instituted. It is all very well 
for General Malan to say, by way of a press statement, that there is 
nothing secret or sinister about the System : the point is that the 
NSMS was designed to co-ordinate the activities of the SADF, SAP and 
National Intelligence Service, each of whose activities are prec~uded 
from being reported by very specific pieces of legislation (the 




What is important is that both sensationalism and evasion cloak the 
NSMS in an aura of mysticism and intrigue of which the authors of spy 
!iction might have cause to be proud. Neither approach is useful· : 
both implicitly portray the NSMS as omnipotent and omnipresent. What 
is lacking in these p.pproaches 
. 
is a dispassionate account of the 
structures and an analysis of their strengths and weaknesses, their 
potential for providi~g solutions or exacerbating problems. 
Also implicit, particularly in the sensational accounts, is the 
all~gation that these structures are new and that they have been 
activated since the f~rst. State of Emergency was declared in July 
1985. Part of the purpose of this study was to show that.while the 
large-scale political dissatisfaction which manifested itself before 
and during the Emergency has· thrown the NSMS into sharper focus, the 
Sy~tem itself has been planned in intricate detail over a long 
period. It is tempting to speculate whether the expressed goal of 
some of the anti-apartheid community organisations of making South 
Africa "ungovernable" would have succeeded had the NSMS not been in 
place, or, conversely, whether such organisations would have embarked 
on this campaign in the first place had they been appraised of the 
sophisticated nature of the repressive system they were up against. 
As it was, the "mini-revolution" South Africa experienced in.1985 and 
1986 allowed the security planners to refine the NSMS and make it 
more flexible. As we have seen,· the NSMS, particularly on JMC level, 
is able to adapt itself effortlessly from a welfare mode to a 
security mode, depending on the perceived threats to the security of 
the State. Equally, the structures vary from place to place, 
depending on local circumstances (for example, such as whether there 
is a viable black local authority in existence). One implication of 
this is the difficulty researchers experience in definitively 
outlining the structure.s created by the NSMS. What appears to be 
correct information may apply only to one area at one time; 
researchers need to be cautious of uncritical generalisation or 
extrapolation. 
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Nonetheless, it is clear from this study that certainly within the 
security intelligence structures and, given the all-embracing nature 
of the total strategy, probably within the central government 
decision-making structures as a whole, a fundamental shift in the 
locus of power has occurred. This has had important implications both 
for the style of government, and for civil-military relations in 
South Africa. 
Many commentators have suggested that what has occurred has been a 
de facto coup by the military. Not surprisingly, government spokesmen 
have been at pains to play down the influence of the military in 
central government. decision-making. In an interview during 1986, 
General Malan stated unequivocally when asked whether a coup had in 
fact taken place -
"In Suid-Afrika is die konsep van mili tere regimes 
totaal taboe. Di t is nie by ons ingeburger nie. 'n 
Mili tere regime is nie 'n oplossing vir ons probleem 
nie - di t is 'n ontwyking van ons probleem. 'n Staats-
greep is totaal on-Suicj-Afrikaans en vreemd aan ons 
geskiedenis en lewensfilosofie." (5) 
General Malan's view about the relationship between the State and the 
Defence Fore~ was equa£ly clearly expressed in the same interview -
"Ons model is die van 'n veiligheidsmag wat sy volk en 
die re~ering van die dag - maak nie saak wie die 
regering is nie - met lojali tei t moet dien en nie in 
die verleentheid stel nie." ·(5) 
Similar sentiments have also repeatedly been stated by the Chief of 
the SADF and the Chiefs of the service arms, a recent example being 
Admiral Syndercombe, in his "Message from the Chief of the Navy" in 
Navy News. (7) 
·These ~loquent dis.claimers are as predictable as they are superfi-
cial. It is true that the outward manifestations of a coup are 
absent. It is also dubious whether the SADF would be able to mount an 
effective coup given the sma11· professional component of the SADF. 
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Something like 88% of the Defence Force consists of recruits and 
members of the part-time forces; (8) to involve these people in an 
overthrow of civilian government would be risky, since the "generals" 
could never be sure of their allegiance in an exercise so 
controversial. 
If a formal coup has not happened, what precisely has occured? Is 
South Africa perhaps drifting towards the "garrison state" model 
outlined by Harold Lassell? Lasswell was, of course, writing at the 
time of the Fascist and Nazi dictatorships, but his analysis appears 
as apposite to South Africa in the 1980' s, as it was to Italy and 
Germany in the 1930's and 1940's. 
Lasswell identified five elements which characterise a "garrison 
state". First, the military authorities, or "specialists on vio-
lence", must assume power, not as a temporary phenomenon, such as 
during a war or emergency, but on a fairly permanent basis. 
Importantly, this assumption of power'must carry the blessing of the 
civil government. 
Secondly, these military rulers normally possess skills more 
traditionally associated with civil government and/or technical 
management. These skills are superimposed upon the basic training of 
the soldier making him an expert not only on violence, but on aspects 
of civil management as well. 
Thirdly, there needs to be "a deep and general sense of participation 
in the total enterprise of the state", ( 9) and for this to be 
accomplished, it will be necessary for the rulers of the garrison 
state both 'to master techniques of propaganda, as well as to promote 
the "socialisation of danger", so that all citizens become identified 
with the "destiny and mission of the state". (10) However, as 
Lasswell cynically, if .correctly, points out, "war scares that fail 
to culminate in violence eventually lose their value", (11) and it is 
then necessary to go to war, 
sturdy acquiescence in the 
thereof so richly benefit. 
in order to preserve "those virtues of 
regime", (12) from which the rulers 
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Fourthly, there needs to be discipline, consciously promoted, to 
ensure the internal cohesion of the garrison state. The most 
effective means of discipline is by early socialisation, but, 
obviously coercion is an integral part of the process. 
Finally, the rulers of the garrison state will find it necessary to 
change the fundamental principles and means by which the state is 
run. Decisions will tend to be made autocratically; democratic 
practices will fall into desuetude -
"Government will be highly centralised, though devo-
lution may be practised in order to mitigate 'bureau-
cratism'. Not only will the administrative structure be 
centralised, but at every level it will tend to 
integrate authority in a few hands." (13) 
As part of this bureaucratic political control, the rulers will have 
to have a monopoly on the dissemination and interpretation of news. 
Many of these features appear to have occurred in South Africa • 
. Military men, suitably qualified, have tended ·to assume important 
responsibilities within civil government, and this appears not merely 
to carry the blessing of elected politicians, but indeed to pave been 
facilitated by them. Moreover, by an unrelenting diet of "total 
onslaught" propaganda, the white population have become convinced 
that their security and the existence of the State are inextricably 
interw.oven. In addition, the repressive nature of the State, more 
particularly during the Emergency, has ensured that the wider 
population are, if not disciplined, then at least cowed into 
submission. Finally, as we have seen, the shift in power brought 
about by virtue of the institution of the NSMS has meant that more 
and more political decisions are made within bureaucratic forums, 
excluding thereby both traditional democratic accountability by the 
Executive to Parliament, and scrutiny by the press. 
Yet throughout Lasswell' s the.sis, he refers to military officers, or 
more broadly to "specialists on violence", as being the key actors 
\ 
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within the "gcirrison state". How would one then explain a new 
generation of civil servants from specifically non-military back-
grounds who are achieving prominence within the NSMS? One could 
refer, for example, to officials of the Department of Foreign 
Affairs, such as Neil van Heerden and David Steward. How does - one 
explain the emphasis on the welfare mode in areas which are being 
upgraded, and the back seat which many of the specialists on violence 
are having to take during these upliftment activities? 
In posing these questions, there is no attempt to deny that the 
military have become more influential·in South African politics. This 
is incontrovertibly true. This can, however, in large part be 
attributed to the fact that, as primary exponents of the concept of 
total strategy, military officers - and particularly those who had 
completed the Joint Staff Course at which the works of Beaufre were 
extensively aired - were uniquely placed to take advantage of posts 
which wer~ created when Mr Botha effected the implementation of the 
structures which General Beaufre had outlined. However, the relative 
preponderance of military personnel has declined over time, as more 
and more bureaucrats from other departments became familiar with the 
total onslaught/total strategy concepts and began to take a more 
active role in security management. 
The other indicator often advanced by the military coup advocates is 
the fact that the "specialists of violence" are numerically 
preponderant in the institutions central to the Security Management 
System, and particularly on the Secretariat. This is, however, 
probably more attributable to the fact that, as the primary 
intelligence clearing-house, the Secretariat employs more specialists 
in intelligence evaluation. As we saw, the four line departments 
involved in intelligence evaluation - the NIS, the SAP, the SADF and 
the Department of Foreign Affairs - constitute 94% of the staff 
establishment of the Secretariat. Given the chaotic state of 
intelligence evaluation which Mr Botha inherited from his prede-
cessor, it seems reasonable that he would have created institutional 
structyres which have forced these agencies to co-operate. Simply to 
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adduce as evidence of a military coup the mere membership of the 
Secretariat seems somewhat unconvincing. 
Besides, there is a great congruence between the SADF and the 
politicians. Both recognise that the "struggle" in which South Africa 
is involved cannot be won by force of arms indeed, the evidence .. 
suggests that it was the SADF which sold the 80% poli tical/20% 
military argument to Mr Botha, and through him, to the political 
establishment in South Africa. If anything, the SADF top structure 
might regard the pace of reform to be too slow; certainly, the chance 
of the SADF embarking on a right-wing counter-revolution, such as was 
attempted by the French in Algeria, is beyond the realms of 
possibility. 
It would appear, then, that the NSMS represents a more subtle and 
sophisticated phenomenon than merely a takeover by the military. When 
the National Party was returned to power in 1948, the new government 
inherited a bureaucracy which, in classic British tradition, was 
formally politically neutral. While the Government was careful to 
preserve this appearance, it set about moulding the thought-pattern 
of the civil service corps within its own ideological parameters. 
Thus, for decades after 1948, the civil service engaged itself in 
making apartheid work, and in "selling" the concept both internally 
and internationally. 
:; 
The problem was that, from the mid-1970's onwards, it became apparent 
that the ideology of apartheid was not working, nor could it be 
induced to work. This realisation became apparent to the civil 
service unevenly; those with the most exposure to world opinion (for 
example, officials in the Department of Foreign Affairs) appreciated 
it first, and the military command structure realised it after 
Angola. It became urgently necessary, therefore, to provide a new 
ideology to replac'e apartheid; an ideology, moreover, which would, 
like apartheid, guarantee continued white domination, even with a 
hostile world environment and a changed geo-poli ti cal equation in 
Southern Africa. This ideology was found in the total onslaught and 
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total strategy. It was operationalised not necessarily entirely by 
the military, but by a class of politicians and civil service 
mandarins (which initially included large numbers of SADF personnel) 
who saw in' it the potential for a much more sophisticated form of 
white domination than apartheid had been able to provide. 
The aims of this new "ideology" - if so it can be called - are as 
simple as they are ambitious. On the one hand, the total strategy, 
manifested iri the NSMS, must guarantee internal stability by a 
judicious mix of security action and socio-economic reform. On the 
other hand, it must secure regional domination for South Africa, so 
that neither the national liberation movements, nor the OAU, nor the 
Soviet Union and its allies can 
internal revolution. Thus the 
together denied the prospect 
in favour of an 
strategy hang 
outside South 
tip the balance 
two legs of the 
of invasion from 
Africa's borders, the political leadership of the internal resistance 
movements must either face 
security establishment, or 
effectively co-opt them. 
the rigours of a highly sophisticated 
else participate in structures which 
It is in the context of this paradox that the "reform" policy of Mr 
Botha's government needs to be understood. The relationship between 
political reform and the total onslaught continues to be an important 
consideration. of the security planners attached to the NSMS. The 
System, as we have seen, is designed to identify not only purely 
security problems, but also political and socio-economic problems 
which may affect security. 
It stands to reason that evaluated intelligence must show the extent 
of social and political dissatisfaction in South Africa, particularly 
amongst those communities to whom access to the central decision-
making structures has been denied. Furthermore, while the official 
view is that the organisations which most vehemently articulate these 
dissatisfactions are part of the onslaught (whether wittingly or 
not), the security planners cannot be blind to the fact that the mere 
denial of full political rights to those communities either 
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constitutes, or else has the potential to contribute to, a security 
problem which needs to be redressed. Yet, as we have argued, domestic 
political constraints demand that reform is addressed in a particular 
manner. 
General Malan has been unambiguous in stressing the need for 
political reform, without it, the war against the onslaught will be 
as good as lost. Speaking about the nature of a revolutionary war, he 
said -
"Jy verloor nooi t hierdie soort stryd mili ter nie. Jy 
verloor dit staatkundig, polities, ekonomies en op 
sulke terreine. Die mili tere of veiligheidsoptrede is 
eintlik 'n geringe deel van die stryd." ( 14) 
By contrast, when he was asked what importance the SADF attached to a 
political solution, he replied -
"Di t is die kern waarom di t draai. As daar nie 'n 
staatkundige of poli tieke oplossing moontlik is nie, 
kan die Parlement maar spreekwoordelik more sluit. 'n 
Staatkundige oplossing is die kern waarom dit draai ••• 
Jou staatkundige faktor is die bepalende faktor, terwyl 
die ekonomiese, finansi~le, militere en ander optrede 
ondergeskik is en ondersteunend bly om daardie doelwit 
te bereik." (15) 
It seems, then, that within the SADF, the necessity for a political 
solution is self-evident. The key considerations are obviously what 
kind of political solution, and in what way the political solution is 
arrived at. 
In the speeches of both Mr Botha and General Malan, there is a 
pre-occupati?n with "orderly" change. People who operate beyond the 
parameters of "orderly" change are, as we saw earlier, contributing 
towards "the revolutionary climate". According to General Malan -
"As jy revolusioner wil verander, is jy 'n radikalis of 
'n ekE!tremis. Of jy 'n linkse of 'n regse ekstremis is, 
maa_k di t nie saak nie. As jy met revolusionere geweld 
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wil verander, is di t vir die Weermag en die Veilig-
heidsmagte onaanvaarbaar ..• Die Parlement is besig met 
evolusie; evolusie wat sigbaar is. Geen drukgroepe kan 
die saak van · hervorming op die oomblik beter dien." 
(16) . ' 
Thus, the only. acceptable political activity to the SADF and, by 
implication, to the Security Management System is that which occurs 
either within Parliament or else within bodies Parliament has 
created. The total strategy demands that political change occurs in 
an orderly and evolutionary way. 
But, as we argued above, the intelligence reports which the Security 
Management System receives must demonstrate that the maximum which 
Parliamentary institutions can deliver by way of political reform is 
too little to match the aspirations of the vast majority of the 
population. This is evidently something which General Malan mis-
understands, despite his belief in· the cardinality of a political 
solution. He argues, for example -
"Die groot vraag is ook hoeveel van die swartmense 
eintlik net in die bevrediging van hulle materiele 
behoeft;es belangstel - behuising, opvoeding, werks-
geleenthede, klere, brood en better, ens. Daar is tans 
net h beperkte gedeelte wat werklik in · politieke 
deelname belangstel. Ek dink vir die massas in 
Suid-Afrika is die demokrasie nie 'n relevante faktor 
nie. Vir hulle gaan dit oor die bevrediging van hul eie 
behoeftes. Hierdie belioeftes verander van tyd tot tyd 
en word nou deur revolusioneres uitgebuit. 11 (17) 
This is a truly revealing statement, since it assumes that the only 
attraction which "·revolutionaries" have for the population is in the 
exploitation of socio-economic grievances. 
It is against these sentiments that the large-scale upliftment 
programmes, outlined earlier, have to be judged. It is often pointed 
' . ' out, correctly, that the upliftment programmes are not in themselves 
sinister. Nor can one find fault with the sincerity and patent 
dedication of the officials involved in such programmes. Many of 
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these officials see themselves as a new generation of missionaries 
whose task it is to undo the harm which Verwoerdian policy has 
caused, and to bring relief to oppressed communities. One needs, 
however, to look beyond this dedication to the political motives 
which lie behind the NSMS. The touchstone in assessing whether a 
community needs upgrading is not necessarily what the people want, 
but whether it will keep the people quiescent and therefore not 
amenable to the exploitation of "revolutionaries". 
There is, of course; a further motive, as we have seen. That is 
simply to bolster the legitimacy of constitutional structures created 
by the Nationalist government. For example, when it became clear that 
black local authorities, established in terms of the Black Local 
Aut~orities Act of 1982, were to be the only constitutional mechanism 
outside the homeland structures provided for the political aspira-
tions of the so-called "urban blacks", the broad democratic movement 
decided to boycott these authorities, and to create alternative 
structures in their place, more representative of township opinion. 
While large-scale intimidation and violence was undeniably part of 
this campaign, the Government's primary concern was not in the first 
place directed at the attendant loss of life - al though this was 
obviously gruesome - but more particularly at the challenge which 
this constituted to the. local aµthority structures themselves, and by 
implication, to the constitution as a whole. 
It was thus essential to keep the local authorities viable; if the 
councillors were, either out of fear or conviction; unwilling to 
co-operate, then council officials had to be induced to provide 
services effectively. The NSMS provided the means of providing such 
services, and thereby, of securing the legitimacy of the very 
apartheid institutions the communities were rejecting. 
The Government's strategy of "broadening democracy" is as plain as it 
is chilling. Those who co-operate within the structures which the 
Government its elf had created get handsomely rew;;trded, not neces-
sarily personally, but by means of access to resources which can then 
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be distributed, enhancing thereby not merely the politicians' 
personal reputations'· but also the advantages of co-operation per se. 
Thus, despite the apparent naivety 9f General Malan's statement, he 
and his security planners know all too well that, provided the 
repression is brutal enough and the rewards for co-operation are 
sufficiently lucrative, the absence of legitimacy by the present 
regime, or the structures it spawns, is essentially immaterial. The 
anti-apartheid community organisations, and, for that matter, the 
ANC, enjoy considerable political legitimacy amongst the disenfran-
chised population, but mere legitimacy has proved to be a poor 
substitute and weak challenge to the control exercised by the State. 
As we have seen, this control is both direct and indirect; it relies 
on straight repression and on co-option. 
What, then, are the prospects for a change in the status quo? For 
decades, international commentators in particular have hopefully and 
yet confidently predicted the imminent collapse of the apartheid 
regime, only to be confounded by its apparent durability. One of the 
few sober correspondents was Johnson, who, writing in the heady 
post-Soweto days, ventured to predict (at the same time as others 
such as Legum, (18) were making five-minutes-to-midnight prognosti~ 
cations) that -
"To put it bluntly : if the Pretoria regime adopts a 
sufficiently .ruthless and brutal policy at home it may 
be able to repress black rebellion well into the 
twenty-first century." (19) 
Undoubtedly, he was one of the more prescient observers, and 
undoubtedly the NSMS.provided the vehicle through which the "ruthless 
and brutal policy" could be carried out. 
Yet the regime does have its vulnerabilities. Chief amongst these is 
its inabili~y to wage war both internally and externally at the same 
time. (Johnson was careful to stress that "Pretoria" should not, 
under any circumstances, commit its forces outside its borders). The 
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reason for this is obvious. The SADF relies very heavily on white 
con5criptees for its manpower provisioning, and as a source of 
manpower, the w.hi te group is at best dymographically static. Indeed, 
if ~urrent tendencies are anything to go by, the birthrate of whites 
is actually declining;. added to this is the fact that more whites are 
emigrating than are settling in the country. 
A counter-revolutionary war de_mands vast reservoirs of manpower, and, 
faced with ~his declining source of recruitment, one might expect the 
regime to become more and more vulnerable as a result. Yet the 
prospects of a successful guerilla war are by no means certain. South 
Africa i.s not Vietnam or even Mozambique, where the terrain lent 
itself to the prosecution of a guerilla war~ Nor is the SADF the US 
Army or that of Portugal, whose conscripts were waging a war on 
for.eign territory with a conspicuous lack of enthusiasm. The SADF has 
been waging a counter-revolutionary war in northern South West 
Africa/Namibia for twenty years without SWAPO, its chief adversary, 
being able to set up an alternative administration in any part of 
that territory .. What is more, the SADF is able to refine its 
operational strategies and to test its equipment in that war, with 
the consequence that if the theatre of war was to change to (say) the 
northern Transvaal or northern Natal, it would be able to field 
highly experienced commanders and battle-tested equipment against 
cadres who, however well-motivated, would be comparative novices. 
However, as we saw, it is implicit in Beaufre's thesis of an exterior 
counter-manoeuvre that one's enemies should not be permitted to 
engage one on one's own territory. The total strategy, by integrating 
defence and foreign policy, has been able to shape a regional 
response to the problem of infiltration - one which has popularly 
become known as destabilisation. 
It g9es beyond the scope of this study to chronicle the development 
of the destabilisation policy in any depth. Other scholars, notably 
Geldenhuys, Price, Jenkins and Davies and 0 'Meara, have done so in 
commendable detail. (20) However, a persistent flaw in some accounts 
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of the destabilisation controversy -. particularly as reflected, for 
example, :j.n Parliamentary debates - is the conclusion that a 
semi-permanent .conflict exists between the "hawks" ·in government 
(broadly represented by the military) and the "doves" (the staff of 
the Department of Foreign Affairs). We have sketched at some length 
the rise and current preponderance of the military in central 
decision-making structures under Mr P W Botha, and it is true that 
the mi,li tary typically have a more blunt approach to the resolution 
of foreign policy problems, but this. approach is only half valid. It 
assumes that central government decision-making is ad hoc and 
unco-ordinated, which, as we have seen, is very far from being the 
case. Mr Botha likes precise determination of policies and he demands 
that they be carried through exactly as planned. He has, furthermore, 
created tne institutional framework which allows this co-ordination 
and execution to occur. 
In part, the confusion about the roles of the institutional actors 
derives from confusion about the goals which the policy afms to 
achieve. The goal is very simple - regional domination of the 
sub-continent - and this goal has remained substantially unchanged 
since Verwoerd's days. What distinguishes the era of total strategy 
under Mr Botha from t~at of his predecessors, is that despite a very 
different geo-political equation, the same results have been able to 
be achieved. 
Regional domination' has been necessary to achieve some very specific 
policy objectives. Firstly and foremostly, it is designed to create a 
series of politically compliant buffer states to the north of South 
Africa, with the objective of preventing, or at least vastly 
complicating,, the infiltration of · ANC/PAC guerillas through these 
states to the South African hinterland. To be sure, there are other 
obj~citives, too; stemming the tide of communism, fulfilling the role 
of regional Leviathan, creating a Constellation of Southern African 
states and so on, , but the primary goal, if and when successful, 
ens).lres that the security forces can deal with internal threats to 
the ~tatus quo without a simultaneous threat of terrorist infiltra-
tion. 
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This policy, too, has been conspicuously successful. The formal 
non-aggression pacts concluded with the Kingdom of Swaziland in 1982 
and the Peoples' Republic of Mozambique in 1984; the collapse of the 
Jonathan regime in Lesot,ho after a mere 19 days of economic blockade, 
and the continued support of the UNITA movement in southern Angola, 
at vast cost to the government of that country, point to the 
single-handed determination by the Botha government to achieve 
regional domination and their success in achieving it. Even 
front-line states hitherto spared large-scale destablisation 
the 
(al-
though sufficient isolated events have occured to suggest a 
malevolent pattern), such as Zimbabwe and Botswana have been at pains 
to stress that their territory is not used for guerilla incursions 
into South Africa. 
This tends to suggest a superficial durability of the apartheid 
regime. Up to a point, this must be true. Bolstered by an internal 
security manageme'nt system which simultaneously co-opts clients and 
cows critics and pushes sources of infiltration far from its borders, 
the regime is indisputably secure in the short and even medium term. 
Yet, there are weaknesses. 
First, from a pragmatic point of view, the NSMS - both in its 
internal and external dimensions is inordinately expensive. 
Upgrading a deprived township is as expensive an operation as the 
development of a new generation of armoured car; the one is essential 
to "win the hearts and' minds" while the other is necessary to keep 
the front-line states in thrall. Ultimately - inflation notwi th-
standing - there is a limit on the amount of taxation which can be 
imposed on what is a relatively small weal th-producing base, and, 
while there are undoubted savings that can be effected within the 
context of a siege economy, the· Government will eventually have to 
face the classic dilemma of opting for either guns or butter, but not 
both simultaneously. 
Secondly, as we argued earlier, the South African government is 
critically short of legitimacy. What legitimacy it does accrue, comes 
from the majority of the whites, who see in it the vehicle which will 
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guarantee their continued survival, identity, prosperity and pri vi-
lege. Should the Government fail to del.iver these qualities, or 
should the costs (say, in taxation used for upliftment operations), 
outweigh perceived benefits, .one might expect the white electorate to 
opt, in increasing numbers, 'for a right-wing alternative whose appeal 
is more simple and more direct. Merely the perceived possibility of 
this occurring might induce the politicians to: resort to more basiC, 
cheaper, but ultimately less effective, forms of repression. 
' -
Thirdly, the international context within which the South African 
government operates, and in terms of which it has to trade, continue 
to deteriorate markedly. While it tends to be true that, under 
conditions of enforced protectionism, most reasonably divE'lrsified 
economies experience a short-lived boom, the ultimate effect of 
tolerably comprehensive sanctions is a shrinking productive base, 
increased unemployment, and consequentially, less state revenue. 
Fourthly, the sheer weight of numbers militate against a minority 
regime being able to rule effectively in the ~ace of popular dissent. 
However effective the regime might be in co-opting and intimidating, 
the vastness of the demographic imbalance is such as to suggest that 
ungovernabili ty will occur, not necessarily as a coherent revolu-
tionary strategy, but more plausibly because there will simply not be 
sufficient manpower to exercise effective internal and external 
domination. 
These factors cumulatively suggest a scenario of degenerative 
collapse. This implies an increasingly desperate, and probably 
vicious, regime faced with a series of worsening and seemingly 
insoluble political crises. While the NSMS, in both its internal and 
sub-regional aspects, is likely to win the regime breathing-space, it 
seems highly unlikely that the politic al system will be able to 
deliver the type of political reform which would win it, on a 
permanent and durable basis, the very "hearts and minds" which the 
Security Management System is intended to secure. 
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